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Dear Dr. Fletcher:
The enclosed document is the Aerospace Safety Advisory Paneli'S (ASAP) annual report
to the NASA Administrator.:: This report provides you with our findings, conclusions
and recommendations regarding the National Space Transportation System (NSTS), the
Space Station Freedom Program (SSFP), aeronautical projects and other areas of
NASA activities. The period covered is from February 1988 through January 1989.
This letter provides an overview of ASAP's findings and recommendations. The ASAP
requests that NASA respond only to Section II, "Findings and Recommendations" and
to the "Open" items noted in Section 1V.B "NASA Response to Panel Annual Report."
The effort associated with the STS recovery program following the Challenger
accident was one of the most intensive tasks that NASA has ever undertaken. This led
to two successful missions, STS-26 and -27 conducted September 29 - October 2 and
December 2-6, 1988 respectively. These flights and the management by NASA of the
effort that led to these successful missions has started NASA well on its way to
recover the momentum that is necessary for the U.S. space program.
The main focus of the ASAP during 1988 has been monitoring and advising NASA and
its contractors on the STS recovery program. NASA efforts have restored the flight
program with a much better management organization, safety and quality assurance
organizations, and management communication system.
The ASAP believes that the orientation of current NASA activities will result in NSTS
operations that are of significantly lower risk than thoge prior to the Challenger
accident. Nevertheless we still consider the NSTS an inherently high-risk endeavor.
The present management organization with its greater emphasis on safety and quality
assurance and communications should be nurtured by all means possible.
The NASA NSTS organization in conjunction with its prime contractors should be
encouraged to continue development and incorporation of appropriate design and
operational improvements which will further reduce risk. The data from each Shuttle
flight should be used to determine if affordable design and/or operational
improvements could further increase safety. The review of Critical Items (CILs),
Failure Mode Effects and Analyses (FMEAs) and Hazard Analyses (HAs) after the
Challenger accident has given the program a massive data base with which to establish
a formal program with prioritized changes.
The ASAPviews asvery important the incorporation of a LaunchApproval focal point,
Deputy NASA Director for Operations, (Captain Robert Crippen) in the NSTS
organization. The positive result of this was noted during our observation of the
Flight ReadinessReview processesand the "go" for launchof both STS-26and -27. As
the launch rate increases,this official will comeunder increasingpressureto relax the
strict observanceof launch criteria in order to meet schedules. It is imperative that
this key Director of Operations continues to receive full support from NASA
management. The ASAPwill monitor this effort closely.
Now turning to morespecific commentswe offer the following:
The Office of Safety, Reliability, Maintainability and Quality Assurance (SRM&QA)
The establishment of the Office of Safety, Reliability, Maintainability and Quality
Assurance headed by an Associate Administrator reporting directly to the NASA
Administrator was a positive major change. This organization, under George Rodney,
has come a long way toward providing an essentially independent certification
authority within NASA. The success of this organization in the future will depend to a
large extent on the backing and support it receives from NASA management. It should
be manned with skill levels equal to those which exist in other NASA technical and
program organizations. The SRM&QA personnel now are among those having authority
and responsibility to "sign-off" or certify design reviews, test plans and test results,
and launch criteria and approval. With the proper manning of the SRM&QA
organization these approvals will go a long way toward ensuring that every waiver gets
the proper attention. The ASAP considers monitoring the effectiveness of the
SRM&QA organization one of its prime responsibilities.
Space Shuttle Design Safety Reviews
Prior to the launch of the Orbiter Discovery (STS-26), NASA conducted a complete
review of the External Tank, Solid Rocket Boosters, Space Shuttle Main Engines,
Orbiter, Launch Processing System and their many components. Extensive resources
were devoted to these essential activities to support the decision to return to flight
status. Failure Modes and Effects Analyses, Critical Item Lists, and Hazard Analyses
were rebaselined and expanded. The in-depth review process resulted in a large
number of changes to the Shuttle elements (e.g., 226 modifications to the Orbiter
alone). All previous waivers were cancelled, and new waivers were granted as
required only after careful analysis and assessment.
The result of this process was a Space Shuttle that has successfully returned to
flight. It also yielded a much clearer understanding of the many risks and safety
margins built into the present system. This understanding, in turn, has led each of the
program elements to identify modifications which would further reduce risk and
improve safety. A list of some of these modifications which the ASAP believes
warrant inclusion in the Space Shuttle System as soon as practical is contained in
Table I. What is needed now is a program to prioritize the remaining risks by using the
"data bank" developed from the post-Challenger review. This prioritization of
continuing safety improvements should take advantage of risk analysis techniques
which are available.
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Advanced Solid Rocket Motor (ASRM)
The continuous program to increase the safety and reliability of the current solid
rocket motors which will be used for the foreseeable future raises the question as to
the wisdom of proceeding with the procurement of a new solid rocket motor which, by
the time it is introduced, will have less proven and documented safety and reliability
features than the current Redesigned Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM). The ASAP
recommends that NASA reconsider its intention to procure the ASRM because for a
small and questionable increase in reliability over the continually improved RSRM it
will command large expenditures which should better be directed towards the
improvement of the STS's overall safety. Furthermore, as NASA has not yet decided
on those steps it will take regarding Space Shuttle and Expendable Launch Vehicle
evolutionary development, it would be prudent to delay the ASRM decision until these
future launch vehicle decisions are made. Among the things that should be included in
this evaluation are an independent risk assessment and the possible replacement of the
solid motors with liquid rocket boosters.
Lessons Learned and Their Application
The present management, communications and quality assurance systems of the STS
should be maintained and strengthened and under no circumstances should backsliding
toward the systemic problems which existed prior to the Challenger accident be
permitted. Complacency must be avoided, and a strong, competent and authoritative
systems engineering and integration function must be maintained. Each new flight
should incorporate those system, component, and operational changes which have been
demonstrated by previous flights to be needed for the enhancement of safety. At no
point should the STS be declared to be an operational system in the routine sense. The
risk level of STS operations will always be high.
Space Station Freedom Program (SSFP)
The ASAP has increased its activities on the Space Station since our last report. The
Space Station program has reached a more defined state, thereby allowing the ASAP
to offer more specific commentary.
We have a basic concern that many of the problems that occurred in the STS program
may recur in the Space Station because of the lack of clean cut interfaces, lines of
responsibility and communications. The ASAP urges NASA to continue to examine the
Space Station organization and interfaces to take advantage of the lessons learned
that led to the current STS program structure.
In 1988, a committee headed by General Sam Phillips recommended that NASA
establish a Space Station Freedom management structure featuring a fully
authoritative program office (Level II) co-located with and operating under the
direction of the Associate Administrator for .the Office of Space Station (Level I).
This program office has been established and located at Reston, VA, for lack of office
space at NASA Headquarters. The rationale for the recommendation was to establish
a strong program office that could direct and control the design, development,
certification and operational activities of the NASA centers assigned these different
responsibilities.
The program office in Reston, while attempting to implement its responsibilities, has
not utilized its systems engineering and integration support contractor effectively, is
currently understaffed and appears to be encountering some difficulty in effectively
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directing and monitoring the work at the centers. It is additionally burdened with
intra-program office administrative tasks occasioned by its separation from the
Headquarters complex.
The ASAP recommends that NASA Headquarters closely monitor the performance of
the Space Station Freedom management structure and provide the necessary resources
and support for effective leadership and management of the SSFP.
Space Shuttle Launch Rate
The ASAP is concerned about NASA's ability to maintain the currently manifested
launch rate required for assembly of the Space Station Freedom. Depending upon the
Space Shuttle alone to accomplish this task is risky. The use of expendable launch
vehicles (ELVs) could alleviate pressure to achieve overly optimistic flight rates for
the Space Shuttle.
We recognize the severe budget pressures and difficult choices involved in carrying
out many of our recommendations. Program managers have to make certain that
funds under their control are not wasted on inefficient or unnecessary activities. Top
NASA management has to determine a clear sense of priority in apportioning available
funds while vesting managers with authority to execute programs and holding them
responsible and accountable. As Congress plays a role, they should provide NASA with
greater flexibility to manage programs efficiently by avoiding micro-management but
holding NASA accountable for its stewardship. Finally, it is hoped that the
Administration and Office of Management and Budget will recognize that nothing is so
costly as short-sighted efforts to sustain a cut-rate, bargain-basement space
program. Expenditures made in a timely manner to achieve desirable objectives
almost always turn out to be the most cost-effective spending possible.
The task of having restored the Space Shuttle to flight status should be viewed as the
beginning rather than the end of the improvement process. NASA should now take
advantage of the output of its many reviews to enhance further the safety of the
Space Shuttle system. This can best be accomplished by embarking on a vigorous
program of product improvement aimed at those design areas where analysis has
shown that significant reduction of risk can be achieved at reasonable costs.
It has been our pleasure to work with the dedicated people of NASA and its
contractors during this past year. We look forward to further NASA successes in 1989
and truly appreciate your continued support.
Sincerely,
Jgoseph F. Sutter
Chairman
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
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TABLE I
TYPICAL SPACE SHUTTLE SAFETY ENHANCEMENTS
ELEMEN_ENHANCEMENT
SSME:
. High Pressure Oxygen Turbopump
bearings show excessive wear,
improve design and installation.
. Install the 2-duct hot gas manifold to
"unload" the internal components of
the SSME.
. Use of the enlarged throat diameter
to "unload" all parts of the SSME,
particularly the pumps.
4. Use of single-crystal turbine blades.
. SSME needs a degree of redesign to
both reduce welds and to make welds
totally inspectable.
SRB/SRM:
. Attend to the recommendations of the
NRC (Dr. Stever) SRB Redesign
Review Panel.
. Locking feature for nozzle leak check
port plugs.
.
4.
One-piece case stiffener rings.
Non-asbestos motor insulation.
.
.
Lightning protection enhancement for
case and nozzle.
Aft skirt structural modification.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
4.
.
.
SAFETY REASON
Potential for failure in a liquid oxygen
environment.
Smoothing the flow profile reduces
lateral pressure differentials and
consequent material cracking.
Lower internal operating environment
thereby provide greater safety
margins and longer life.
Increase blade life and structural
margins.
For example, the internal heat
exchanger has always been a source of
concern because of weldments. A
"single-tube" HX design eliminates
some welds and makes others
inspectable.
Continue to enhance RSRM safety,
reliability and performance. Final
report Dec. 21, 1988.
Prevent plugs from allowing gas flow
during propellant burn. Increase
structural margins.
Increase structural margins.
Personnel safety and meet OSHA
standards.
Environmental hazard reduction.
Increase margins to enhance RSRM
safety, reliability and performance.
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TABLE I Continued
ET:
1.
ELEMEN_ENHANCEMENT
Upgrade Liquid Hydrogen and Oxygen
temperature, pressure and liquid level
sensors.
2. Upgrade thermal insulation on areas
where dislodged insulation can affect
the Orbiter.
3. Corrosion prevention methods should
be investigated to preclude structural
problems.
ORBITER:
1. Structural modifications to eliminate
negative margins.
o Upgrade of the auxiliary power units
(APUs).
. Nose Wheel steering redundancy,
possible extension of the nose wheel
strut.
. Elimination of Kapton electrical wire
insulation.
. Upgrade of valves and regulators to
preclude leakage of fuels and
oxidizers.
LAUNCH PROCESSING:
.
.
Personnel exposure to toxic materials
during ferry flights, OPF/VAB/Pad
processing.
Hardware Interface Module (HIM) card
upgrade (circuit boards) for restart
commands for ground equipment, GH 2
fire detectors.
. Eliminate single failure points on
Firex systems.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
SAFETY REASON
Structural integrity and performance
are dependent upon sensor data.
Protect the Orbiter thermal
protection tiles from damage.
ETs are stored for long periods and
must maintain structural integrity.
Tail, wings, aft fuselage and mid-body
should be brought up to specification
and ability to meet expected flight
envelope.
Preclude dangers associated with
turbine blade cracking, fuel
decomposition/fire and so on.
Landing-rollout steering effec-
tiveness, reducing loads on landing
gear system.
Reduce fire hazard.
Fire and performance degradation.
Upgrade of ground detectors and aging
equipment and facilities.
Prevent hazardous processing
situations.
Prevent hazardous processing
situations.
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IINTRODUCTION
The STS-26 and -27 missions are strong
indications that the massive effort put forth by
NASA and its many contractors has produced a
safer and more reliable ground and flight Space
Transportation System (STS). This does not,
however, eliminate the inherent risks associated
with manned space flight which are noted in the
Mission Safety Assessment documentation. This
means that NASA and its contractors must
maintain a vigilance over its many operations to
assure that complacency does not overtake
either management or the "hands-off' operators.
The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
(ASAP) continues to examine many critical
aspects of programs and projects dealing with
both aeronautics and space (manned and
unmanned) in a manner which provides timely
and, we hope, useful information to enhance
safety, quality and performance. The ASAP has
conducted in excess of 60 factfinding sessions
during this reporting period of February 1988 to
January 1989. As noted in last year's report,
the ASAP members and consultants were active
participants in outside review panels (including
the National Research Council) established to
examine the STS Solid Rocket Booster/Motor.
The ASAP has provided testimony during con-
gressional hearings and has made wide distribu-
tion of its annual report (in all approximately
2,100 copies).
During the 21/2Year period prior to STS-26,
the ASAP spent the major portion of its
resources on supporting the return-to-flight
activities. Nonetheless, the ASAP has already
begun placing additional emphasis on the Space
Station Freedom Program (SSFP) and its
interfaces with the STS. Panel members have
been participating in System Safety
meetings/reviews as well as meeting with SSFP
personnel at NASA centers (JSC, KSC, MSFC).
There is more time allocated to examining the
role of management in major manned space
flight programs and the impact of resource
restrictions on both maintaining as well as
enhancing the safety of flight.
The primary areas of interest in the
aeronautical disciplines at NASA have been, as
before, the management of the safety of flight
programs at Headquarters and at the Centers,
and specific areas of research and development
as they relate to the safety of design, test and
research flight.
As of January 1988 there have been two
changes in ASAP consultants: Dr. Walter W.
Williams, former NASA Chief Engineer and
Consultant to the NASA Administrator, has
been brought onboard, and Herbert E. Grier, a
former ASAP member and a consultant for
some years has retired.
John G. Stewart (Tennessee Valley
Authority) recused himself from the Panel's
consideration of the Advanced Solid Rocket
Motor (ASRM) project and therefore has not
participated in the Panel's recommendations on
this subject.
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FINDINGS AND
II
RECOMMENDAT IONS
A,NationalSpaceTransportationSystem(NSTS/STS)
a. F/ndfng: Strengthening the role of
NASA Headquarters (Level I) and STS program
management (Level II), coupled with tighter
management and budgetary controls over
NASA's R&D Centers (Level III), has clarified
responsibilities within the total STS program
and strengthened authority and accountability
at all levels. Of special importance is the
position of Deputy Director (NSTS) for Opera-
tions as the focal point of the highly complex
shuttle processing and launch activities at the
Kennedy Space Center.
Recommendation: It is essential that this
more disciplined management structure--
characterized by clear lines of authority,
responsibility and accountability--continue in
place once the launch rate accelerates in order
to support NASA's commitment to the operating
principle of "Safety first; schedule second."
b. Finding: The Safety, Reliability, Main-
tainability and Quality Assurance (SRM&QA)
function is now stronger, more visible, better
staffed and better funded since establishment
of the position of the Office of Associate
Administrator for SRM&QA which reports
directly to the Administrator. The Panel notes
that the incumbent, George Rodney, is a part of
the key decision loops and has established the
beginnings of an essentially independent "certi-
fication" process within NASA. However, there
is recent evidence that budgetary pressures
within the Shuttle program are causing project
directors to propose budget cuts in various
SRM&QA activities (e.g., safety documentation
associated with the Space Shuttle Main Engine,
such as FMEA/CILs and Hazard Analyses, and
oversight of major STS projects.)
Recommendation: Across-the-board bud-
get cuts that jeopardize the recently strength-
ened SRM&QA function must be denied. Fund-
ing to maintain essential safety-related docu-
mentation of STS systems must be provided.
e. Ffndfng: Management communications,
a necessary component in achieving a successful
STS program, have improved, both horizontally
and vertically within NASA. In particular, the
reinstatement of the Management Council, an
entity that fosters direct and regular communi-
cation among all top STS managers and center
directors, has brought a higher level of aware-
ness of common problems and coordinated
action to resolve them. This, in turn, has
resulted in better informed and effective design
certification reviews (DCRs) and flight readi-
ness reviews (FRRs).
Recommendation: As the flight rate
increases, greater attention to maintaining
these improved communication channels will be
required.
& Ffad/ng: NASA, along with many other
Federal agencies, has suffered through more
than a decade of hostility directed toward
Federal employees and a related failure to
maintain salary comparability at the higher
management levels. NASA urgently needs
greater flexibility and resources in competing
for and retaining the skilled personnel who are
required to carry forward the Nation's space
and aeronautical programs.
Recommendation: Although the salary
comparability question will be settled by the
Administration and Congress, NASA should
speak out clearly about the increasing costs of
the present situation and the specific steps that
are needed to once again make NASA careers
among the most desirable and respected.
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F/nd/ng: To ascertain the nature of efforts
to enhance the safety of the NSTS through
upgrading of the five elements (Orbiter,
External Tank, Solid Rocket Motor/Booster,
Space Shuttle Main Engines, and the Launch and
Landing Processing System) the ASAP requested
compilations of such improvements from both
NASA centers and their prime contractors.
These lists are shown in Appendix IV.D. which
only cover currently recommended changes for
reliability and flight and ground safety beyond
those installed for STS-26. Other such changes
may reveal themselves as the program
progresses.
Reeommendation: These lists, and other
changes as they are identified, should be priori-
tized based on attributes of safety enhancement
(severity and consequence), cost, schedule and
performance. This prioritizing should use the
data bank developed as a result of the post-
Challenger reviews and the results of the mis-
sions from STS-26 and on. Advantage should be
taken of risk analysis techniques.
Ffndfng: NASA's decision to procure the
Advanced Solid Rocket Motor (ASRM) is based
on the premise that the new motor will benefit
from advanced solid rocket motor technology
and new manufacturing methods and thus would
evolve into a safer and more reliable motor
than the current redesigned solid rocket motor
(RSRM).
On the basis of safety and reliability alone
it is questionable whether the ASRM would be
superior to the RSRM which has undergone
extensive design changes until the ASRM has a
similar background of testing and flight experi-
ence. This may take as long as 10 years from
go-ahead. In the interim, the current design is
expected to have had over 160 additional firings
prior to the introduction of the ASRM.
Furthermore, it is not evident why the new
manufacturing processes planned for the ASRM
cannot be applied to the manufacture and
assembly of the RSRM. Consequently, it is not
clear to the ASAP why NASA is proceeding with
its plan to develop a new and expensive solid
rocket motor, especially as there are still many
elements of the STS system which, if modified
or replaced, would add significantly to the
safety of the operation. Furthermore, NASA
has not thoroughly evaluated other alternative
choices to the ASRM such as liquid rocket
boosters.
Recommendation: The ASAP recommends
that NASA review its decision to procure the
Advanced Solid Rocket Motor and postpone any
action until other alternatives, including con-
sideration of long range objectives for future
launch requirements have been thoroughly
evaluated.
Ff_dfng: A review of the development of
the overall logistics and support systems for the
STS shows a very satisfactory trend. Full
advantage has been taken of the "stand-down
time" resulting from the STS-51L accident.
Especially noteworthy is the movement of key
Rockwell personnel to the KSC area and the
enhancement of direct control of the logistics
program right up to the launch pad itself. The
NASA-KSC logistics organization has made
great strides in facilities, equipment and inven-
tory and has been aided immeasurably in this
task by protection against having its funds
occasionally diverted to other STS areas, as was
the case in earlier years. There appears now to
be excellent liaison between top management of
NASA-KSC and Rockwell-Downey and a real
spirit of cooperation is observable at this level
which has permeated down to the ranks.
There are, however, areas still in need of
attention: (1) the control of all STS logistics is
not centralized at KSC, and (2) the repair pipe-
line turnaround time is much too long to support
the program.
Recommendation: Continue the good
work. Focus efforts on the need to improve
overhaul and repair turnaround time, and the
integration of all STS logistics programs in one
place--KSC.
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a. Redesigned Solid Rocket Motor/Booster
(SRM/SRB)
(1) Ffndfng: The redesigned solid rocket
booster is more reliable than those used through
the STS-51L mission. A number of significant
areas of continuing concern were identified
during redesign and testing of the new booster.
These included the following:
(a) the need to eliminate possible
voids and blow holes in the polysulfide adhesive-
ly bonded case-to-nozzle joint;
(b) a better characterization of the
materials used in the internal nozzle ablative
composite parts;
(c) the need to prevent the accumu-
lation of slag, which plugs cowl vent holes
during tail-off burning, resulting in adverse
differential pressure across the nozzle flexible
boot;
(d) the need to develop a resiliant O-
ring material (temperature compatible) for
primary and secondary seals in order to elimi-
nate the required field joint heaters; and
(e) the need to conduct a structural
analysis in order to determine the criteria for
safe reuse of rocket motor case segments.
Recommendation: NASA should develop a
program based upon the items listed above and
other significant items to improve the solid
rocket motors/boosters and further reduce risk.
(2) Ffadfag: The booster aft skirt failed on
STA-3 static structural test article at 128¢ of
limit load. This is below the required factor of
safety of 140¢ (1.4 over limit load).
Recommendation: Perform tests to deter-
mine the effect of various loadings and provide
fixes needed to meet the original design
requirements.
b. External Tank (ET)
Ffndfng: There have been numerous
failures of various sensing devices for liquid
levels, temperature and pressure on both the
hydrogen and oxygen tank systems. Many of
these measurements are used in launch commit
criteria and are required during flight.
Recommendation: NASA needs a coordi-
nated effort to resolve the cause of these many
sensor problems and should take the necessary
actions to remedy this situation.
e. Orbiter
(1) Ffadfag: Upon completion of the 6.0
loads/stress analysis it was determined that
negative margins of safety existed in the
Orbiter structure. In order to launch STS-26
and subsequent missions it was necessary to
reduce the design flight envelope to such an
extent that the probability of launch was con-
siderably below the original target of 95_.
Recommendation: If NASA desires to
attain the originally specified high probability
of launch they should implement the identified
structural modifications (structural area of the
wings, fuselage and vertical tail).
(2) Ffadfag: The current General Purpose
Computer (GPC) flying on the Orbiter is built
upon very old, outdated technology and is a
limiting factor in Shuttle operations (due to
memory limitations, among other things). It
will be increasingly difficult to maintain
because parts for the older technology will
become increasingly difficult to obtain. The
GPC needs to be upgraded as soon as possible.
NASA has been working on a replacement cen-
tral processing unit for at least 5 years now,
and use of the new processor is still not sched-
uled until 1991. The sooner that the upgrade is
completed, the sooner advanced applications
programs can be placed in the computer system.
Though the new GPC has been tested
extensively in the laboratory, there are no
flight tests scheduled for the new processor.
Recommendation: NASA should plan at
least one flight test with the new GPCs carried
as a test payload and used throughout the flight
in a test mode. The computers should be used
in as close to an actual flight mode as possible,
including sensor inputs if that can be done,
except, however, that the new GPCs should not
be in line with any actual control outputs. This
test should be performed and the upgrade
completed as soon as possible.
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d. Space Shuttle Matin Engines (S M s)
Finding: The engines used for the success-
ful STS-26 flight incorporated 39 changes.
Extensive certification testing was carried out
on these changes with excellent success on all
of the most critical items with the exception of
the High Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump (HPOTP)
bearings. The data indicates that the various
cracking problems in the turbopump blades have
been resolved. Limited testing on a large-
diameter throat engine (0208) showed major
reductions in various engine stress environ-
ments. A two duct (vs current three-duct) hot
gas manifold power head was completed and
made ready for testing at year end. A complete
structural audit, a detail assessment of all key
welds on the engine, and a thorough failure
trend analysis were also completed in 1988.
Evaluation of a reliability model for the SSME
was continued.
Recommendatfon: The contractor should
continue work to provide a high pressure oxygen
turbopump (HPOTP) bearing having better
margins to prevent failures due to wear and to
provide longer cycle life. The two-duct power
head and the large throat combustion chamber
should be vigorously pursued and certified as
rapidly as possible.
e. Launch, Landing, and Mission Operations
Finding: As the flight schedule picks up in
FY 1989, there remains the clear and present
danger of slipping back into the operating
environment at KSC that helped to contribute
to the Challenger accident. At the same time,
the need to achieve greater efficiency and cost-
effectiveness in turnaround procedures is
clear. In this situation, NASA's commitment to
the operating principle of "Safety first; sched-
ule second" must be retained. If experience of
the past is a guide to the future, the pressures
to maintain or increase flight rate will be
intense.
Recommendation: NASA must resist the
schedule pressures that can compromise safety
during launch operations. This requires strong
enforcement by NASA of the directives govern-
ing STS operations.
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B,SpaceStationFreedomPr0gTam(SSFP)
a. Ffndfng: The Space Station Freedom
Program (SSFP) has an extremely complex
organizational structure which includes a pro-
gram support contractor (PSC) with system
engineering and integration (SE&I) capability.
NASA has not utilized this program support
contractor effectively.
Recammendatfon" NASA should ensure
that the SSFP has a strong, competent systems
engineering and integration team with the
responsibility and authority to pull all of the
various parts of the program together.
d. Ffndfng: The number of interfaces,
across which designs must be consistent, is very
large. The responsibilities for defining design
requirements to span these interfaces are not
clear. This may lead, at best, to the need to
backtrack in the design effort and, at worst, to
the omission of a safety critical element.
Recom mendatfon: SSFP management
should clearly define the interface responsibili-
ties for design definition as soon as possible.
This will help ensure that each item is
addressed as the design work progresses because
the cognizant center, work package or design
office will be aware of its role in the definition.
b. Ffndfng: There are semantic and defini-
tional differences across the international
partners and, perhaps, even the work packa-
ges. There is also an abundance of new acro-
nyms being used. Some of these are a re-
definition of acronyms used on previous NASA
programs. As a result, there is great potential
for confusion.
a. Ffnd/ng: The level of activity of the
SR&QA program for the SSFP appears low
considering the complexity of the system
design, integration and operational problems. A
human factors function is not evident in the
program's organizational structure.
Recommendatfon: NASA should ensure
that there are commonly accepted definitions
for key terms and acronyms. Where common-
ality is not possible, corresponding lists should
be developed and widely disseminated. Con-
tinuing control over this process is required
throughout the life of the SSFP.
c. F_db-tg: Some of the international
partners have difficulty following discussions in
English at the numerous working meetings. This
limits their ability to make contributions and
leads to the possibility of misunderstandings.
Recommendation: Interpreters should be
available at all meetings attended by interna-
tional partners who have difficulty keeping pace
with the English proceedings. The SSFP should
make sure that it has ready access to document
translators for sending and receiving meeting
minutes, letters of clarification and project
me moranda.
Recommendation: Management should
make sure that the resources applied to SR&QA
activities are commensurate with the need. An
identifiable human factors function at Level II
should be established and should be tasked with
key relevant issues. The SR&QA activity must
maintain its independence of operation and not
be subordinated within the program.
bo Finding: The Safety Summit process
started in February 1988 has shown the poten-
tial to make a marked improvement in the
depth and breadth of the program's safety
function. This process is being conducted
despite a lack of a charter, which is needed to
formalize its activity.
Recommendatfon: The Safety Summit
process should be made formal through approval
of a charter specifically delineating its func-
tions and responsibilities.
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a. Finding: The SSFP design as baselined
still does not include a specific "lifeboat" or
crew emergency rescue vehicle (CERV). It is
not clear whether NASA has given up on provid-
ing this capability or still has the issue under
study.
Recommendation: The Panel has stated
previously: "that a single purpose crew rescue
vehicle or lifeboat should be an essential part of
the Space Station's design."
b. Finding: The design philosophy for the
caution and warning system (CWS) as embodied
in NASA-STD-30000 does not provide sufficient
guidance for establishing the precedence that
the CWS should have in the design hierarchy. It
also dictates a classification system which may
not be best for the unique mission of the SSFP.
Recommendatfon: The CWS system design
should be given primary status among all SSFP
signaling and information systems.
c. Finding-The Software Support Envi-
ronment (SSE) being developed as the Station's
primary software development tool appears
excellent. It does, however, lack a provision for
making safety checks of software as it is being
developed. The SSE design process also does
not include an independent validation and
verification (IV&V) of the SSE itself.
Recommendation: The SSE development
program should be modified to incorporate both
IV&V of the SSE and functional checks of the
safety and reliability of the software developed
using the SSE.
d. Finding- There have been many good
"preliminary" or "quick look" studies performed
to support SSFP preliminary design activities.
These studies often involve broad assumptions
which are used to fix certain items while others
are varied. This is an excellent approach.
History tells us it is important to document the
extent and nature of these assumptions very
clearly. This will minimize the possibility that
people reading these studies in the future will
mistake areas not examined for those examined
and excluded as potential problems.
Reeommendatfon: The SSFP management
should develop and disseminate a standard
policy for documentation of assumptions in
preliminary studies. This policy should clearly
differentiate among things assumed and not
studied, items given a partial examination, and
those studied fully.
e. Ffnding: It is understood that consi-
deration is being given to expanding experi-
ments or the storage of experimental gear into
the nodes. This would make them essentially
undifferentiated from the attached modules
with respect to safety considerations.
Reeom mendathm: SSFP management
should establish a policy on node use as soon as
possible. However, since there will always be
the possibility that the nodes will be used for
experimental or storage purposes, they should
receive the same safety scrutiny as the remain-
der of the Station.
f. Finding: The baseline design does not
include a provision for cleanup of hazardous
spills in the open cabin area. Prevention of the
spills appears to be the sole countermeasure
approach.
Reeommendatfon: The Space Station
should include the capability and equipment for
the crew to manage and resolve a toxic spill in
the open areas and prevent spills from propa-
gating to the remainder of the Space Station.
g. Finding: There is concern that the use
of the current Shuttle space suits will be inade-
quate to meet the time line required for the
erection of the Space Station Freedom.
Recommendation: NASA should go all-out
to develop the new higher pressure suit so that
it can be made available for timely use in the
construction of the Space Station.
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C,Aeronautics
Ffndfng: Review of the safety policies
associated with the NASA flight research
programs at Langley, Ames and Dryden indicate
good appreciation of the importance of a com-
prehensive aviation safety program that is
closely linked to, but independent of, the flight
projects. Whereas there are similar functions
and activities being followed by all flight
research centers, they operate under different
operational procedures and are organized dif-
ferently. The safety procedures of each center
seem to have evolved separately. As an exam-
pie, the Basic Operations Manual published by
Dryden establishes the Chief Engineer as the
focal point for aviation safety with the Aviation
Safety Officer assigned to the Flight Crew
Branch. The Langley Flight Research Program
Management document establishes the Chief,
Low-speed Aerodynamics Division as respon-
sible for the overall flight research program
including aviation safety with the safety officer
in a subordinate branch.
Reeom mendatfon: Headquarters should
review the flight research policies and proce-
dures of the concerned flight research centers
to determine if their existing flight safety
procedures are adequate or if it is appropriate
to standardize on a NASA-wide set of proce-
dures for conducting flight research.
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D,RiskManagement
(1) Finding: In 1988 NASA issued several
NMIs and NHBs that provide policies and direc-
tion designed to improve the identification,
evaluation and disposition of safety risks. In
particular, NMI 8070.4 titled "Risk Management
Policy for Manned Flight Programs" calls for a
risk management process that includes cate-
gorization and prioritization of "riskg' using
qualitative techniques for ratings of the fre-
quency expectation and severity of the poten-
tial mishaps. The documents also provide for
use of quantitative risk analysis to provide a
more definitive ordering of risks for purposes of
risk management.
Recommendation: The risk management
policies and initial implementing methodologies
which have been issued in 1988 need to be
evolved further. Practical quantitative risk
assessment and other relative risk-level rating
techniques should be actually developed. They
should then be applied to help define the risk
levels of flight and ground systems.
(2) Finding: The Panel has found strong
commitment by each of the Center Director
Offices to the rebuilding of the System Safety
Functions in NASA. They have provided valua-
ble guidance, encouragement and some level of
financial support to the difficult restructuring,
staffing and new policy implementation activi-
ties at their respective Centers. We are con-
cerned that program resource cuts may be
beginning to erode the progress which has been
made.
Recommendation: In addition to continuing
their good work we believe that additional
vigorous assistance is required on the part of
each Center Director's Office to assure the
allocation of resources that are necessary so
that the promising progress toward a truly
effective Systems Safety capability does not
falter and wither away after a few successful
STS flights. The Center Directors must be seen
as major champions of safety engineering within
NASA.
(3) Finding: At JSC there is a clear com-
mitment from the Director's level down to
implementing the general policies and require-
ments of NMI 8070.4, and to improving tech-
niques for risk assessment and risk mitigation.
We observed that the SRM&QA organization is
still not completely staffed. The organization
has assembled hazard information that is used
in the decisions of whether or not to fly.
Whether this same information can be used to
identify safety enhancing changes has yet to be
examined.
Recommendation: Examine the collected
data to see if it can be used to identify safety
enhancing changes, and, if so, define these
changes.
(4) Finding: At JSC the ASAP was pre-
sented a new approach to hazard rebaselining
and rating, and a new format for the Mission
Safety Assessment report (MSA). The new
report is basically a set of evaluated fault trees
which identify the potential system mishaps
which might result from various hardware or
human faults. For STS-26, 25 "significant risk"
mishaps were "selected" for evaluation. All
items selected had worst-case severity levels of
"loss of crew and/or vehicle." All items were
also rated as "unlikely," which was the lowest
probability rating used in the hazard rating
matrix. Thus, the MSA did not address even the
relative risk-levels of the selected potential
mishaps. However, the system safety organiza-
tion did color-code various faults -- red, which
designates that Improvement is Highly Desira-
ble (IHD). Because all of the items elected for
inclusion in the MSA are rated as unlikely to
occur and therefore "safe to fly," there remain
a large number of undifferentiated items desig-
nated IHD.
Recommendation: The ambiguity regarding
risk levels implied by the red color-coded MSA
needs to be removed. NASA needs to provide a
much more objective (quantitative) and data-
based risk assessment methodology that will
differentiate the "unlikely" events for purposes
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of assessingthe principal contributors to risk on
STS and Space Station type programs.
(5) Ffadfag: Functional areas such as
system-safety engineering at the Centers
appear not to have received the resource sup-
port necessary to fulfill their responsibilities.
The SRM&QA organizations at the centers
appear to be relatively loosely coupled to
Headquarters.
Recommendation: The various systems
safety organizations throughout NASA should
get stronger assistance from Headquarters
especially regarding financial support.
(6) Ffndfng: At MSFC the ASAP found an
excellent SRM&QA organizational structure and
good progress in staffing it with experienced
engineering personnel. As other centers have
done, they have engaged the services of two
contractors to aid in developing the analysis
techniques for practical, more quantitative risk
assessment and statistical evaluation of data
bases.
Recommendation: MSFC is to be com-
mended for their progress in evolving its
SR&QA function and these efforts should
receive continuing high level support.
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III
INFORMATION IN SUPPORT
OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A,NationalSpaceTransportationSystem(NSTS/STS)
NASA will continue to face stern manage-
ment challenges in this period of tightening
budgetary resources. In this environment, there
will be little opportunity to reflect on the
important improvements that have been
achieved during the long period of post-
Challenger recovery. The ASAP, however,
wants to make note of these improvements,
many of which had been advocated for several
years prior to the loss of STS 51-L. It is especi-
ally important that the expected budgetary
pressures in fiscal year 1989 and beyond not be
allowed to erode these advances.
a. Strengthening of the role of NASA
Headquarters (Level I) and STS program man-
agement (Level II), coupled with tighter man-
agement controls over NASA's research and
development centers (Level III), has clarified
responsibilities within the total STS program
and strengthened accountability at all levels.
Of special importance is the position of Deputy
Director (NSTS) for Operations as the focal
point of the highly complex shuttle processing
and launch activities at the Kennedy Space
Center. It is essential that this more disci-
plined management structure continue in place
once the launch rate accelerates. The ASAP
has advocated for many years the operating
principle of "Safety first; schedule second."
NASA must always manage the STS program
with this principle firmly in mind.
b. The Safety, Reliability, Maintainability
and Quality Assurance (SRM&QA) function is
now stronger, more visible, better staffed, and
better funded since establishment of the posi-
tion of Associate Administrator for SRM&QA,
reporting directly to the Administrator. The
incumbent, George Rodney, has brought to this
position the professionalism and management
ability to ensure that safety considerations
receive the priority attention they should
have. He is clearly in the key decision loops
and has established an essentially independent
"certification" function within NASA. At the
NASA Centers, the respective Directors of
SRM&QA report directly to the Center Director
and provide oversight of all projects at the
Center while also reporting functionally to the
Associate Administrator. Channels exist for
appealing issues of concern to higher authorities
within SRM&QA and program organizations.
There are budgetary pressures within the NSTS
program which are causing directors of major
STS elements to propose cuts to reduce
SRM&QA activities. In a similar vein, cutbacks
have been proposed in critical safety documen-
tation associated with the Space Shuttle Main
Engine, i.e., FMEA/CIL and Hazard Analysis
documentation.
In the ASAP's view, the SRM&QA function
should not be subject to budget reductions of a
magnitude that will eliminate or downgrade
essential activities. This view is reinforced by
the fact that increased, not reduced, attention
will be required as the flight rate increases and
the dangers of complacency and human error
expand accordingly.
c. Management communications have been
greatly improved, both vertically and horizon-
tally. Evidence of this improvement is the
return of the Management Council, an entity
that fosters direct and regular communication
among all top STS managers and R&D Center
Directors. This straightforward sharing of
critical problems and information among per-
sons who must deal with them has, in turn,
produced important benefits throughout the STS
organization. These benefits are evident at
critical program mileposts, such as Design
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Certification Reviews and Flight Readiness
Reviews, in terms of knowledge of outstanding
problems, status of fixes to these problems,
availability of resources, and impacts on the
total program.
As the flight rate and attendant operating
pressures increase, additional efforts will be
needed to maintain the viability and usefulness
of these communication channels.
Two other management issues merit
comment:
(1) In launch processing, the operating
principle of "Safety first; schedule second" must
be reinforced while NASA is working to achieve
greater efficiency and cost-effectiveness in
turnaround procedures. This is a delicate
balance to achieve and maintain. At present,
NASA's philosophy and strategy regarding
launch processing, along with related opera-
tional criteria, are not universally understood.
It is extremely important, as budgets grow
tighter that NASA develop and communicate a
clear, unambiguous statement of the nature,
purpose, and operating principles of the STS and
how these are served by the launch processing
function. This statement should take into
account the Shuttle's continuing R&D charac-
teristics, the alternative of using expendable
launch vehicles for missions not requiring
human presence in space, budget priorities, and
the level of risk that is acceptable in Shuttle
operations. There remains the clear and pre-
sent danger of slipping back into the operating
environment at KSC that contributed to the
Challenger accident.
In this regard, the Shuttle Processing
Contractor (SPC) appears to be growing in
capability and control of the highly complex
turnaround and launch procedure aided by
knowledgeable personnel from the element
contractors. SPC personnel are now routinely
part of key JSC, MSFC, KSC, and element
contractor teams working on launch processing
matters (a situation not initially true). Inte-
grated data systems to track the condition of
the Orbiter and its elements, along with the
launch processing sequence, are still in devel-
opment; various interim systems will continue
to be relied upon for the foreseeable future.
There is also a need to involve more hands-on
technicians in efforts to streamline the turn-
around and launch process. The importance of
logistics and maintenance factors in the process
(discussed in more detail in Section III.A.4 of
this report) cannot be overstated. Nonetheless,
launch processing must continue to receive the
continuing attention of NASA's top
management.
(2) NASA, along with many other Federal
agencies, has suffered through more than a
decade of hostility directed toward Federal
employees and a related failure to maintain
salary comparability at the higher management
levels. Not too many years ago Federal careers
were viewed as highly desirable by many of the
Nation's "best and brightest." NASA, in
particular, was able to recruit from among the
most highly respected scientists and engineers
and retain these employees. This commitment
to excellence among its personnel was perhaps
the single most important factor in NASA's
many successes. Many of these outstanding
civil servants have chosen to stay with NASA,
usually at great personal financial sacrifice, but
many others have left. Recruitment of the best
graduates is increasingly difficult, if not
impossible.
The ASAP recognizes that NASA urgently
needs greater flexibility and resources in com-
peting for and retaining the skilled personnel
who are required to carry forward the Nation's
space and aeronautical programs. This recogni-
tion is growing through the work of such groups
as the National Commission on the Public
Service, chaired by Paul Volker, and the
American Agenda project, chaired by former
Presidents Ford and Carter. Although the
salary comparability question will be settled by
the Administration and Congress, NASA should
speak out clearly about the increasing costs of
the present situation and the specific steps that
are needed to once again make NASA careers
_imong the most desirable and respected.
After the Challenger accident NASA
embarked on a major review of all matters
relating to safety of flight. All waivers were
cancelled. All critical items, failure mode
effects and analysis and hazard analyses were
thoroughly reviewed at all appropriate levels of
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NSTS and NASA management. Final decisions
were made by the Level I management team
headed by Mr. Arnold Aldrich. Many changes in
hardware and software design as well as
operational procedures were approved and
implemented.
Using the Orbiter as an example, there
were over 200 design changes made prior to the
STS-26 mission. These were tested, retested as
appropriate, leading to qualification for flight
on STS-26. Reviewing the effectiveness of the
manner in which these modifications/changes
were implemented revealed that NASA,
Rockwell and other contractors felt they were
all mandatory to bring the Space Shuttle to an
acceptable level of safety and it was reported
that not one of them showed any anomalies
during the STS-26 and -27 missions.
The flights of Orbiters Discovery (STS-26)
and Atlantis (STS-27) did, however, show the
impact of weather, particularly upper winds and
low level cloud formations on launch ability.
Obviously structural margins above those now
available would certainly improve the proba-
bility of launch and safe flight through
changeable weather conditions. Structural
changes to improve this situation are now well
understood.
The tile damage on STS-27 clearly shows
that there remains much to learn from each and
every mission and that a continued effort
toward a sturdier tile system and reduction in
impacting debris is required.
As the flight rate increases a very strong
effort will be needed to determine what is
necessary to further enhance safety--and a
method for incorporating the changes will be
required to prevent undue disruption of opera-
tions. A major portion of management's atten-
tion and action will be required to make this
effort effective.
As a result of the post Challenger efforts
many mandatory changes were incorporated and
a large data base was developed. This data base
can provide the means to further enhance flight
and ground safety. The NASA centers and
prime contractors have provided the ASAP with
their own candidate lists of items which need
further study, see Appendix IV.D.
STS management should establish an
aggressive program to prioritize these lists with
the end objective being to incorporate safety
enhancing changes into the Space Shuttle. As
discussed elsewhere in this report, modern
analytical risk assessment methods could be
used to prioritize proper changes with emphasis
on real gains in safety while taking into consid-
eration the many other factors needed to sup-
port risk management decisions. Program
management must maintain the momentum now
evident to achieve further needed safety relat-
ed hardware and software changes within the
resources available to the STS program.
Such an effort merits a high priority if the
future flight rates are to be achieved with
acceptable safety levels. The ASAP views this
as a two-step process:
The first step is the identification of
design and procedural changes which
can lead to a cost effective reduc-
tion in risk and, hence, a safety
improvement. The extensive analy-
ses, design modifications and proce-
dural changes leading to the flight
of STS-26 provided new insights into
the design of the STS system and
identified numerous changes which
were necessary or desirable. The
identification process is continuing
as lessons are learned from each
flight and fed back into the planning
and mission safety assessments for
the subsequent efforts.
The second step in the process
involves the control and communica-
tion of the product improvement
information to ensure that STS
management is constantly aware of
changes which can reduce risk in a
cost effective manner. This step is
not presently well understood.
Although there are lists of desirable
and required changes, there is no
methodology/system for making sure
that a change, once identified, is
kept constantly in front of manage-
ment. A decision to defer action on
an identified change should not
cause that change to disappear.
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NASA should review and implement a
simple management information system to
collect information on design changes and keep
that information in front of management at key
decision times.
NASA has received well deserved world-
wide congratulatory comments on the success-
ful resumption of Space Shuttle flights. Of
particular interest at this time has been the
performance and post-flight condition of the
solid rocket motors. Examination of the motors
thus far has not disclosed any flaws or unusual
condition that would indicate cause for concern
about the safety and reliability of the
Redesigned Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM). In
view of this it is difficult to understand NASA's
determination to proceed with the procurement
of a new solid rocket motor -- designated as the
Advanced Solid Rocket Motor (ASRM) -- for
which is claimed superior safety and relia-
bility. As discussed in the section of this report
devoted to the Solid Rocket Booster, the
Redesigned Solid Rocket Booster (RSRB) has
corrected the major design deficiencies of the
STS 51-L SRMs and improved other components
that were considered marginal.
NASA's premise is that the ASRM will
benefit from advanced solid rocket motor
technology and automated manufacturing
methods and thus evolve into a safer and more
reliable solid rocket motor than the current
RSRM. It is not evident why such improve-
ments, as they develop, could not be introduced
into the current production process. In any
event the current STS schedule, if successfully
carried out, would see more than 160 uses of
the RSRMs before the new ASRM is intro-
duced. With such a history behind it, any quan-
titative risk assessment analysis would most
certainly favor the RSRM as regards reliability
and safety.
In view of this situation--and because other
elements of the STS system, if modified or
replaced, could contribute more to improving
safety margins--the Panel recommends that
NASA reexamine the plan to procure the ASRM
and study other options for the replacement of
the current solid rocket motors. Such options
should consider liquid rocket motors including
the pressure-fed type. Safety and reliability
should be the prime objective but it is believed
these features can be achieved along with any
desired performance enhancement.
The ASAP endorses the liquid pressure-fed
rocket technology program being undertaken at
MSFC and recommends that NASA support and
expedite their effort. Also, rocket technology
improvements arising from the Advanced
Launch System (ALS) technology program
should be carefully monitored and applied to the
manufacturing processes of the current rockets.
The transfer of a major part of Rockwell's
logistics and support activities for the Orbiter
to the immediate KSC area has been completed
and management programs as well as certain
facilities and equipment are in place. The
Rockwell Service Center program has been
funded for $419 million covering three years
from October 1, 1988, and will provide for all
Rockwell management functions related to
logistics, material, ground support equipment
and quality assurance functions. Continuity in
management and technical experience is thus
assured. An arrangement of this kind was, in
fact, recommended by the ASAP several years
ago and we are pleased to see that it has now
come into being.
Relationships between the SPC contractor
(Lockheed) and Rockwell appear now to be
excellent and the technical working interfaces
are maturing well. A great deal of credit for
this generally satisfactory situation must be
accorded to the NASA-KSC logistics manage-
ment group together with top management of
RI-Downey and the KSC Center Director. Some
general comments upon major aspects of the
program follow:
Control of Cannilmlizaffon
The cannibalization issue, over which a
great deal of concern has been expressed in
earlier ASAP Annual Reports, appears to be
yielding to careful control methods instituted
by KSC, RI and SPC. Under the original funding
guidelines a large number of components could
not be provisioned and some cases have caused
multiple removals. There is now funding for a
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high proportion of these under a Zero Balance
Cannibalization Candidate program. A system
of priority allocation for Line Replaceable Unit
(LRU) repair and overhaul programs has also
been instituted. The rate of cannibalization is
decreasing and, most important, any contem-
plated action towards cannibalization must
receive approval from the highest authority at
KSC, JSC and RUSPC. Each individual canni-
balization action is continuously tracked by the
NASA-KSC Integrated Logistics organization.
While cannibalization in such a small-fleet
program of highly specialized and unique
Orbiter vehicles can never be completely
eliminated, the management attention and
control mechanisms instituted should ensure an
acceptable pattern. The need for cannibaliza-
tion can be expected to rise again as the launch
rate increases but will now, we believe, be
under satisfactory control.
Improvement in Overhaul and Repair
Turnaround Time
This vital aspect appears to be receiving
full attention on the part of NASA and its
contractors and the individual component and
equipment manufacturers. Control programs
identifying the worst offenders in terms of
component turnaround periods are now in place
and a vigorous auditing system involving team
visits to selected manufacturers is in place.
An LRU spares reservation policy was
established in November 1987 to ensure that
components or units should not be issued until
the real need date thus conserving shelf
supplies. In spite of diligent management
attention of this kind, however, the backlog of
repairable components is increasing and "aged
items" (items over six months old) quantities
are increasing. This remains a serious problem
and continuing attention is required. In line
with this, some thirteen extensive meetings are
planned with key vendors in an effort to
improve the turnaround times.
Aequisition and Control of Inventory
frill rates)
Budget--at least in the near term--does not
now appear to be a constraint in the spares
acquisition process. Lead times for procure-
ments are, of course, still occasionally critical
but the actual fill rates (the response ratio to
demands for spares) are close to 99¢ for non-
repairable items and moving toward a goal of
95_; for repairable items. Alternative pro-
curement for selected items through DOD
sources has shown significant cost savings.
Development of ATE (Automatic Test
Equipment)
The ATE program at the Rockwell Service
Center (RSC) is proceeding well. The test
equipment has been modified to emphasize the
type of units that will offer the best economical
return. For example, large population LRUs
offer excellent opportunity for employing ATE,
the multiplexer units being good candidates.
The programs are now ahead of schedule and
are expected to be fully operational in FY 1993.
FMEA/CIL Completions
The Failure Modes and Effects Analyses
and the Critical Item List resolutions have been
completed. This task encompassed some 12,000
FMEAs. 2,585 CIL waivers were required but
all have been resolved or approved. This enor-
mous task is viewed as being very beneficial to
the logistics program and a large number of the
FMEAs will be rewritten in 1989 using the
experience gained.
Control and CommunieaHon for
Log_sffes
Control and communications for logistics
management from coast-to-coast and also
between the NASA Centers has been greatly
improved. The evolving Rockwell Service
Center at KSC is central to this and as the
repair facilities come fully into effect with
both RSC and NASA Logistic groups, combined
with the necessarily tighter integration with the
LSOC-SPC, good results may be anticipated.
At the detailed controls end of the spectrum
such devices as the Logistics Assets Tracking
System (LATS), which is a desktop computer
component or item locating system, can be
expected to enhance control. Within the KSC
Logistics organization, innovative statistical
and trend analyses are being developed to
provide full visibility of the use of logistics
assets. These data will permit enhanced man-
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agement control and, insofar as possible,
decrease the need for cannibalization activities.
The following notes refer principally to
activities or directions which should be con-
sidered for 1989 and beyond:
a. There is a need to properly implement
the plan for scheduled structural overhaul in a
phased manner for the Orbiter fleet. Such a
plan should probably be divided into zones on
the vehicle culminating in a period out of
service at RI Palmdale for major overhaul
actions such as control surface removal, landing
gear exchange, etc. Specific programs would
inspect for corrosion and heat damage and the
repair or replacement of fatigued structural
parts. It may well be that such an overhaul
program is being comtemplated now but the
ASAP would welcome an opportunity to
examine it in detail.
Allied to the above is the need for a
pilot program to remove selected functional
system high-time components (Rockwell has
such a maintenance sampling program proposal
in conjunction with JSC). This pilot program
needs to be studied and expanded with rather
earlier periods for removal, teardown and
reporting than the 8 years time-since-new
typically shown for OV-102.
b. On the matter of SSME logistics and
support there needs to be a closer working
relationship and attendant information
exchange between RI Downey and Rocketdyne.
This also applies to MSFC and the KSC
Logistics operation. This element of all the
support issues, seems to be considered in isola-
tion, that is, "outside the loop" of the Orbiter
vehicle itself. What is required is a "systems
approach" to total logistics support.
c. When considering support and supply
programs one must project real plans to at least
the year 2000 when most of the vendors will
have totally lost interest and the real problems
begin. The Space Station has no other carrier
and self-sufficiency at KSC will be paramount.
d. The continued attraction of technical
skills and management capability upon a career
basis at the KSC complex over the next 10 to 20
years demands expanded interest and attention
now.
e. If the entire logistics and support
program is allowed to continue on its present
course the KSC complex will constitute a
uniquely valuable space-launch facility. It is
unthinkable that the Space Station should not be
designed from the outset to take the fullest
advantage of this superb program.
a. Redesigned Solid Rocket
Motor/Booster (SRM/SRB)
The redesigned solid rocket booster has
corrected the design deficiencies found in the
original b_sters used with the STS 51-L
vehicle. In addition, other components that
were considered to be of marginal design, were
improved. Extensive subscale and full-scale
testing results and analyses provided the con-
fidence needed to launch STS-26. Most of the
changes that were incorporated and actions
taken are documented in the Report of the
National Research Council's Panel for the
Technical Evaluation of NASA's Redesign of the
Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Motor/Booster. An
ASAP member served with this special panel.
The major items redesigned were the case-
to-case field joints, the igniter, internal nozzle
joints, nozzle ablative parts, nozzle outer boot
ring, the External Tank attach ring, and ground
support equipment. The most important rede-
sign effort centered on the case-to-case joints
which corrected the former design deficien-
ces. The redesigned field joint features
included:
(1) The adhesively bonded insulation
joints and barrier o-rings which prevents the hot
combustion gases from reaching the primary
and secondary o-rings. Tests proved that the
seals worked even with the introduction of
severe intentional flaws.
(2) The capture feature of the field
joints and the addition of 100 radial bolts to the
case-to-nozzle joint reduced the gap opening.
All of these improvements have made the
redesigned rocket boosters more reliable than
the original rocket boosters, and were proven
out by an extensive test program. The test
program included:
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(3) A number of full scale, full duration
hot firing tests. The production verification
motor (PV-1) test (Fig. 1) was typical of these.
Other full-scale, short duration and sub-scale
tests, as shown in Fig. 2, also exhibited consis-
tent results. All of these tests were conducted
successfully with no appreciable erosion or
"blow by" affecting the primary or secondary
o-rings. In many of these tests, where deliber-
ate flaws were introduced to the primary and
secondary o-rings a pressure of 700 to 800 psi
reached these o-rings, but because it took over
10 seconds for the pressure to build up, the
combustion gas had cooled to below 130
degrees F.
(4) As further assurance, the o-ring
resiliency has demonstrated its ability to track
a gap opening of .018 inches, which is twice the
joint gap opening. Electric heaters were added
to the joints in order to maintain a temperature
of approximately 75 ° F which guarantees the
required resiliency.
There are a number of enhancements that
need to be considered in the following areas
which affect reliability:
(5) The polysulfide adhesively bonded
case-to-nozzle joint forms voids and blow holes
because the fixed housing slides over the insula-
tion on the aft dome during assembly. Although
full scale testing with intentional flaws show
that only cooled gas can reach the o-rings,
these voids should be eliminated to obtain a
better reproduceable product.
(6) Internal nozzle ablative composite
parts which protect vital components against
hot combustion gases have shown blisters,
charring and "wedge-outs" in carbon-cloth
phenolic material during nominal full-scale hot-
fire tests as well as during the STS-26 mission.
Because of the unpredictable behavior of these
materials as a result of process and
manufacturing variations a program of analysis
and testing should be undertaken to understand
and then eliminate these problems.
(7) The field joint heaters allow the
baseline fluoroelastomer o-ring to act as a
satisfactory seal. However, NASA should
continue its efforts to find an o-ring material
compatible with grease which has low tempera-
ture resilience so that it can function without
heaters.
(8) Stricter environmental control sys-
tems for internal insulation bonding and protec-
tion of components should be established and
implemented.
(9) Improved non-destructive testing and
evaluation methods are needed.
(10) Current requirements specify SRM
case segments are to be designed for 20 uses.
However, the effect of interference fit, joints,
hydroburst tests, corrosion protection and the
effect of ocean splash-down need to be properly
assessed and validated by structural analysis in
order to determine criteria for reuse of case
segments. Appropriate data concerning reuse,
cost and lead time to obtain additional cases
should also be developed.
(11) The accumulation of propellant slag
that plugs the nozzle boot ring vent holes
causing excessive differential pressure across
the flexible boot ring at rocket motor tailoff
should be eliminated.
In addition to the above items, there are
other situations that require attention and
corrective action. The aft skirt weld cracked
at hold down post #8 at 128_ of limit load
during the STA-3 static test (140_; required).
Although it was considered safe to fly STS-26,
additional analysis and testing is needed to
determine why the welded area failed at 0.8_
strain, when specimen uni-axial tests showed
failures at 4.0_ strain level. Tests to deter-
mine the effect of various loadings and poten-
tial fixes should be conducted. Experimental
techniques like stress coat with additional
strain gauges should be employed to better
understand the stress distribution so the analy-
tical model can be improved. Many of the
Finite Element Model structural analyses have
yielded predicted stresses that were in error by
30_;. Structural modeling and analytical
methodology of the behavior of complex struc-
tures subjected to multiple loads is challenging
and must be verified by information from tests.
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b. External Tank
Of all the elements of the STS the external
tank has displayed two characteristics of note:
reliability and small but annoying anomalies.
There have been few problems with the external
tank during its use in the ascent phase of the
mission and its programmed entry and destruc-
tion. The external thermal insulation and
various sensors have been troublesome almost
continuously but neither of these has been a
major concern. How to protect the orbiter
external tile system from insulation debris is a
problem that is being worked continuously but
poses little threat to the orbiter tiles. The
sensors for temperature, pressure, valve posi-
tions and liquid levels have been bothersome
and to some degree detract (during launch
processing and the countdown for launch) from
other, more significant activities. To reduce
any impacts on ground and flight operations it
behooves NASA to develop an integrated plan to
provide solutions to these problems.
c. Orbiter I.oads/Stre_ Analysfs and
Structural Modifications
The Space Shuttle orbiter original
loads/stress analysis program, Automatic
Systems for Kinematic Analysis (ASKA), was
stretched out over a period of six years and the
follow-on ASKA 6.0 loads/stress analysis over a
period of four years. Some of the reasons for
this lengthy analysis program are:
(1) The existing ASKA loads and stress
analysis computer programs had to be upgraded
to solve the complex problems associated with
the Space Shuttle configuration.
(2) The proper level of funding was not
available to keep the analyses progressing at a
uniform rate and there were too many starts
and stops as well as changes in personnel.
(3) New requirements were injected into
the analysis from time to time which com-
pounded difficulties by adding to the scope of
the activity.
The lessons learned from the orbiter stress
analysis program should be used to avoid
unnecessary problems in the design of the Space
Station and future vehicle systems.
The Orbiter structure has been proof tested
to 120_ of design limit load, but flight test
results show that the wing and tail loads are
15_ to 20_ higher than anticipated. Because
of this it is necessary to employ trajectory
shaping to protect the structure.
A restricted allowable flight envelope was
established to protect the structure during
flight. The character of the envelope is illu-
strated, in part, by diagrams called "squatche-
loids" such as shown in Fig. 3. This figure shows
an original squatcheloid which was used in the
Integrated Vehicle Baseline Configuration
IVBC-3/ASKA 6.0 loads/stress analysis. Nega-
tive margins in the wing, fuselage and vertical
tail structure cause the flight limitations.
Restricting the flight profile to avoid both
regions of negative structural margins and
major modifications of the existing structure
has lowered the probability of launch from the
original goal of 95_. Although this situation
can be somewhat mitigated by more timely
winds aloft data.
The ASAP feels that the Orbiter structure,
Fig. 3a, should be strengthened as soon as
practical in order to decrease the risk to the
STS during ascent. There are some modifica-
tions to the wing and aft fuselage that can be
accomplished in a short period of time, how-
ever, there are other structural modifications
(aft fuselage and vertical tail) that are more
costly and require a larger downtime for
rework.
d. Spaee Shuttle Main Engine
In its 1988 report, the ASAP noted that
many changes were to be incorporated into the
shuttle main engines prior to the flight of
STS-26. Of the various problems underlying
these changes, The ASAP considered the
following to be the most significant:
(1) HPFTP* First Stage Blade Cracks
(2) HPFTP Second Stage Firtree Face Cracks
(3) HPFTP Coolant Liner Maximum Pressure
(4) HPOTP** First Stage Shank Cracks
(5) HPOTP Bearing-Ball Temperatures
(6) HPOTP Bearing Failure
(7) 4000 Hz Pressure Resonance in Liquid
Oxygen (LOX) Inlet Region
*(HPFTP = High Pressure Fuel Turbopump)
**(HPOTP = High Pressure Oxidizer
Turbopump)
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Each of these problems and the design or
manufacturing process changes underway to
resolve them were discussed. During 1988
extensive testing of the changes met with major
success in all areas with the exception of the
HPOTP bearing failure. The status in late 1988
was:
HPFTP First Stage Turbine Blades
The problem was transverse cracks of the
blade firtree lobe resulting from excessive
strain levels in presence of hydrogen. The
phase II changes improved the blade root fit and
used shot peening to increase the strain capa-
bility. Extensive certification testing was
completed in 1988. No lobe cracks were
detected and wear patterns showed improved
load sharing resulting from tighter fit
acceptance standards.
HPFTP Second Stage Turbine Blades
The second stage TP blade cracks initiate
at defects or carbide inclusions during the first
mainstage cycle. They were enhanced by
thermal stresses and the hydrogen environ-
ment. The initial process changes (shot peening
and gold plating) eliminated downstream face
cracks but appeared to cause many corner
cracks. The above processes combined with
recontouring shank and enlarging the corner
radii have been extensively tested with no
cracks detected. Unmodified blades incor-
porated into the same turbine shells showed
cracks in as high as 40 _ of that population.
HPFTP Coolant Liner Maximum Pressure
Reorificing and manufacturing weld con-
trols incorporated in the improved liner design
continued to demonstrate throughout 1988 that
major pressure differential reductions from
earlier configurations have been achieved.
HPOTP First Stage Turbine Blades
This problem was the appearance and
growth of high-cycle fatigue cracks in the blade
shank after only 1000 to 2000 seconds of opera-
tion. The design solution was to incorporate a
two-piece damper in the blade. This design was
tested in 1987 with encouraging results. In
1988, validation testing was continued to estab-
lish inspection and replacement cycle times. By
year end, two blade sets had undergone ten
cycle 5500-second certification tests and eight
sets had accumulated 114 cycles and more than
59,000 seconds with no shank cracks. The
highest time on a single set was greater than
11,000 seconds.
HPOTP Bearing-Bali Temperature
The issue of whether the balls in the turbo-
pump bearings have any realistic probability of
undergoing sustained auto-ignition in the oxygen
environment should be considered closed.
Extensive tests and micro-surface analysis in
1988 and the very high total time of bearing
ball exposures since the start of the SSME
development have all shown sustained ignition
(or any ignition) to be a vanishingly small risk.
HPOTP Bearing Failures
This short operating-life problem with the
HPOTP bearing showed up more explicitly in
1987 tests with HPOTP units having internal
strain gauges and accelerometers and was
described in ASAP's 1987 report. The basic
design problem is complex, involving inadequate
loadsharing, design tolerance, cage design and
materials, etc. Based on extensive review and
analysis during 1988, a decision has been made
to limit the current bearing to a single flight.
ASAP endorses this action since the data shows
that a significant margin (3x) would exist
against wear/play criteria. There will be a
number of bearing redesigns investigated in
1989 for later incorporation to provide better
engine turnaround economics.
4000 Hz Pressure Resonance
This problem was discussed in ASAP's 1986
and 1987 reports. ASAP agrees with
Rocketdyne that this is an engine-build specific
phenomenon which can be (and now is) screened
out by acceptance test rejection. It is, there-
fore, a cost effectiveness issue, not a hazard.
For several years ASAP has strongly sup-
ported the benefits of the two-duct powerhead
and the large diameter throat combustion
chamber, and has advocated their earliest
incorporation into flight engines. Both of these
changes would result in significant reductions of
-19-
stress on the turbopump systems and structural
loads on various parts of the ducts and liners.
Therefore, they would significantly reduce the
risk levels at the 104¢ power setting, and even
more critically during operation at 109¢ during
certain abort modes. We are pleased that both
of these improvements were converted into
hardware in 1988.
The large throat engine (0208) underwent
limited testing quite successfully. System
pressures decreased, turbine temperatures were
lowered and overall internal engine stress
environments were significantly reduced. The
post test hardware condition reflected these
reduced stresses. As an additional benefit, the
engine performance was only minimally impact-
ed. The improvement in operating margins can
be seen in Figure 4 where the power level
equivalent of various key stress parameters are
compared at 104_ thrust with a standard Phase
II engine.
A two-duct hot gas manifold power head
was also completed and was ready for testing at
year end. Three other units are in work which
would permit full certification in 1989-90.
ASAP believes both of these new designs should
be certified and introduced into the SSME flight
hardware as soon as possible to provide major
safety risk reduction.
In late 1987, three other important activi-
ties were underway at the SSME contractor,
Rocketdyne, and these were continued during
1988.
(1) A structural audit
(2) A weld assessment
(3) Failure trend analysis and reliability
model
Structural Audit
The structural audit reviewed all of the
structural analyses with special emphasis on
long-term durability. It reexamined critically
the environments, analytical models, material
properties, fabrication processes and total
history of verification testing. The work was
done by an audit team of specialists experi-
enced in various disciplines such as structures,
dynamics, aerothermal, heat transfer, materials
and manufacturing. As completed in 1988,
there were a total of 192 part audits, with
heavy emphasis on the turbo-machinery. Of the
192 parts, 25 had residual concerns identified.
Of these, all but eight were resolved by further
analysis or measurements. The eight remain
limited by Deviation Approval Requests (DARs).
Weld Assessment
The weld assessment project identified all
"critical item" welds and reviewed in detail
their specifications, safety factors, fabrication
processes and inspectability. The activity also
calculated critical initial flaw sizes for critical
welds and assessed their detectability using the
best non-destructive inspection techniques.
Over 3000 welds were reviewed. The rationale
for retention of each weld was reassessed
against various acceptability criteria. It is the
ASAP's view that more work needs to be carried
Out on weld inspection techniques for blind
root-side welds. Furthermore, the uncertainty
in verifying such welds should demand higher
design factors of safety in all future hardware
designs where such welds cannot be eliminated.
ASAP commends NASA and its contractor,
Rocketdyne, for completing these objective and
thorough audits. They have served to greatly
increase confidence in the engine's structural
design and in the techniques for verifying each
engine's true configuration.
Failure Trend Analyses and Reliability
Model
As reported in 1987, the SSME contractor,
Rocketdyne, has been evolving methodologies
for analyzing the entire data base obtained on
the development and flight engines. The failure
trend analyses were matched to component
failure models using both "failures" and
':unsatisfactory condition reports." Adverse
"trends" would be quantified when possible as an
aid to managing corrective actions. The failure
data are also being used to make estimates at
selected confidence levels of the "statistical
failure probabilities," assuming the engine is a
random failure statistical system. The data are
being summarized at two stages of mission
operation" prior to SRB ignition and after
liftoff; and for two general consequences--
shutdown of an engine and criticality 1, loss of
life or vehicle. Results are presented for three
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Phase II vs Engine 208 Rated Performance
Comparison Based on 104% Data
(MR = 6.011)
Parameter
Altitude Thrust
Specific Impulse
MCC Pc
Turbopump Speeds
LPFTP
LPOTP
HPF'FP
HPOTP
Turbine Discharge Temp.
HPOTP
HPFT
Pump Discharge Pr
HPOTP Main Boost
HPFTP
Phase II
490,000
452.9
3126
15,925
5,158
35,131
28,109
1390
1700
4311
7378
6390
Engine 0208
(Rated)
490,000
452.5
2856
15,177
5,011
34,887
28,205
1280
1569
4090
7284
6093
Equivalent
Power Level
97%
100%
103%
104%
93%
91%
100%
103%
101%
Figure 4
MTBF After Redesign
Mean Number of Flights Between Engine Shutdowns
Liftoff
Mainstage
Power Level
Redesign Effectiveness Factor
0.0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1.0
27 36 51 90 416
100 Percent 53 67 89 135 280
104 Percent 19 24 34 58 202
3.8 4.9 6.9 12 89109 Percent
Figure 5
power levels, 100, 104 and 109_. The data base
is quite extensive, comprised of 49 equivalent
engines and almost 1000 tests with nearly
300,000 seconds of hot fire.
The results can be expressed in the form of
"mean number of flights between engine shut-
downs" for (1) prior to liftoff, assuming a three-
engine cluster, and (2) at mainstage (a function
of power level) with the effectiveness of all
redesigns subsequent to each failure as a para-
meter. Current data is shown for a confidence
value of 50_ in Figure 5. The prudence of
limiting engine operation to 104_ is supported
by these results, as is the potential value of
incorporation of the two-duct powerhead and
the large throat combustion chamber.
It should be noted, however, that such
"probability" data (particularly with relatively
limited data using the phase II turbopumps) does
not really describe the probable risk level
associated with the engine. For developing a
"risk level" one needs to evolve probabilities for
the various consequences of an engine shutdown
during mainstage. One also should estimate the
most likely asymptotic values of the curves
depicting cluster reliability versus number of
cycles for the reconfigured engines with LRU
replacement criteria as a parameter. These
most likely asymptotic values will be dominated
by the demonstrated margins against the criti-
cal failure modes with the uncertainty around
the values being a function of the extent of the
test data base.
For many years the ASAP has been advo-
cating that margin-to-failure demonstration is
most important in assessing the risks associated
with critical failure modes. Therefore, we were
pleased to see that significant work along this
line was carried out on the SSME during 1988.
Some of the most significant tests were:
O Demonstration (360 seconds at 1760 R)
of flight redline temperature on the
HPOTP
o Incorporation of degraded bearings on
two HPOTP units
o Fuel pre-burner injector contamination
o Sustained hot and cold wall leaks in the
engine nozzle
o HPOTP nozzle-plug ingestion - two
units
o Stuck throttle evaluations with electri-
cal and hydraulic lock-up
Such testing, when carefully planned and
instrumented, can provide the most cost effec-
tive way of estimating the asymptotic failure-
rate values for the various critical failure
modes.
The Panel is aware of work underway on an
alternate set of turbopumps to replace the
existing Phase II configurations. This activity,
in support of enhanced reliability and safety, is
an excellent use of NASA resources. The ASAP
commend the STS program for this initiative.
The sheer magnitude of the test data base on
the existing pumps developed over the past nine
years and the fact that each of the serious
failures pinpointed original design weaknesses
that have now been corrected, provides strong
arguments against switching to an all new
turbopump concept. While such new pumps may
(or may not) provide somewhat improved life-
cycle replacement costs, they would bring a
whole new set of failure modes which would
need many years of testing and corrective
action to develop a basis for risk assessment.
During that period, flights with such engines
would have a much lower indicated cluster
reliability status.
eo Launch, Landfng and Mission
Operations
The pre-launch processing for STS-26 had
virtually no time constraints. The launch date
was allowed to slip as needed to accomplish a
thorough assessment af all systems and process-
es. Much learning and re-learning was involved
so both delays and unusual costs were
acceptable.
Processing for STS-27 has shown some
greater efficiencies, particularly with respect
to the stacking of the solids. The launch pad
has now sustained two flights, and the launch
crews are more aware of processing strengths
and weaknesses.
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Based on the launch of STS-26 and the
processing through the FRR of STS-27, it does
not appear that the turnaround rate implied by
the shuttle manifest can be reached. Discus-
sions with managers of various STS program
elements yield somewhat different outlooks
ranging from confidence that efficiency can be
significantly improved to the belief that none of
the existing processing steps can be eliminated.
There is a clear need for a re-evaluation of
the processing which leads to a Shuttle launch.
In particular, a formal, inter-center review of
the need for and composition of each major step
in the processing flow should be undertaken.
The objective of this review should be to char-
acterize steps as:
o Essential in their present form.
o Essential but subject to change to
improve their speed and/or results.
o Not needed and capable of being elimi-
nated immediately.
O Suitable for elimination in the future at
a predetermined milestone point and
under a predefined set of conditions.
The review of each step should be based on
formalized inputs from those managers who
used (or did not use) the step's results. STS
program management and the SRM&QA organi-
zation each should be able to veto the elimina-
tion of a step but not a consensus decision to
retain it.
The ASAP is still concerned with the
availability of appropriate processing staff at
KSC without the need for excessive overtime.
Plans to control excessive work hours have been
established, and KSC and contractor manage-
ment are to be commended. However, future
processing flows on a tighter schedule and with
four orbiters will be a problem. Personnel
planning for current and future processing
operations should continue to receive a high
priority so that the excellent overtime and work
policies currently in place can be maintained.
Data vs. Information
During the return-to-flight activities
instrumentation was added to the STS systems.
The acquisition of additional data covering
system status can assist in decision-making,
however, data are not necessarily information.
Only when data are processed into valid and
reliable measures whose implications are well
understood can they be of real use to
management.
There have been instances where such new
data were included in establishing a launch
commit criterion (LCC) without validation.
Obviously no formal system criteria should be
based on information if the data to develop that
information are suspect.
Schedule
The Shuttle manifest appears to be
optimistic. This could lead to pressure to "cut
corners." Management should have a formal
evaluation process in place in order to have a
firm basis for safely deleting or modifying steps
in the flow.
The ASAP continues to emphasize "Safety
first; schedule second." NASA program man-
agement working with the SRM&QA organiza-
tion must act to preserve the appropriate
emphasis on safety.
Human Factors
Even as a "mature" system design, the
Shuttle should be subject to continuing human
factors analyses. Last year, the notion of
conducting a study to identify and correct
possible design induced errors at all stages for
preparatory, launch and in-flight activities was
recommended. It has yet to be undertaken. In
the meantime, there have been human factors
related incidents such as improper I-load data
entry (a reversed sign) and the inability of flight
crew members to reach certain cockpit
switches when wearing the new pressure suits.
Now that the Shuttle has returned to flight,
plans for future improvements have been dis-
cussed. These include the upgraded computers
and a possible retrofit of a "glass cockpit" (use
of cathode-ray tubes instead of dials). While
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these changes are likely to be productive and
important for the service life of the Shuttle,
they should be undertaken after a total human
factors analysis of the system. As with the
revised Hazard analyses coincident with the
return-to-fight activities, a human factors
assessment of proposed modifications will help
limit the risk of human error.
Flight Roadiness Review Process
The Flight Readiness Review process, as
we observed it, was well organized, comprehen-
sive and well conducted. The discussions were
open, uninhibited and, where they could be,
decisions were made on the spot. The numbers
of people in attendance were large but didn't
seem to impede the process and individuals with
detailed knowledge were always available to
clarify details or provide detailed discussion.
The mission management team, chaired by
Capt. Crippen, was very much in evidence and
was well informed on all the issues that arose.
In effect, Crippen was the launch and test
manager for the program--something that had
not been present in the past in the Shuttle
program. This is certainly a large plus.
A key to the efficacy of the F RR we
observed was the fact that everyone had done
their homework at Levels III and IV and all
those involved were intimately familiar with all
the details of problems and issues. There were
no surprises in any of the discussions. This is
crucial to a successful space flight program and
must continue. Also, the face-to-face meeting
was more effective than the telecons that had
been used in the past.
A concern that remains is the ability to
close out anomalies from the preceding flight
before the next flight. Such close-outs are a
key element of any FRR and they must be
closed properly before the next launch can
occur,
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B,SpaceStationFreedomProgram(SSFP)
The Space Station Freedom Program (SSFP)
is an ambitious undertaking. It is attempting
breakthroughs in technology while simultane-
ously designing, deploying and operating a long-
term orbital platform. All of this is to be
accomplished with single-year funding and a
background of uncertainty arising from changes
in the Administration and less than universal
support for the program. This is obviously a
situation frought with opportunities for safety
hazards to occur.
The ASAP has begun a continuing review of
the organization and design activities that will
lead to the development and deployment of the
Station. During the course of the year, the
ASAP carried out the following fact-finding and
oversight activities:
o Participated in Safety Summits.
o Attended several Level I program review
meetings.
o Attended portions of the Preliminary
Requirements Review sessions.
o Reviewed safety activities conducted at
Level II.
o Reviewed computer safety related
activities.
o Participated in AIAA conference on
Space Station Automation and Robotics.
In spite of the difficult environment in
which development must take place, the ASAP
has seen a major step forward in Space Station
(SS) activities this year. There are many KS
developments that the ASAP applauds,
including: 1) the safety summit process,
2) efforts at establishing a risk management
program, 3)efforts early in the program to
establish an integrated Technical Information
and Management System and a coordinated
Software Support Environment, and 4) the
beginnings of a life-cycle cost thinking in the
system design. Nevertheless, there are still
many areas in which the ASAP believes that
improvement in safety related matters is
needed. These include:
o Organizational interactions.
- Systems Engineering and Integration.
-International glossary and acronym
list.
- Language barrier with internationals.
- NSTS/SSP conflicts on safety certifi-
cation of payloads.
o SR&QA Activities.
- Formal KS SR&QA activity.
- Charter for Safety Summit.
o Technical studies.
- Assured crew return.
- Caution and Warning display signals.
-Independent SR&QA (product assur-
ance) for KSE.
- Evolution management.
-Documenting assumptions in "quick
look" studies.
Treat nodes as labs with respect to
hazard detection.
Toxic cleanup.
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a. Organizational Interactions b. Safety
The Space Station Freedom organizational
structure is very complex and at times appears
unmanageable. It was spawned from a 1986
management study conducted by General Sam
Phillips and is modeled after the Apollo Pro-
gram organizational plan of the 1960's which
concentrated key administrative and technical
leadership in the Apollo Program Office at
NASA Headquarters supported by a system
engineering contractor, Bellcom Inc. That
management concept was perhaps ideal for the
time. NASA was itself a fledgling agency
overseeing four nascent centers, each thorough-
ly occupied with specific assignments requiring
full-time dedication. There was need for a
strong and visible focal point of leadership
which was the Apollo Program Office in NASA
Headquarters.
At the present time NASA is experiencing
growing pains in applying that management
concept to the Space Station organization.
However, there has been in this past year or
two several top level personnel changes as well
as a major relocation of the program office
from NASA Headquarters to Reston, VA. This
move, in effect, established a "mini-centeff'
which has to organize and manage its own in-
house support activities as well as managing the
program. In addition, five now mature NASA
centers have been assigned major roles, each
with a set of program ideas of their own, and
each possessing broad technical competence to
support their views. In effect, the centers are
more mature and experienced in their assigned
tasks than the organization set up to provide
overall leadership and guidance. This situation
has frequently led to confusion and indecision
and is most evident at joint meetings where key
issues are debated.
Nevertheless, the current management
structure is set in place and with the newly
assigned Associate Administrator for the Space
Station Office, a newly assigned Deputy Associ-
ate Administrator, and a newly assigned Space
Station Freedom ProgramDirector, one can
hope that some of the glaring deficiencies in
the management implementation will be over-
come and that the system will be made to
operate effectively in the manner originally
envisioned.
The safety function appears to have been
downplayed while management addresses the
myriad of start-up problems being faced. It is
not sufficient to be aware of safety and analyze
for it after the design is set. Safety must be an
inherent part of the SSFP design process from
the beginning if the desired level of risk reduc-
tion is to be achieved.
c_ Systems Engineering & Integration
Grumman Aerospace Company, the Pro-
gram Support Contractor (PSC), has been given
the contract to be the SE&I organization for the
Space Station Freedom Program Office. It is
not evident that the PSC is being utilized as
effectively as it might be in its role. Its activi-
ty appears more of a support service function
where certain tasks are assigned by the program
office rather than serving as the major integra-
tion arm for the program office. This deficien-
cy has been recognized by NASA top manage-
ment and it is our understanding that NASA is
reassessing this situation and taking the neces-
sary actions to have the PSC perform the role
intended for it.
NASA plans show that it intends to erect
the basic structure of the Space Station during
flights of the STS. This basic structure is to be
sufficiently complete so that the Station can be
permanently manned. NASA has also stated
that the erection of the Station will be accom-
plished using the EVA (Extravehicular Activity)
soft suit. This suit is currently limited to two
or three EVA's and requires major recondition-
ing of the suit after the two or three EVA's.
This reconditioning cannot, at this time, be
done in flight. Thus, for each STS flight there
will be a maximum of 24 to 36 manhours of EVA
to construct the Space Station. It is our opinion
that the construction program cannot be com-
pleted in the allocated number of STS flights
because of the limitations of the current suits.
NASA has allowed considerable time to
pass without authorizing a full-blown effort to
develop the so called "hard suit." It should not
lose any more time and should authorize a full
blown effort to develop the new suit since it
bears promise of:
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1. Greater flexibility--therefore easier to
do work in space.
2. Longer life between major required
maintenance.
3. Greater durability.
. Capability for higher internal pressure
with resultant reduction or elimination
of required prebreathing. Therefore,
more time will be available for produc-
tive work by the astronauts.
International Glossary and Acronym
L_t
The Safety Summit meetings revealed that
there are a number of terms that do not appear
to have the same meaning among all of the
international partners, or that there are differ-
ences in some of the basic program goals.
For example, simple words such as "risk"
and, particularly, "hazard," appear to have
different meanings across the international
community. In some cases risk refers to loss of
crew and/or vehicle and in other cases, it
includes that or a failure to accomplish mission
objectives. A definition of mission objectives
to support the prevailing risk management
classifications would help overcome much
confusion.
Another example arises in the interpreta-
tion of the words "standards and specifica-
tions." Some take them quite literally, while
others view them as a "first cut" that can be
changed or waived later on.
The ASAP, therefore, believes that there
should be an international effort for developing
a glossary of terms and semantics used in the
Program. If common definitions cannot be
achieved, then, at least, the different groups
should be documented. The glossary should then
achieve wide circulation throughout the inter-
national teams involved in the Space Station
Freedom Program.
Every new program in NASA leads to many
new terms and acronyms. Many of these grow
up locally within individual centers or, since
this is an international effort, within an indi-
vidual country or group of countries. The Space
Station effort seems particularly prone to the
development of new acronyms. And acronyms
are generally used without definition; listeners
then often try to fill in the gaps using words and
semantics familiar to them which seem to fit
the context. Unfortunately, such a process will
often lead to misinterpretations, and ultimate-
ly, to errors in the system.
The acronym problem has the potential to
become severe, and even dangerous. Acronyms
are particularly subject to local definition and
subsequent use in a broader context. Clearly,
with many groups creating acronyms indepen-
dently, many acronyms will acquire multiple
meanings. NASA should create some form of
acronym control. It could be as simple as a
central computer data base clearinghouse for
acronyms with which groups must register the
meanings of their acronyms. Then, a list of
acronyms could be prepared and distributed
each month. A more sophisticated scheme
might associate a "level of usage" with each
acronym indicating the level at which it has
been cleared for uniqueness and at which it is
safe to use.
e. Language Barriers with Internationals
It was evident during the Safety Summits
that there were language difficulties in working
with some of the international partners. The
various discussions proceeded too quickly for
some people to follow. As a result, they had to
try to work almost exclusively from the
vu-graphs.
Participants must also be careful to
remember that preparation of documentation
does not ensure understanding. Care must be
taken through faithful translations and careful
discussion to be sure that others understand
what is being said. If an interpreter cannot be
used during meetings with international
participants, then someone should be tasked to
work with an interpreter and any international
representatives needing assistance at the end of
the session to make sure they understand the
agreements reached and any action items
relating to them.
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fo NSTS/SSFP Conflicts on Safety
Certification of Payloads
There are a number of different groups
defining safety standards and procedures for
different parts of the system that will be in
operation when the Space Station is in orbit.
Aside from terminology issues, there are tech-
nical liaison issues that arise. It is important
that the safety procedures be compatible for
both sides of an interface components.
For example, certain NSTS requirements
place severe restrictions on SSFP operations,
e.g., the requirement to be ready to deorbit in
30 minutes (20 minutes to get the payload ready
and 10 minutes for payload bay door closing)
could necessitate that Station assembly include
safing the structure every 20 minutes! That
would surely interfere with assembly of the
Station, especially given the limited available
EVA times. There are many different scenarios
for the occurrence of failures while people are
working on the assembly of the Station, both
before and after achieving the permanently
manned configuration (PMC).
Some form of arbitration on interfaces of
this sort is needed, and NASA should ensure
that there is agreement and a safety interface
among all components that interact in Space
Station operation.
Organizational and budgetary problems
have had an impact on the SSFP's safety func-
tions. The SSFP safety organization has not
been allocated the staff necessary to function
at maximum effectiveness. The extent of
human factors involvement in all aspects of
SSFP from design through launch to operation
and, ultimately, final disposition, strongly
suggest that human factors should be given
programmatic recognition. The ASAP believes
that it is urgent that this situation be remedied
during the coming year.
a. Safety Summit Charter
The SSFP "Safety Summit" process started
in February of 1988 and is an excellent way for
the various centers and international partners
to exchange information and work on common
problems. It is one of the more progressive
activities that has been undertaken with respect
to safety for the Space Station and, in the view
of the ASAP, should continue throughout the
lifetime of the program. The Summit has no
official charter. Accordingly, no one is obliged
to attend (and there have been some notable
absences from the summits) and the conclusions
of the summits are binding upon neither the
participants nor others within NASA.
The ASAP has seen a number of positive
things about the technical development of the
Space Station during the past year. Among
these are: 1) the decision to utilize a 32 bit
data processor, 2) the incorporation of a means
to evolve from a 16 bit data bus to a 32 bit (or
larger) bus, 3) the early release of a contract to
develop the Software Support Environment
(SSE), and 4) the efforts toward a common
information management system.
The ASAP has a number of specific techni-
cal recommendations for the Space Station
which it believes will enhance safety.
a. Assured Crew Return
There are many possible scenarios that lead
to either the Station no longer being habitable
for the crew on board or the need to immedi-
ately return an individual crew member to
Earth. Such situations might arise from cata-
strophic failures (e.g., meteor hit), loss of
logistics (e.g., NSTS failure), failure of life
support system, or crew illness. Moreover,
there are many situations in which it would be
impossible to wait for a rendezvous with an
orbiter. STS launch commit criteria are advi-
sedly stringent and substantial delays are the
norm rather than the exception. Or worse,
another Challenger-like disaster could block
Shuttle flights for some time. Sick crew or a
limited life support capability could make the
delays intolerable. The ASAP thus believes that
an alternative crew return vehicle is an essen-
tial safety device that must be required for the
SSFP.
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b. Caution and Warning Display Signals
The Space Station is a special operating
environment in which there will be an almost
continual need to communicate operating status
and safety information to the crew. If the
caution and warning system (CWS) part of this
communication is divorced from the overall
system, if it does not have the highest priority
from the outset or if SSFP information system
planning is not undertaken early in the program,
problems will surely arise. Perhaps they will
not pop up immediately, but, rather, after the
Station has been in operation for some time and
multiple events occur which generate confusing
signals leading to incorrect decision-making
and, possibly, a disaster.
The ASAP believes that the Safety Summit
process has improved the original approach to
the SSFP CWS on which we were briefed last
Spring. Unfortunately, there still seems to be
the very real possibility that the CWS will be
developed as an add-on after the Station design
is mature and the hazards are identified and
classified. The basic concepts in the NASA-
STD-30000 which are being adapted are fine.
However, it is particularly disturbing that this
standard does not give the CWS specific prece-
dence over all other information presentations
to the crew. On the contrary, the words in the
NASA-STD-3000 seem to suggest that the CWS
should be designed to co-exist with the other
systems of the Station rather than vice versa.
There are many examples of poor CWS
design in aircraft, power plants, etc., which
arose through the process of insufficient
emphasis on the CWS during design definition.
The problem is magnified by the difficulty of
systems integration which the SSFP will surely
face. The ASAP therefore suggests that the
SSFP consider a sequence of activities such as
the following to obtain a maximally effective
CWS design:
o The SSFP management at Levels I and II
should make it clear that the CWS is part
of a total Space Station Information
System which must be defined and devel-
oped as a whole rather than as a set of
discrete units.
O The CWS be designated as the driving
force in all information presentations.
The CWS and its associated signals and
displays should be defined first. There-
after, all other subsystems must avoid
using the same signals ancl displays.
Further, it will be the duty of those
other subsystems to demonstrate that
their messages do not conflict with those
emanating from the CWS.
Space Station Management would be pru-
dent to consider taking the following steps
regarding the CWS:
O Determine if the 5 alarm classifications
in paragraph 9.4.4.3.1 of STD-30000 are
appropriate for the SSFP.
O Select display and signalling modalities
to associate with each of the 5 alarm
classifications.
O Produce a guidance document which
prescribes signals and alarms to be used
in the CWS and establishes rules of use
for the other subsystems which ensure
that the CWS usage is unique and
maximally discriminable.
Establish a clearinghouse as the program
progresses for determining if other
signals are conflicting with the CWS.
c_ Independent SR&QA for the SSE
The Software Support Environment (SSE),
currently being developed under the auspices of
Johnson Space Center, is one of the most
important initial developments for the Space
Station. The SSE will comprise the set of tools
(e.g., compilers, editors, debuggers) with
which all software for the Space Station itself,
and many of the payloads, will be built. The
SSE will impact virtually every phase of the
Space Station program. It is thus essential that
the SSE itself be free from errors. An
independent validation and verification (IV&V)
function, as would be conducted by an SR&QA
program, is essential.
The SSE will not be a static entity; it will
continually evolve as new tools and hardware
are added and compilers and other tools
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updated. Underscoring this is the fact that
the SSE will contain a component for
evolution management, as described below. The
IV&V function must be a continuing one, and
NASA must ensure that the SR&QA program for
the Space Station includes an effort directed
toward the SSE.
In addition to ensuring the integrity and
accuracy for the SSE itself, the activities of
SR&QA will ultimately encompass verifying
that the software produced using the SSE is safe
to operate on the Space Station. It is generally
true that efficiency is increased and costs
reduced if safety-related errors, particularly in
software, are caught and corrected as early in
the development process as possible. Hence, it
would seem wise and cost-effective to include
some built-in safety checks of the software as
part of the basic SSE design.
cL Evolution Management
During the 30 year lifetime of the Space
Station, it will evolve and change. New labora-
tory modules will be added, experiments will be
changed, the physical structure will be modified
or grow most dramatically, and at least four or
five generations of computers can be expected.
The Space Station must be capable of
dealing with this evolution. The geometric
models of the Space Station must be modified
as structure evolves. The computer systems
must evolve, and this should be handled in an
organized and efficient manner. Equally impor-
tant, the tools used for operating the Station
will evolve, for example, compilers will change
to produce more efficient codes, and editors,
debuggers, and other environment tools will be
frequently upgraded in capability.
Two basic sets of tools whose use will
pervade nearly all of the Station are the Tech-
nical Management Information System (TMIS)
and the Software Support Environment (SSE).
The former will hold information regarding all
aspects of the Station, while the latter will be
used for preparation of most of the software
used both in the Space Station and for ground
support. Although the ASAP is very pleased to
see coordinated efforts in these two areas
started early in the life-cycle of the Station,
sufficient tools or plans for managing the
expected evolution were not apparent. Specifi-
cally, it is believed that the design of the SSE,
TMIS and other relevant parts of the Space
Station effort must include evolution manage-
ment capabilities.
e. Documenting Assumptions in "Quick
Look" Studies
Much of the analytical work performed to
date for the Space Station has been in the form
of "quick and dirty" case studies. These are
very useful, but they do not provide an in-depth
look at the problem. The ASAP has found that
NASA frequently does not clearly document all
the assumptions made in the conduct of such
studies. This raises the possibility that someone
will look at these analyses at a later date and
assume that the area was examined and was not
a problem rather than that it was excluded by
the assumptions of the "quick look" study. For
example, the dual egress studies all assumed
that the crew was healthy and able to partici-
pate in their own safety activities. That
assumption is reasonable as a first look. How-
ever, the analyses list no impacts on the various
approaches studied if a crew member is
incapacitated.
f. Nodes as Laboratories
The nodes on the Station are now being
considered for use as more than connectors.
There is apparently a move to use them for
storage and additional experiment space. This
makes them no different than the major
modules of the Station with respect to safety.
They must be treated like other laboratories
with respect to failure detection, e.g., fire and
toxics, safe haven and crew escape. NASA
management should set boundaries on node use
immediately so that design and safety efforts
can properly deal with them.
g. Toxic Cleanup
It is the understanding of the ASAP that
the baseline design of the Space Station does
not include any provision for kits or other
means to clean up toxic spills. The process
material management subsystem (PMMS) will be
able to scrub the recirculated air of the many
contaminants. Spills in open areas, however,
are apparently being dealt with solely by
prevention.
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Experience with other programs and the
long-planned life cycle of the Space Station
suggests that hazardous spills in the open cabin
areas are something which should be covered by
design. Some type of cleanup kit or other
means of correcting the problem appears
worthy of consideration. Likewise, a firm
definition of a "panic button" system which
would seal a module in which a spill occurs is
needed. This will avoid having a toxic spill
contaminate the entire station through the
distributed systems. A study of the nature and
type of such a system, e.g., manual versus
automatic, response time, appears warranted.
The current baseline design provides the
capability of a single repressurization of one of
the Station's attached modules. This seems
unnecessarily limiting in light of the pre-
liminary meteor and debris impact studies
presented at the Safety Summit and the possi-
bility of having to completely exchange a
module's atmosphere to remove toxics.
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C,Aeronautics
As a result of reviews of the three NASA
centers involved in flight research (Langley,
Ames and Dryden), it is apparent that flight
safety procedures have been developed by the
centers to suit the individual nature of their
flight research projects. In addition to flight
research projects that relate to the basic
aeronautical sciences (aerodynamics, structure,
controls, etc.), flight activity extends to sup-
port programs that require platforms, such as
the Boeing 737 aircraft that supports the
Advanced Transport Operating System (ATOPS)
program at LaRC. Here, a second cockpit with
operational controls and displays for navigation
and approach research is incorporated in the
fuselage of the aircraft. _A wide variety of
different type aircraft including rotary wing,
general aviation, fighter, large transport and
executive class are included in the flight
research programs. With the large diversity of
aircraft and the unique configurations being
flown on each of the aircraft, there is a signifi-
cant need for maintenance, test, training and
proficiency flying at each of the centers.
These functions are handled by different
management organizations and procedures at
each of the centers. For example, at Langley
the assurance of flight safety is the responsi-
bility of the Director of Aeronautics. Imple-
mentation of a safety program is part of the
responsibility of the Chief of the Low-Speed
Aerodynamics Division (LSAD). Within the
LSAD is the aircraft operations branch which
includes the Airworthiness and Assurance
Officer, and the Research Aircraft Support
section - all participating in the flight research
programs with well defined functions. The
Airworthiness and Safety Review Board (ASRB)
is formed as an ad hoc board for each project
with membership from the Aeronautics, Elec-
tronics, Structures, and Systems Engineering
and Operations Directorates and also includes
the Aviation Safety Officer and other members
assigned by the Center Director. It provides
oversight of the line functions and includes the
following responsibilities: (1) conduct safety
reviews as required for all flight research
programs, (2) evaluate hazards analyses and risk
assessments, (3) approve "Flight Test Opera-
tions and Safety Report," and (4) issue "Flight
Safety Release." The ASRB does not have
responsibility for routine flight functions such
as maintenance, incorporation of airworthiness
directives, etc. The Aviation Safety Officer is
responsible for the review of established opera-
tional safety and maintenance procedures and
to recommend approval for the safety aspects
of all flight-related activities. He is also
responsible for coordinating with the Airworthi-
ness Assurance Office and the Project Engineer
as required for creation of flight research
System Safety Program plans. The Project
Engineer also has a set of prescribed responsi-
bilities relating to safety which include identi-
fication of possible hazards peculiar to the
project and generating a description of modifi-
cations which might affect the aerodynamic
and/or stability and control characteristics of
the aircraft or any other needs for flight condi-
tions that fall outside the normal flight
envelope for the particular aircraft.
The flight safety procedures at LaRC
appear to possess adequate mechanisms to
insure a safe flight operation including over-
lapping procedures that serve as checks with
members of a number of separate offices
inspecting the projects. Although this is also
true for the other centers, it may be beneficial
to develop a more standard set of procedures
for all of the flight research activities. The
vortex flap project is an excellent example of a
full-fledged flight program combining flight,
wind tunnel, analytical and other center activi-
ties to assure that the program is conducted in
a safe manner while achieving technical objec-
tives. On a note of caution, the vortex flap
project's low budget may be causing a "short-
cutting" of structural loads analysis with its
detrimental effect on the stress analysis. In
this connection, the method of determining the
loads (and stresses) in the redesigned wing
involve approximations that could be more
accurately defined if greater resources were
available.
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D,RiskManagement
In the ASAP 1988 report we commented on
the significant progress being made in structur-
ing the safety engineering and quality assurance
functions throughout NASA. We noted that
NASA had several NASA Management Instruc-
tions (NMIs), NASA Notices (NNs) and NASA
Handbooks (NHBs) in work that would provide
new policies, guidelines and implementation
techniques for performing many of the activi-
ties necessary to improve the identification and
evaluation of safety risks. These documents
were to provide guidance for the development
of Risk Management plans for each major
program, and defined the role of the Office of
SRM&QA in providing support and oversight to
each program's risk management process. A
Code Q "Centralized Safety Program," released
in March 1988, provides a framework for overall
systems safety management. A top-level NMI
8070.4 titled "Risk Management Policy for
Manned Flight Programs" was released in
February 1988, and an update of NHB 1700.1
(Volume 7) was released in August 1988. Drafts
of two NHBs, one on "Risk Management Pro-
gram Roles and Responsibilities" and one on
"Risk Management Program Tools and Tech-
niques" are in work.
NMI 8070.4 provides policy statements
regarding establishment of a structured risk
management process for each manned flight
program. The risk management process is to
encompass risk identification, categorization,
estimation of risk levels, definition of risk
acceptance criteria and selection of risk miti-
gation alternatives. The policy also indicates
that a wide variety of methods may be used to
conduct risk assessments. It further states that
NASA believes that qualitative risk assessments
will be appropriate for most NASA programs.
These qualitative assessments are to be based
on FMEA and hazards analysis. It does state
also that the hazards analysis should be
augmented whenever appropriate by fault tree
analysis (FTA). The results of these activities
are to be reviewed and subjectively assessed for
risk during various reviews.
To enhance the procedures above, NMI
8070.4 requires that critical failure modes and
their corresponding hazards, as well as hazards
identified as arising from other sources, shall be
categorized and prioritized with at least subjec-
tive ratings of the frequencies and severities of
the mishaps that could arise from these
hazards. The policy goes on to state that "risk
acceptance or risk mitigation decision-making
shall then be guided by these ratings, to the
extent possible, taking into account the uncer-
tainties in them. In the world of systems safe-
ty, a rating (value) given to the frequency
(likelihood of occurrence) and to the severity
(the consequence) of a mishap is almost the
definition of a "safety risk." One needs to add,
however, the likelihood of the consequence
having a particular severity level in order to
actually define safety-risk level for risk
management.
The ASAP is strongly supportive of the
framework for risk assessment described in
NMI 8070.4. It is our opinion that the methods
and criteria to be used for establishing the fault
and hazard ratings which are critical to defining
the safety-risks is still an area of significant
ambiguity and concern. The qualitative priori-
tization of mishaps which are only identified by
Fault Free Analysis (FTAs) and Event Tree
Analysis (ETAs) is a good first step in focusing
on what could possibly be the most significant
possible risks. NASA has recognized that where
the risk levels may be significant, a more
quantitative risk assessment methodology may
be required. In NMI 8070.4 the evolution of
such methodologies and data handling systems
for future manned flight systems is stated as a
NASA objective.
During 1988, the ASAP reviewed the struc-
ture and operations of the SRM&QA organiza-
tions at Headquarters, JSC, and MSFC, with
particular focus on the implementation of NMI
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8070.4. Throughout NASA we found a high level
of awareness regarding systems safety and
broad commitment to improve the processes of
identification, evaluation and control of system
safety risks. Policy and overall direction con-
cerning safety activities originate in the Office
of the Associate Administrator, SRM&QA, who
has direct access to the Administrator of
NASA. This office is responsible for agency-
wide oversight regarding the implementation of
all safety-related matters, and thus provides
the required independent path for risk concerns
to be elevated through the NASA management
structure to the very top.
The ASAP notes that NASA does very little
work "in-house" on its programs now. The
majority of the work is performed by the con-
tractors--including most of the SR&QA tasks.
Therefore a principal function of the NASA
SR&QA organization is to see that the tasks
mandated by NASA policies are performed
properly, and that the significance of the
results and recommendations for safety-related
actions are communicated to the responsible
managers in the various programs. In the event
of disagreements, the SR&QA staffs must
exercise their right and duty to elevate the
issues to higher authority both within SR&QA
organizations and through program channels.
In addition to the "monitoring" type work
just described (which also entails making sure
that the tasks have been stipulated in the
contracts) the SR&QA has the responsibility to
perform independent assessments and analyses
of pertinent subjects. It is our observation that
to date much of the execution of the oversight
function by Headquarters has been carried out
directly by the Associate Administrator for
SRM&QA. This has been in part because of the
critical requirement to get the STS back into
flight, but also it has been the result of a slow
buildup of required experienced personnel. We
perceive that other programs such as the Space
Station need more attention both in the form of
stronger Headquarters direction, and in the
personal attention of the Associate Administra-
tor for SRM&QA. It is a critical time period in
the Space Station schedule if the NMI 8070.4
policy objective of developing a more "quantita-
tive risk assessment methodology and asso-
ciated data base" is to be realized and made
useful for effective risk management.
At JSC it was very evident to the ASAP
that a great deal of attention is now focused on
systems safety activities. The Center Director
was dedicated to continuing across-the-board
improvements in risk assessment and risk miti-
gation. This commitment was also strongly
evidenced by the Deputy Director of the NSTS
Program Office and by the Director of the
Center's SRM&QA organization. However, we
observed that the safety organization is not
fully staffed to adequately come to grips with
real risk assessment functions nor with how to
use such information for systematic risk man-
agement. The information gathered by the
SR&QA group was clearly used in decisions of
whether or not to fly, but it is less clear how
the information will be used in decisions of
what efforts should be put into modifying the
Shuttle or developing the Space Station. NASA
needs to examine the kinds of information being
provided and determine what kinds of decisions
could and should be made and by whom. There
should be designated individuals who have the
specific charge of looking at the risk informa-
tion produced for each program and making
recommendations regarding action items.
A second issue that was expressed first at
JSC and later at MSFC, was the apparent lack
of budgetary support to SRM&QA offices in the
centers from the Office of the Associate
Administrator for SRM&QA. There were
reports of budget cuts to SRM&QA without the
knowledge or participation of the AA for
SRM&QA.
The ASAP was given presentations on new
approaches to hazard rebaselining and attempts
at risk-level rating using a 3 x 3 matrix. A new
format and content for the Mission Safety
Assessment (MSA) report for STS-26 was com-
pared to earlier MSAs. A graphical presenta-
tion approach is taken using fault trees to
highlight system effects resulting from lower-
level faults. The selection of hazards to be
included in the MSA came from a subjective
prioritization of results for rating hazards using
the 3 x 3 matrix. It should be noted that the
probability of occurrence of the causing faults
really is not addressed since they all fall in the
"unlikely" box of the 3 x 3 matrix. Similarly,
only one level of severity, loss of crew and
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vehicle is used to select items for the MSA.
The likelihood of the severity level occurring is
not addressed, and therefore even the relative
risk is undefined.
Thus, the new MSA document highlights a
selected set of possible mishaps which might
result from various hazards caused by either
hardware failures or human errors. It can be
used to communicate the selected undesirable
events and the control methods in place (or
required) to block the fault chain propagation.
It does not, however, communicate the risk
associated with each possible mishap and there-
fore makes it difficult for Program Office and
NASA authorities to evaluate the real serious-
ness for the selected "significant risks."
For the NSTS program, a Systems Safety
Review Panel has been created which includes
members from all centers and Headquarters.
The head of the Panel reports to the Director of
SRM&QA at JSC in his role as NSTS Level II
Safety manager. The NSTS Level II indicates
there are several routes to the top of NASA.
An issue raised by the new MSA is the
significance of the color coding used. This
coding is said to provide better "risk" visi-
bility. The use of red to indicate "improvement
highly desirable" (IHD) or even yellow indicating
"improvement desirable" (ID) is a way of quali-
tatively assigning some relative levels of risk to
the event. Because the hazards selected were
all placed in the unlikely box of the hazard
rating matrix, the safety-risk assessment of
"improvement highly desirable" becomes non-
definitive. If the risk is so low as to be rated
unlikely, why are improvements in design or
controls highly desirable? If the risk really is
greater than unlikely, should STS fly before the
improvements are made? How should a pro-
gram office react to such data? It is difficult
for ASAP to see how they can accomplish any
really effective management of risks without a
much more objective and data-based metho-
dology for assessing the relative risk levels.
The ASAP reviewed a study done to com-
pare the "risks" for two alternative crew escape
systems for STS. This qualitative assessment
technique utilized five levels for likelihood of
each failure model occurrence and considered
five levels for likelihood of the worst-case
failure effect. This approach provided a more
definitive relative risk-level comparison which
permitted selection of the "pole" escape sys-
tem. A similar system was used to compare
"risks" of the unlatched and latched 17-inch
valve configurations.
Also reviewed were the plans for risk
management of the Space Station Freedom
Program. This program is evolving its own
system safety effort (JSC Space Station Safety
Plan, JSC 32066), along with the prime contrac-
tor's safety plan MDC H4038A (McDonnell
Douglas Corporation). These plans include
better quantification of uncertainty and severi-
ty which can form a basis for prioritization of
risks and their management.
Members of the ASAP heard strong con-
cerns with regard to the delay in establishment
of the systems-safety requirements for Space
Station. The system engineering trades are
already far along, and still safety requirements
and their resulting impact on all the system and
specific hardware design criteria are not
available. If system safety is going to become a
reality on Space Station this entire function has
got to be rapidly and effectively implemented.
Otherwise the designs get forever fixed and the
risk assessment trades will be "academic"
because they are too late.
The ASAP was impressed with the progress
made at MSFC in structuring and staffing the
SRM&QA organization. The Center's manage-
ment is committed to the evolution of a strong,
professional systems safety organization.
Support has been arranged for various aspects
of SR&QA from various programs and the
Center's resources. We believe the SRM&QA
organizational structure at MSFC is excellent
and provides good grouping of engineering
disciplines and responsibilities. In particular
the Systems Safety and Reliability Office with
its two functional divisions contains the organi-
zation elements which are necessary to evolve a
very effective Systems-Safety Engineering
capability, something that the ASAP has strong-
ly recommended over the past few years.
The SRM&QA team has been built up using
experienced managers from MSFC Science and
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Engineering,Special Projects and various major
program offices. It now hasa staff of over 180
people and includes specialists brought in from
industries and universities. The ASAP is
impressed with the plans, goals, technical
discipline development and personnel training.
They are focusing significant efforts on more
definitive objective risk assessment and on
statistical data base development. Although
they currently are also using the 3 x 3 "risk"
matrix for hazard rating and JSC's general
format for the Mission Safety Assessment,the
ASAPfound MSFC hasa goodunderstandingand
concern for the limitations those methodshave
as far as providing the measurable, objective
risk assessmentsrequired for systematic cost
effective management of the reduction and
control of risk levels. To help build the neces-
sary technologies for doing this and analyzing
the test and flight data bases,andfor support-
ing activities in systems safety engineering
analysis, probabilistic (or quantitative) risk
assessments(PRA and QRA) and other related
disciplines, MSFC has engaged the services of
EMHART Advanced Technology Inc. and Arvin
Calspan Inc. They have the potential to evolve
this engineering discipline into the complete
capability envisioned and recommended by the
ASAP.
The MSFC Space Station project organiza-
tion is still evolving and has had difficulty
becoming truly effective, possibly because of
the lack of adequate direction and funding.
This has been compounded by not having a
systems safety requirements document, and no
defined, unified approach to safety risk man-
agement. Specific criteria for design and test
program planning to develop the information
required for risk assessment have not yet been
developed. The Space Station is the first pro-
gram to which the objectives of the new sys-
tems safety policy in NMI 8070.4 are to be
applied. It is crucial that the above problems
be corrected.
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The NASA response was dated September 16, 1988 and in accordance with the Panel's
letter of transmittal, NASA was requested to respond to Section II, "Findings and
Recommendations" and to the "Open" items noted in Section IV.D, "NASA Response to
Panel Annual Report, March 1987."
As noted here, "open" indicates actions may have been taken but are not to the point
where the action can be considered completed. "Closed" indicates no further action on
the part of the ASAP is necessary.
STATUSSUBJECT
A. 1.a. Support new organizational structure for CLOSED
both programs and the SRM&QA operation
A. 1.b. Keeping the Administrator informed of C LOSED
program status and activities of note
A.l.c. Use of the STS where human presence in CLOSED
space is needed for mission success
Reevaluation and recertification workload
and prevention of human error at KSC
Methodology and implementation for conduct
of FMEA/CIL/Hazards Analyses. Prioritizing
of items
A.3.a. MLP prelaunch loads and launch loads CLOSED
A.3.b. Instrumentation/Inspection of recovered CLOSED
SRM/SRBs
A.3.c. NASA to continue to have clear and uniform CLOSED
policiesfor Shuttle processing
A.3.d. Clear, unambiguous launch commit criteria CLOSED
B.l.a. SR&QA (Code Q) Risk Management directives CLOSED
and directionsfor manned and unmanned
programs
The dangers of complacency
A.l.d. OPEN--
Monitor
A.2. OPEN--
Monitor
B.l.b. OPEN--
Monitor
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C°2°
C.3.a.
C.3.b.
C.3.c.
C.3.d.
SR&QA NMIs and Handbooks for risk assessment
Study of potential design-induced human
errors
SRB aft skirt structural concerns
Establish criteria for nominal joints and
flawed joints as part of CEI specification
N/A
Orbiter OV-102 Strain gauge calibration
Orbiter structural inspection and maintenance
Shuttle Computer Upgrade
APU turbine wheel blade cracking concerns
SSME certification testing time at 109_ RPL
KSC STS launch processing working environment
as affected by schedules and mod work loads
CLOSED
OPEN--
Monitor
CLOSED
CLOSED
OPEN
CLOSED
CLOSED
OPEN--
Monitor
CLOSED
OPEN--
Monitor
C.5.b.
C.5.c.
C.5.d.
C.5.e.
D.I°
D°2°
D.3
E°I°
E°2°
Human resource problems at KSC to match work
load including worker morale and productivity
Launch frequency (manifest) concerns
Concerns regarding General Purpose Computer
memory read/write procedures (gmems) at KSC
Procedures for approving late software
changes at JSC/KSC
Space Station Computing Systems
Crew Emergency Rescue Vehicle activities
EVA/Space Suits for Space Station
X-Wing lessons learned regarding development
of key technologies and structuring R&D
programs
X-29 flight test program
OPEN--
Monitor
OPEN--
Monitor
CLOSED
OPEN--
Monitor
OPEN--
Monitor
OPEN--
Monitor
OPEN--
Monitor
OPEN--
Monitor
C LOSED
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E.3. CLOSEDFlight recorders placed in training and
administrative aircraft
E°4° Aircraft Operations and Safety Management OPEN--
Monitor
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The following items were holdovers from the March 1987annual report and respondedto
in Dr. Fletcher's letter dated September16, 1988,page 29-37. A number of these were
discussedagain in the March 1988 annual report and are carried over into the status
report noted previously. As suchthey are considered"closed" here.
Pg. 29 B.1. Extra Vehicular Activities (EVA)/Space Closed
Suits
SeeD.3.
Pg. 30 B.2. SpaceStation Organization/Management Closed
Pg. 30 C.1. Orbiter Structure/Brakes Closed
Pg. 31 C.2. STSOperations Closed
SeeC.5/A.1
Pg. 31 D.1. Shuttle Management Closed
See C.5/A.1
Pg. 33 D.2. Space Shuttle Systems Closed
See
C.1/C.3/C.4
Pg. 34 D.4. Safety, Reliability, Quality Assurance Closed
See
A.1/A.2/B.1
Pg. 35 D.5. Space Station Program Closed
See
D.1/D.2/D.3
Pg.37 D.6. Aeronautics Closed
See E.I-.4
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N6SA
National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
Washington, D.C.
20546
Office of the Administrator SEP i 6 ?388
Mr. Joseph F. Sutter
Chairman
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
9311 Fauntleroy Way
Seattle, WA 98131
Dear Joe:
The enclosure contains our detailed response to the
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) Report of 1987. In
accordance with your letter, we have responded to Section II,
"Findings and Recommendations" and to the "OPEN" items noted in
Section IV.D, "NASA Response to Panel Annual Report, March 1987."
The ASAP has done its usual excellent work during 1987. We
believe your activities and specific recommendations play an
important part in reducing risk in NASA's manned flight programs.
We concur with the vast majority of the recommendations and, in
most instances, are implementing corrective action.
We thank you for your valuable contribution and look forward
to your comments in the 1988 report. As always, your
recommendations are highly regarded and receive the full
attention of our senior management personnel.
Enclosure
S]
/
/
ncere ly,
[mes C. Fletcher
Iministrator
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NASA'S RESPONSE TO THE
AEROSPACE SAFETY ADVISORY PANEL
ANNUAL REPORT
FOR 1987
]3-6
II. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Safe Return to Flight
1. Space Transportation System (STS) Management
a. Finding_ NASA has responded positively to ASAP's recommendations and those of
the Presidential Commission dealing with reorganization of NASA and the National Space
Transportation System, including the re-establishment of an independent safety, relia-
bility, maintainability, and quality assurance function.
Recommendations_ NASA's top management should continue to support vigorously the
new Agency and programmatic organizational structure. The Office of SRM&QA should
continue to be provided with the management support and resources it needs to carry out
its essential oversight and review function in a fully independent and comprehensive
manner. (p. 3)
NASA Response: The Associate Administrator (AA) for Safety, Reliability, Main-
tainability, and Quality Assurance (SRM&QA) is on an equal organizational basis with the
top program officials within the Agency. The AA also has access, both on an as required
and on a regularly scheduled basis, with the other top management officials within the
Agency. Additionally, requests for resources, both budgetary and personnel, are given
careful and deliberate consideration. NASA is committed to providing a vigorous and
independent oversight and review function through the Office of Safety, Reliability,
Maintainability and Quality Assurance. This capability has been developed and is in
place. NASA's long range plans include the maintenance of this established capability
and the continual strengthening of the SRM&QA functions within the Agency.
b. Finding_ In the investigation of the Challenger accident, it was revealed that a
breakdown developed in the Shuttle management structure over the course of time.
Explanations for this abound. Nevertheless, the view persists that if the management
breakdown could have been averted, vital information pertinent to the decision-making
process could have reached responsible management in a more timely manner.
Recommendations_ Once a management system for a program has been adopted,
especially for long term projects, it would seem prudent for the NASA Administrator to
be apprised periodically of its functioning to ensure that changes in personnel and
program direction have not resulted in deterioration of the management structure. (p. 3)
NASA Response: NASA agrees. How well the management system functions is a key
element in the assessment of NASA programs. The management system, much like
technical or budgetary elements, is being reviewed periodically, with the results provided
to the NASA Administrator. Among the management mechanisms in NASA that enable
this to occur are the various Management Councils that involve the appropriate NASA
Center Directors, and the monthly General Management Status Reviews (GMSR) where
the various NASA Associate Administrators report directly to the Administrator. The
direction and discipline applied for these reviews ensures that the intent and content of
these reviews cover all aspects of technical as well as programmatic problems facing the
Agency, the Centers, and programs. All changes in key personnel, management structure
and organizations and the status relative to performance, problems, and concerns are
continually reviewed as part of the agendas for these reviews. In addition, the SRM&QA
organization, Code Q, is strengthening the Agency's audit system capability, which
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includes the periodic survey and assessment of the Centers' technical and management
and reporting systems.
c. Finding_ The STS is a complex system with many R&D-like characteristics. To
employ the system so that there is an acceptable level of risk requires much effort and
vigilant attention to detail.
Recommendation_ NASA should adopt the goal of using the STS only in those circum-
stances where human presence in space is needed for mission success. Otherwise, access
to space should be gained by using unmanned expendable rockets. Given the expected
long-term requirements of the Space Station and other space projects of national impor-
tance, the need to begin development of an unmanned heavy lift vehicle is clear.
These initiatives should be part of a long-term, comprehensive national space policy that
sets clear objectives, determines the best way to accomplish these objectives, and then
commits the United States to a realistic schedule and budget. (p. 3)
NASA Response: NASA agrees and is working toward this goal. However, the Space
Shuttle must be utilized to reduce the current payload backlog. The President's national
space policy, which sets forth a long-term balanced and clear cut set of goals, principles,
and guidelines, states that the Space Transportation System (STS) will be used to main-
tain the Nation's capability in manned space flight and to support critical programs
requiring manned presence and other unique STS capabilities. The policy also states that
the United States' national space transportation capability will be based on a mix of
vehicles, consisting of the STS, unmanned launch vehicles and in space transportation
systems. NASA strongly supports this policy and is intent upon meeting its objectives.
As stated in the response to the 1986 ASAP report, the mixed fleet analysis study has
been completed. The resulting plan is currently being implemented for a mixed fleet of
launch vehicles. The March 1988 Mixed Fleet Manifest for flights through September
1993 shows 16 NASA and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
spacecraft previously planned for the shuttle being reassigned for launching on expenda-
ble launch vehicles (ELV's). In addition, some 20 DOD payloads have been off-loaded
from the shuttle to E LV's.
NASA also agrees with the need for development of an unmanned heavy-lift vehicle. The
Agency is a partner with the Air Force in the definition of an Advanced Launch System
(ALS) and is also conducting initial studies of an unmanned, cargo version of the Space
Shuttle, Shuttle C.
d. Findin_ The reevaluation and recertification of all hardware and software sys-
tems on the STS has produced an extremely heavy workload related to launch processing
including more paperwork, many modifications to existing systems, and a greatly
expanded test program.
Recommendation_ NASA, the Shuttle Processing Contractor (SPC), and supporting
contractors must exercise the most intensive and unrelenting scrutiny to prevent human
error from occurring. In particular, the natural tendency to sign off routinely on com-
plex documents approved at lower levels, shortcut test procedures, or otherwise work
around nagging problems must be avoided at all costs. (p. 4)
NASA Response: Both NASA and contractor management are sensitive to the need to
prevent human error from occurring. Increased discipline has been manifested by addi-
tions to manpower in the areas of engineering support to the on-line workforce and addi-
tional quality control personnel, with clear direction for increased emphasis on planning
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and control of work. In the SRM&QA area, the ratio of quality control inspector-to-
technicians has been increased in all areas from pre-STS 51-L levels.
Certification and recertification training also continues to be provided for the work-
force. NASA, the Shuttle Processing Contractor (SPC), and element contractor man-
agement periodically review these programs to assure that each critical discipline area is
properly supported. Additionally, the currently budgeted Shuttle Processing Data Man-
agement System (SPDMS) is being implemented to lessen the paperwork burden. This
automated system will improve the work control system by providing for faster, more
accurate problem disposition with appropriate management visibility.
In addition to the above, the NASA Headquarters SRM&QA Office, Code Q, has revised
the System Safety Handbook whereby a chapter is devoted to Human Factors considera-
tions and requirements. Code Q will also validate the effectivity of organizational func-
tions, systems and staffing through selected staff assistance surveys. Such overview
actions will permit insight for determination relative to existence and application of
adequate discipline within the system.
2. Reassessment of Risk
Finding_ NASA and the STS contractors have been redoing the Failure Modes and
Effects Analysis (FMEA's), Critical Items List (CIL's) and Hazard Analyses for all
elements of the Shuttle system. We found that, although there were great differences in
the specific techniques and data management employed by different organizations, the
work was thorough and of high quality. Only a limited number of new failure modes were
uncovered in the original designs. There were, of course, new modes identified for
designs that had changes incorporated or planned. One result of the rework is that the
number of Criticality 1 and 2 items increased dramatically. This occurred primarily
because of new ground rules as to levels at which components would be addressed.
NASA is considering various techniques for prioritizing the CIL so that the "highest risk"
items can receive the highest levels of attention. The ASAP strongly supports this
concept. A more definitive prioritization for such risk management purposes would
require a more quantitative methodology to establish safety-risk levels.
Recommendations: (1) NASA should take steps to establish uniform methodology for
conducting FMEA/CIL/Hazards Analyses for the Agency as a whole. (2) In addition to
the above, NASA should develop and implement a consistent method of prioritization of
items in the CIL so that appropriate attention can be given to the greater risks. (3) Data
developed from the FMEA/CIL/Hazards Analysis process should be organized in such a
fashion that it provides the deciding authority with information permitting him or her to
assess the risk and make informed decisions. (p. 4)
NASA Response: (1) As part of the revalidation process for the STS "Return to Flight",
the National Space Transportation System (NSTS) Program issued NSTS 22206, "Instruc-
tions for Preparation of Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items
List (CIL)" and NSTS 22254, "Methodology for Conduct of NSTS Hazards Analyses
(HA)." The purpose of these documents is to provide consistent methods for the prepara-
tion, maintenance, and publication of the FMEA/CIL's/HA's. These documents are being
used by the SRM&QA Office to develop NASA handbooks that will provide the Agency-
wide guidelines. Drafts of these handbooks have already been prepared, and it is antici-
pated that the final documents will be issued prior to the end of FY 88. (2) A procedure
(NSTS 22491, "Instructions for Preparation of Critical Items Risk Assessment") was
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developedand issued by the NSTS Program to implement a method of categorizing NSTS
failure modes by severity of effect and likeliness of occurrence and prioritizing them
from most severe effect to least severe effect. In addition, a method (Memorandum
NA2/87-L046, "Implementation of Hazard Prioritization Technique", September 29, 1987)
for categorizing Hazards by likelihood of occurrence and severity was also implemented
in order to determine a risk index for each hazard. These methodologies are being incor-
porated into an overall Agency Risk Management Program being developed by the
SRM&QA Office. (3) The NSTS Program has developed a new closed-loop accounting
system known as the System Integrity Assurance Program (SIAP). A key feature of SIAP
is its Program Compliance Assurance and Status System (PCASS). This is a computer-
based information system which functions as a database that integrates a number of
information systems. FMEA/CIL and Hazards Analyses data are a part of this data
base. PCASS has the potential to provide, in near real-time, an integrated view of a
number of risk assessment parameters to NSTS Program decision-makers.
3. Design, Checkout, and Operations
a. Findingr_ Mobile Launch Platform stiffness data. The prelaunch and liftoff loads
data have been found to be inadequate owing to new Mobile Launch Platform (MLP)
stiffness test results.
Recommendations: The Solid Rocket Booster hold-down posts, struts and attachments
can be instrumented properly and data recorded during static ground tests, firing tests
and actual launches. The recorded data should then be correlated with the calculated
data obtained from analysis. (p. 4)
NASA Response: The prelaunch loads have been revised to incorporate the new MLP
stiffness test results and the revised Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) aft skirt math model.
These include the results from the MLP - 1/2 stiffness tests. The liftoff loads, which are
less affected by the new MLP stiffness test results, utilize the earlier MLP-3 stiffness
data. The combined load, designated DCR-2, are the loads being used to certify and
clear the Shuttle vehicle, including the SRB hold-down posts and struts for launch. The
SRB hold-down posts and struts have been instrumented for the first three flights. Data
recorded during the structural qualification test of the aft skirt (STA-3) ground tests,
completed on April 1, 1988, are being correlated with calculated data. Data from the
flight readiness firing (FRF) test and subsequent launches will be correlated with pre-
vious data.
b. Findings: Flight evaluation, product improvement and ground testing. Valuable and
much-needed data should be obtained from the Solid Rocket Booster flight articles,
especially the first flight (STS-26).
Recommendation_ A comprehensive program of measurement in flight, inspection of
recovered motors and assessment of results should be made for each SRB flight. The
flight evaluation program should provide for design and production evaluation. The
hardware from the first several flights can be used in ground tests such as the Joint
Environmental Simulator (JES), Nozzle Joint Environmental Simulator (NJES), and
Transient Pressure Test Article (TPTA) to obtain valuable data for evaluation of solid
rocket motor re-use. (p. 5)
NASA Response: An inspection plan for the retrieved SRB/SRM hardware is being
implemented which involves personnel from Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC),
Kennedy Space Center (KSC), United Space Boosters, Inc. (USBI), Morton Thiokol, Inc.
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(MTI), and the Shuttle ProcessingContractor (SPC). Documentshave beenprepared to
define the inspections to be performed, and distinguish between nominal and anomalous
conditions. Development flight instrumentation is currently planned for the first three
flights. There currently are no plans to utilize the returned hardware from the first
several flights as test articles. However, there are plans under consideration to conduct
a multiple cycle hydroproof test, with periodic disassembly and measurement of dimen-
sional changes, to assess reusability, and to conduct flight support motor static firings to
validate ongoing production. Consideration is also being given to Multiple Cycle Testing
of the aft skirt, under prelaunch load conditions.
c. Findiug_ Prior to the STS 51-L accident, there was no cross-reference listing
between the Operational Maintenance Requirements Specifications Document (OMRSD)
and the Critical Items List (CIL). Since the accident, an OMRSD/FMEA/CIL matrix has
been generated to help ensure that a focus is kept on all critical items in every step of
the processing procedure. One of the shortcomings in the procedures prior to the 51-L
accident was the lack of traceability of OMRSD requirements to the Operations and
Maintenance Instructions (OMI). An Operations and Maintenance Plan (OMP) is now in
use to provide this traceability. A closed-loop requirements accounting system is
expected to be in place for STS-26R. This will be a partially manual system for STS-26
but is expected to be fully automated by February 1989.
Recommendations: NASA should continue its efforts to establish clear-cut and uniform
policies for the Shuttle Processing Procedures and for the flow of all evaluations top-
down as well as bottom-up in a consistent and rational manner. (p. 5)
NASA Response: NASA is continuing its efforts to have clear and uniform policies for
shuttle processing procedures and evaluations. NASA and its contractors are expending
major efforts to properly identify, document, and cross reference all shuttle critical
items in the CIL, OMRSD, OMI's and OMP. These documents have all been thoroughly
reviewed, revised, and reformatted for that specific purpose, and matrices allow tracing
a CIL item throughout the series. Closed-loop OMP - OMI - OMRSD Accounting has been
initiated and is in place supporting STS-26R KSC processing. The complete automation
of this system is in process and on schedule to be partially available for STS-26 and com-
pleted by February 1989. This system will provide for uniform implementation of policy
and create a greater awareness of the critical portions of shuttle processing and facili-
tate problem identification, resolution, and anomaly evaluations. The PCASS system will
also be used to track and provide the status of Criticality 1 & 1R hardware problems.
d. Finding_ The content and format of the launch commit criteria document are
being improved significantly. The format change will make it easier to use. In addition
to these changes, the command chain during the countdown has been modified to include
a "Mission Management Team" to whom the Launch Director will report. There is a
concern that no clear distinction is being made between a "redline" and other criteria
whose values are, advisedly, subject to interpretation or evaluation.
Recommendation_ Clear,
Commit Criteria between
operations. (p. 5)
unambiguous distinctions should be made in the Launch
"redline_' and other parameters monitored during launch
NASA Response: The Launch Commit Criteria have been thoroughly reviewed by all
concerned elements of the shuttle program to remove all ambiguous and unnecessary
guidelines and leave only clear and concise criteria. Except for some introductory
material about the document and general information on crew restrictions, only true
"redlines" remain. These true "redline_' have no built-in margins and are intended for
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countdown holds, shutdowns, or recycles, depending on the phase of the count. All of the
"redlines" that can be automated are being automated. The automation stops the count-
down (clock) when any "redline" (limit) is reached prior to T-31 seconds, to allow a con-
sidered decision by the appropriate experts and program management on whether to
proceed with or terminate the countdown, or take an alternate course. Encountering a
"redline" after T-31 seconds leads to a shutdown and/or recycle of the launch countdown.
B. Safety, Reliability, Maintainability and Quality AssIlranco Programs
1. General
a. Finding_ The restructured SRM&QA organization and operational mode appears to
meet the recommendations made by the Presidential Commission, the Congress and the
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel and the internal NASA working groups. The policies
and plans promulgated by the Associate Administrator/SRM&QA are being implemented
by the NASA centers. There is a new team spirit evolving throughout the SRM&QA
world within NASA and its contractors that bodes well for the future.
Reeommendation_ Official direction, through an appropriate document(s), should be
provided to all programs/projects on the decision process for risk decisions. Without such
direction for each specific program/project, risk decisions will not be made with com-
monly understood and agreed upon definition of the factors pertinent to the decision.
The AA/SRM&QA should ensure the implementation of directed SRM&QA activities are
conducted in an orderly, thorough and timely manner to support the various milestones
set by program/project offices. (p. 6)
NASA Response: The risk management NMI's and NHB's, as discussed in Section B.l.c on
the next page, provide direction on the risk disposition decision process, which is the
central function of risk management. These directives and handbooks will be applicable
to all programs. As appropriate, they provide for qualitative analyses with likelihood and
severity treated categorically, and uncertainty reflected in the potential variability of
the categorizations. They also provide for quantitative analyses with likelihood and
severity combined in numerical risk estimates, and uncertainty expressed as numerical
distributions of the possible variations in the estimates.
The development of the Risk Management Program Plan for each program is a program
management responsibility. Guidance is provided in the NMI's and the NHB's, and the
Safety Division (QS) Risk Management Program Manager provides additional assistance in
the development of the plan and its implementation, as required. The Risk Management
Program Manager in Code QS also supports or participates in program risk management
assurance activities designed to provide oversight of the program's risk management
process. Code Q will, through its audit, oversight, and independent assessment charter,
provide personnel and resources to ensure that the programs properly implement the risk
management program plans.
b. Finding_ NASA has successfully instituted a variety of new procedures and reports
to ensure and monitor safety. These are being given much attention in the efforts to
resume STS flights. As regular Shuttle flights resume and become more routine, there is
a danger of complacency setting in.
Recommendation_ Because there is danger of complacency setting in, it is recommend-
ed that NASA review and audit the safety assessment process implementation on a
periodic basis. Particular emphasis should be placed on the quality of the information
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reaching decision-makers. A regular review of the processwill help managersdiscrimi-
nate between meaningful changesin the system safety and unanticipated alterations in
the reporting process. (p. 6)
NASA Response: The Office of SRM&QA is well aware of the dangers of complacency
and its impact on the safety of the various programs. One of the principal functions of
the Deputy Associate Administrator for System Assurance is to establish and implement
an audit/oversight function that will determine the SRM&QA acceptability and posture
of each program. Program trade-offs and engineering decisions, vis-a-vis their effects
on safety, are key elements to be reviewed, as well as the safety data that was generated
to support these decisions.
The expanded audit process and methodology, with plans and schedules, are being
developed with the support of the NASA Headquarters Code Q support contractor.
Audits will take place on a regular and/or as needed basis. Audit teams will consist of
SRM&QA personnel from Headquarters, the Centers, support contractors, and outside
experts in selected disciplines. The reporting systems and decision-making processes will
be incorporated into the audit checklists to ensure that alterations to management
systems and changes to reporting procedures are recognized with changes being properly
assessed. Additionally, the Safety Division, QS, will continue to monitor the degree of
implementation of the Agency safety policies by means of its own assistance visits and
assessment/reviews. A training course is also being developed for personnel who will
participate in audits, reviews, and surveys to assure effectiveness of the audit system.
Maintaining the safety awareness and motivation of the workers at the floor level is also
critical to the prevention of complacency and maintaining the safety assessment
process. In support of this, the Safety Division is developing an Agency level Safety
Awards Program that will provide top level recognition to project groups, facility groups,
or individuals who have demonstrated superior safety performance.
c. Finding_ New NASA Management Instructions and Notices related to risk assess-
ment and risk management policies are being developed. These instructions provide
important new thinking and enabling policies that could lead to a more comprehensive
and objective safety risk management methodology for NASA. As yet, there is no
organizational or functional structure for systems safety engineering that could imple-
ment effectively such a comprehensive program.
Recommendations: The ASAP recommends that (1) NASA complete NASA Management
Instructions and Notices and their implementing handbooks and promulgate them as soon
as possible. (2) NASA develop as rapidly as possible a more integrated systems safety
engineering functional structure (possibly within the Headquarters SRM&QA organization
with similar organizations at the centers). (p. 6)
NASA Response: (1) NMI 8070.4, "Risk Management Policy for Manned Flight Programs,"
was promulgated on February 3, 1988. NMI's are also in draft and under review on risk
management for unmanned programs and for research and technical facilities. These
NMI's will identify, in general terms, the roles of qualitative and quantitative risk
assessment in support of risk disposition decision-making. The NMI's also reflect recog-
nition of the need to tailor these roles to specific applications, in accordance with appro-
priateness criteria that are related to the significance of the risks of concern, the infor-
mation available for risk assessment, and the resources required for assessment and inte-
gration of results.
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NHB's are also being developedto aid in the implementation of the processes defined in
the NMI's. A draft NHB on risk management program tools and techniques is currently
under review. An NHB on risk management program roles and responsibilities has been
developed, and a draft is currently available. The first NHB is a compendium of
advanced qualitative and quantitative risk assessment and risk decision-making
methods. The second NHB delineated the functions and interfaces of program and facili-
ty management, engineering, system safety, and other Code Q elements. It further
delineates the roles and responsibilities in risk management assurance. The primary role
of program and facility management is recognized, as is the role of system safety in risk
management support. The key role of oversight and special technical assistance in risk
management assurance is particularly noted.
In addition, a two-volume Safety Risk Management Program Plan has been published. It
serves as a basic information source on risk management program objectives, rationale,
and basic methodology.
(2) NASA Code QS has recently completed filling the system safety organizational struc-
ture. When combined with the system safety portion of the Code Q Support Contract,
awarded in February 1988, adequate resources are available to implement the risk
assessment and risk management policies being developed. System Safety has completed
an initial draft of the NMI defining the NASA System Safety Program and has a final
draft of the revised System Safety Handbook (NHB 1700.1 Vol. 7) ready for review and
coordination. In addition, other NHB's in the various system safety technical areas are
nearing the final draft stage. The current schedule aims for completion and issuance of
these documents in August 1988.
d. Finding_ The majority of NASA's safety efforts have focused on hardware
reliability and the training and preparation of astronauts and pilots. There are potential
safety problems that can arise from human errors at any level of the system because of
its inherent complexity.
Recommendation_ More emphasis should be placed on the study of potential design-
induced human errors. (p. 7)
NASA Resl_nse: NASA Code QS is already providing additional emphasis on identifying
and, when possible, preventing by design the potential safety problem areas arising from
human errors. One chapter of the revised System Safety Handbook is devoted to Human
Factors, Considerations, and Requirements. Continued emphasis will be applied towards
incorporating these concerns into contract statements of work or as overall applicable
contract requirements. Review of appropriate progress will be conducted during design
and safety reviews to ensure that design takes into consideration human factors require-
ments. Additionally, Code QS intends to validate the effectiveness of the multiplicity of
discipline products and interfaces generated within the highly-matrixed SRM&QA organi-
zational functions through selected staff assistance surveys.
C. Space Shuttle Element Status
1. Solid Rocket Motor/Booster (SRM/SRB)
a. Finding_ The SRM existing aft skirt (Fig. 1) failed 14 percent below ultimate
design loads in the STA-2B static test. The latest IVBC-3 loads are slightly higher than
the loads used in the STA-2B test and the redesigned aft skirt strength is only a slight
improvement over the existing aft skirt. Thus, the redesigned aft skirt has not met its
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objective and the final loads,basedonnew Mobile LaunchPlatform (MLP)stiffness data,
havenot beendetermined.
Recommendations: Perform a series of tests on an instrumented aft skirt to determine
the effect of various combinations of loadings on the stresses in the critical post/weld
area. Test the aft skirt to destruction to provide information for variability in loads and
material strength between aft skirt units. These test results should provide a basis for
determining further action. (p. 8)
NASA Response: The structural qualification test of the aft skirt (STA-3) was completed
on April 1, 1988. The test was planned to apply loading to a maximum of 150 percent
limit load, or to failure, whichever occurred first. The test results were that the aft
skirt was continuing to carry increasing loads at 146 percent of limit when the test was
terminated. Failure initiation began at 132 percent of limit with skin panel to thrust
post weld cracking. A large amount of test instrumentation data were gathered, which is
currently under evaluation.
In addition, aft skirt instrumentation will be located at some of the same locations in the
thrust post weld areas as on STA-3, during the FRF and the first three flights, to corre-
late actual stresses during firing to the STA-3 test. Also, plans for tests of multiple load
cycles on the aft skirt are under consideration to demonstrate useful life.
b. Finding_ The unvented field and case-to-nozzle joint designs were chosen to
prevent hot gases from reaching the case walls. The non-verifiable bonded insulation and
barrier seals in the joints prevent the chamber pressure from reaching the primary O-ring
seal and causing erosion or blow-by during motor operation, (see Figs. 2 and 3). There is
a remote possibility, under the worst scenario condition, that pressure will reach the pri-
mary O-ring seal for the field joint and the secondary O-ring seal for the case nozzle
joint, but will not leak enough to cause a catastrophic failure. The criteria and tests now
planned should provide the necessary margins in the solid rocket motor for successful
restart of Space Shuttle flights, as noted in Figure 4.
Recommendations_ Establish the criteria for nominal (non-flawed) joints and flawed
joints as a part of the CEI specifications. Conduct a few NJES tests with a flaw to the
secondary O-ring seal to assess the radial bolt seals in the case-to-nozzle joints. Con-
duct a full-duration hot-firing motor test with a flaw path to the primary O-ring seal
with pressure transducers at the leak check ports before the first launch. (p. 8)
NASA Response: These recommendations have been implemented. The criterion for
non-flawed joints, contained in the CEI specification, was established to be no erosion or
blow-by of the primary O-rings. Where flaws are incorporated to assure combustion
gases reach the primary O-ring, the criterion is not contained in the CEI specification,
but rather in program directive documentation, and is one of fail safe (i.e., no leakage
from the joint). Tests with flaws to assure combustion gases to the secondary O-ring seal
were conducted on one Nozzle Joint Environmental Simulator (NJES) test and the Transi-
ent Pressure Test Article (TPTA) test TPTA 2.2 which was completed on May 17, 1988.
A full scale static test with a flaw path to the primary O-ring of one field joint and of
the case-to-nozzle will be conducted with the Production Verification Motor (PVM-1)
firing in late August 1988. Pressure transducers at the leak check ports will be included
in the test.
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2. External Tank
Finding_ No significant findings.
Recommendations: None.
NASA Response: None.
3. Orbiter
a. Finding_ 6.0 Loads/Stress Analysis. The latest 6.0 loads/stress analysis shows
negative margins in structural elements of the wing, vertical tail, mid-fuselage and
attachments. The wing loads, vertical tail loads, and fuselage thermal gradients are also
considerably larger than for the original design. The panel has repeatedly recommended
a calibration program for the Orbiter to determine accurate loads. Now it is even more
important to determine accurate loads because negative margins have been determined
in the 6.0 loads/stress analysis requiring limitations to be placed on the STS operating
envelope.
Recommendation_ Perform a comprehensive strain gauge calibration program on OV-
102 during its downtime so that accurate actual loads can be determined on the wing and
vertical tail during flight. In addition, compare stresses and thermal gradients at critical
locations in the wing, vertical tail, and mid-fuselage using data from analyses, ground
tests, and flight tests. (p. 13)
NASA Response: A plan is in place to add strain gauges to the OV-102 wing, tail, payload
bay door, mid-fuselage, and elevons for its next flight (Flight 8) and to recalibrate and
reconnect a number of pressure measurements. This plan includes a wing calibration
after Flight 8.
Midbody thermal measurements are being installed on OV-104 (Flight 3) to collect and
substantiate the 6.0 thermal data. These will be operational on the next flight. Tile
temperature measurements are being added for the next OV-102 flight. The quantity of
measurements will be determined by the KSC work flow and the shuttle budget in FY
1989.
b. Findings_ Periodic Structural Inspection and Maintenance Program. The Orbiter
structure and thermal protection system is subjected to diverse loads and environments
that must meet a long service life. This requires a well-planned periodic inspection and
maintenance program to evaluate the structurally significant elements especially in light
of the high stresses shown in the stress analysis using the latest 6.0 loads.
Recommendations: The inspection and maintenance program should identify structurally
significant items based on safety and economic factors. NASA should develop and pub-
lish a plan for periodic inspection and maintenance of the Shuttle's structure. The plan
should be developed by cognizant personnel within the Shuttle program, assisted by
commercial airline personnel experienced in periodic inspection and maintenance of
commercial air transports. The program for periodic inspection and maintenance, when
approved, should become a mandatory part of the requirements of each vehicle. (p. 13)
NASA Response: A plan was developed in April 1986, which defined the structural ele-
ments of the orbiter that should be inspected and how/when the inspections should be
accomplished. Pan American Airline personnel contributed significantly from their com-
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mercial experience. These requirements have been baselined in the Operational Main-
tenance RequirementsSpecifications Document (OMRSD) and are being implemented on
each of the Orbiter vehicles.
c. Finding_ Shuttle Computer System Upgrade. The risks associated with human
factors and the software testing schedule are likely to substantially exceed those of the
hardware.
No hazards analysis that properly studies all factors leading to multiple computer failure
has yet been performed.
Recommendations: Before any consideration of overturning the 5/0(5-new/0-old) deci-
sion, a hazard analysis is required. This hazard analysis should include computer recon-
figuration procedures and the implications of an increased testing program for a 4/1 (4-
new/l-old) configuration. (p. 13)
NASA Response: Program Requirements Control Board Directive #$40167R2 established
the 5/0 configuration as the National Space Transportation System (NSTS) baseline
configuration for all flights of the upgraded General Purpose Computers (GPC's) on the
Space Shuttle. There is currently no consideration being given to changing that deci-
sion. Consideration is being given to flying a new GPC in an on-orbit test configuration
to exercise its functional capability. In addition, the Spacelab program has implemented
the new GPC into their baseline program, which is currently scheduled to fly before the
new GPC's are installed in the orbiter. These latter two steps should provide for assur-
ance of the new GPC configuration.
d. Finding_ Auxiliary Power Units, (APU's). The ASAP recently was advised of the
extent of turbine blade cracking in the APU's. The situation is being explored in depth by
the concerned centers as well as by Rockwell International and the Sunstrand Corpora-
tion. At this time, a rational explanation as to the cause of such blade cracking has not
been made. Futher work is being done to understand the cause(s). In addition, some
modifications to the turbine blade configuration are being considered. Worst-case situa-
tions for failure put this item in Criticality 1 although such situations have a low proba-
bility of occurrence.
Recommendationsz NASA should review the retention rationale for operation of the
APU's in light of the recent history of turbine blade failures to determine its future
course of action. NASA should emphasize evaluation of cause and development of possi-
ble corrective action for blade cracking on an accelerated basis. (p. 14)
NASA Response: There are currently two efforts underway to resolve the APU turbine
wheel blade cracking issue. The near term approach involves extensive testing, analysis,
and mapping of turbine wheel cracks in order to develop criteria for flying the existing
configuration. This will define acceptable limits for blade cracking and an acceptable
number of hours of "run-time" and APU starts before a wheel should be replaced.
The long-term approach is underway for the design, development, and production of a
new configuration turbine wheel, which will eliminate the concerns associated with such
cracking. Once developed, the new turbine will then be phased into the fleet (approxi-
mately 1990).
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4. Space Shuttle Main Engines (SSME's)
Finding_ The engine to be incorporated in the next STS flight and in all subsequent
flights will be based on the Phase II engine configuration ultimately planned for certifi-
cation at 109 percent of rated thrust. A number of significant problems that were
identified during development testing of Phase II hardware or as a result of the new
FMEA and HA have been resolved during 1987. NASA plans to incorporate about 38
changes in the next flight engines. Of these, 21 are defined as mandatory. The contrac-
tor continues to work on the blade and bearing problems. The situation is being con-
trolled by limiting the hardware part life-usage.
Recommendation_ The contractor should continue his efforts to increase the useful life
of SSME blades and bearings. (p. 14)
NASA Response: While no 109 percent flight requirement currently exists, 27 percent of
all certification testing is done at 109 percent to demonstrate margin. The contractor is
continuing the effort to increase the useful life of the SSME blades and bearings. The
certification program for the SSME blade improvements is complete and additional blade
life tests will be completed prior to first flight (STS-26).
5. Launch, Landing and Mission Operations
a. Findingr_ Work environment at KSC. The work environment at KSC associated
with launch processing can induce human error. NASA, the Shuttle Processing Contrac-
tor (SPC), and support contractors have generally recognized this fact through such
actions as tightened discipline and accountability, improved worker safety programs,
strict guidelines to control overtime, better training programs, and the better availabili-
ty of spare parts and related equipment. However, there are still occasional reports of
schedule pressure and the associated potential for error or acceptance of excessive risk.
Recommendation_ Top management at NASA and the SPC should exercise continuing
vigilance to ensure that a satisfactory working environment is achieved and maintained
at KSC. The ASAP's dictum of "Safety first; schedule second" must be observed by each
and every person involved in the STS program. (p. 14)
NASA Response: NASA and its contractors have recognized that the complexity of STS
launch processing can induce human error, and that there are risks associated with
schedule pressure. The actions cited are intended to mitigate the possibility of such
errors. As an example, SRM&QA management has taken a major step to this end by
forming a Personnel Initiatives Panel (PIP). The purposes of the PIP are as follows:
(1) identify organization problems, recommend corrective action, and provide a means
of communication up to all levels of management;
(2) establish the SR &QA function as an aggressive contributor for the overall team;
(3) promote a workforce that is manned with quality people who are dedicated to
superior performance and the pursuit of excellence; and
(4) develop a comprehensive program to attract, develop, motivate, and retain the best
professional talent available.
B-18
By adhering to these tenets, NASA feels that the "safety first" belief can best be
instilled in every worker.
KSC policy is in place to assure that overtime is carefully monitored and controlled, and
that worker fatigue due to excessive overtime does not contribute to errors during
processing. Additionally, recently approved manpower increases, along with initiatives
to increase operational efficiency, are serving to improve the working environment.
b. Finding_ Capacity to handle workload. Despite the presence of many skilled and
motivated workers at KSC, there still exist problems of recruitment in key disciplines
(e.g., data systems, hypergol servicing}, retention, training, and morale.
Recommendation_ High priority should be placed on resolving human resources problems
at KSC in order to strengthen the workforce and reduce the likelihood of human error.
(p. 14)
NASA Response: NASA and its support contractors are committed to resolving human
resource issues. Adequate contractor staffing levels are currently planned and budgeted
to meet the demands of the STS flight manifest. This plan will require contractor over-
time, and does not include any contingency that requires extra critical skilled manpower
for extended periods, such as for large TPS modifications or repairs.
For NASA Civil Service manpower, the recent freeze impacted buildup. The current
complement, after factoring in NASA/KSC attrition and the partial allocation of addi-
tional hiring allowed, is not considered by KSC to be adequate to meet the processing
demands for FY89 and subsequent years. This subject is under continuing review by
NASA management.
Worker morale continues to improve as the resumption of shuttle flight draws near. KSC
continues to sponsor forums wherein the workers can participate indirect interchanges
with both NASA and contractor officials. The KSC Center Director, General Forrest
McCartney, advocates and participates in the "walkaround" philosophy and talks
informally with workers at all levels. This approach by KSC's senior management has
done much to stimulate positive morale and teamwork spirit. NASA sincerely feels that
making workers aware of, and part of, current plans and policies is a helpful mechanism
to boost morale.
c. Finding_ There were signs that after a series of successful STS missions there was
pressure to increase the frequency of missions, reducing the time available for Shuttle
Mission Simulator testing. Also, the tracking of the training issues associated with CR's
became lax. The staff responsible for flight procedures is very much aware of the
importance of its work and dedicated to doing a good thorough job. The formal protocols
in place for initiating and tracking change requests (CR's) are also extensive and care-
fully thought out. Nevertheless, there are areas of serious concern:
o NASA has not consistently documented software design rationale.
O The safety of the Shuttle computer system is strongly influenced by the crew
procedures used for its operation and reconfiguration.
Recommendationm NASA should take steps to ensure proper documentation of software
design rationale.
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Human factors considerations should be included in evaluating the ad hoc procedures
generated in response to anomalous conditions arising during flight. Any proposals to
reduce training time should be thoroughly reviewed. (p. 15)
NASA Response: The process of changing shuttle software is a rigorous, disciplined, well
documented process. Software changes are defined on software CR's by members of the
NASA requirements community. These are documented as changes to requirements
documents that are under the rigorous configuration control of the Shuttle Avionics
Software Control Board (SASCB) chaired by the manager of the NSTS Engineering Inte-
gration Office. No part of any software requirements document can be altered without
the approval of this board, and only after a thorough review and concurrence by the
requirements community. After a review by the community, the CR is formally pre-
sented to the SASCB, discussed, and dispositioned. The entire proceedings are tape
recorded and documented along with the presentation materials in the minutes of the
SASCB. The implementation of the approved requirements is documented and main-
tained in detailed design specifications, the IBM maintenance specification, the Opera-
tional Increment User's Guide, and the Program Notes and Waivers Document. Addition-
ally, the engineering design community has, since STS 51-L, undertaken an effort to
document the design rationale associated with each mission's unique design data para-
meter. This will include the history, limits, constraints, and trends for each parameter,
as well as the interrelationships of the parameters with each other and with any other
significant flight characteristic. We feel that the above constitutes a thorough and
complete documentation of design and implementation rationale for the shuttle flight
software.
Shuttle crew procedures development involves a combination of astronauts and opera-
tions and engineering personnel. The knowledge base required to develop effective
procedures is extensive and multi-disciplined. It requires detailed knowledge of the
complex vehicle, the wide range of operating environments, as well as the capabilities of
the astronauts. Approval and validation of crew procedures involves formal reviews and
simulator checkouts. Additionally, baselined shuttle crew procedures are exercised
extensively during simulations. We believe that the majority of the human factors con-
siderations are found during procedures validation and during the extensive exercises and
procedures usage in the simulators. Moreover, crew procedures personnel, with estab-
lished interfaces in the human factors group in spacecraft design, are pursuing methods
to improve human factors aspects in procedures development. The guidelines and exper-
tise developed in this activity are extended to the procedures developed in real time.
Following STS 51-L, mechanisms have been put in place to ensure that adequate training
time is maintained. A minimum of 11 weeks of shuttle mission simulator training time
has been baselined for NSTS flights. As part of the flight preparation process, each
flight is reviewed to determine if additional training time is required. Any reduction of
training time from that baseline must be approved by the Level II Program Requirements
Control Board.
d. Findings_ General Memory Changes. The Shuttle software system includes the
capability for general memory changes, referred to as "gmems". A ground base can,
through telemetry, specify an address in the general memory of the computer and new
contents for that address. Changes also can be made from onboard the Shuttle. With
this mechanism, either program instructions or program data can be altered, but only in
controlled ways. General memory changes are made with moderate frequency during
Shuttle flights. The protection mechanisms in place seem better than initially reported
by contractor personnel, but nevertheless fall somewhat short of full security.
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Recommendation_ In view of the fact that errors have occurred during gmems in spite
of significant precautionary measures, the procedures for making them should be
reviewed, and changes for increasing safety sought. Consideration should be given to
reverifying a gmem after it has been made. (p. 15)
NASA Response: NASA agrees with the ASAP concern regarding General Purpose
Computer (GPC) memory read/write procedures (gmems) and has always treated requests
for approval of such changes with a high degree of caution. From the outset, the Shuttle
Avionics Software Control Board (SASCB) has required that any gmem that is considered
for application be brought to the SASCB as a Change Request (CR) and be reviewed and
concurred upon by the software requirements community before it can be applied. Once
approved by the SASCB, the gmem is thoroughly verified by the development contrac-
tors. Except for a few gmem procedures that may be required in times of critical situa-
tions, the rationale and procedure for a gmem is reviewed in real time and reverified in
the Shuttle Avionics Integration Laboratory (SAIL) for the specific vehicle and software
configuration existing at the time of application. The SASCB chairman must then
approve the "gmems" request in real time before it can be applied. In addition, opera-
tions personnel verify that the intended change was made by monitoring the memory
contents before and after the application of the gmem. The effectiveness of their careful
approach is evidenced by the fact that there has never been an error attributable to an
in-flight gmem. Following STS 51-L, the NSTS Engineering Integration Office canceled
the approval of all gmems procedures in effect at the time, requiring that the operations
community resubmit those gmems procedures which were felt to be required for STS-26
for approval by the SASCB. This precipitated a thorough review of those procedures.
There is a second class of shuttle software memory changes called Table Maintenance
Block Update (TMBU) that is restricted to a limited area of software memory, which
contain constants that define the limits for onboard crew alarms and consumable calcula-
tions. The onboard software performs error checking on the actual contents of the
change and will not execute the change if the address specified is outside the TMBU
sections of memory. This class of change has been made much more frequently during
the Shuttle Program than the above mentioned gmems class. Four errors have occurred
during noncritical flight phases and can, in general, be attributed to the manual genera-
tion of these changes. Several precautions have been implemented to preclude future
errors. These precautions include:
(1) modification to onboard software to perform error checking of the address con-
tained in the change;
(2) development of a ground program which automates and performs error checking on
generation of these changes; and
(3) external verification of the ground program.
Finally, in addressing software requirements for future software releases, the SASCB will
give high priority to those changes that eliminate the need for gmem and TMBU proce-
dures.
e. Finding_ There has been a practice in the past of allowing very late software
change requests, even only days before a flight, that involve flight system constants.
When change requests are acted upon this late, there is a potential that normal testing
procedures and checks and balances will be less extensive than normal.
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Recommendation._ The procedures for approving late software change requests should
allow for appropriate testing. (p. 15)
NASA Response: NASA shares this concern about the risks involved in making late
changes to the software and treats all such requests with great caution. Only absolutely
mandatory changes are considered. Once approved, late changes, whether they are data
value updates or code modifications, are put through the same review, development,
testing, and verification process by the development and verification contractors as
changes implemented in the normal development cycle. Standard checklists, automated
process control, thorough testing procedures, formal reviews, and sign off at each
process step, assure the same safety and quality for late changes. NASA and its software
development and verification contractors have always insisted on taking sufficient time
when making late changes to ensure that quality and safety are not compromised. In
some instances, duplicate teams have performed parallel processes in order to reduce the
risk of human error.
D. Space Station Program
1. Space Station Computing Systems
Finding_ The complexity of the Space Station computing system is far beyond that of
any computer system NASA has yet had to deal with. Systems integration techniques for
such large systems are not well understood, and many other large organizations have
underestimated the magnitude of the systems integration task. There is concern that
NASA is making these same kinds of assumptions.
The requirements documents for the Space Station Data Management System (DMS) state
numeric values for a number of important parameters giving neither a rationale for the
values chosen, nor a reference to secondary documents containing the rationale.
It appears that the Space Station does not have a formal procedure in place for comput-
ing equipment upgrading nor do work packages make such allowances for the future.
Recommendation_ Review the resources allocated to the computer_oftware integration
task and ensure that resources are adequate.
NASA should develop a rationale document for Space Station computing requirements.
This should include a consistency check between requirements.
NASA's planning should recognize the need for an upgrade plan for both hardware and
software. This should include software tools such as compilers. (p. 16)
NASA Response: The first computing system concern addressed the apparent under
estimation of the complexity of the Space Station Program Office (SSPO) software
integration task. In this area, the Space Station Program (SSP) recognized early that the
distribution of the very complex SSP software development responsibility to our four
prime development contractors, consistent with their distributed hardware responsibili-
ties, would create a difficult software integration problem. Consequently, and as a
result of a thorough review of resources allocated to the computer/software integration
task, NASA has contracted with Lockheed Missiles and Space Corporation to develop a
common Software Support Environment (SSE) for the program. The SSE will bridge the
gap between the diverse software development, test, and integration procedures, prac-
tices, and tools. Each development organization is required to develop and test its
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software within a specified computer facility (Software Production Facility) which hosts
the SSE provided procedures and tools.
NASA has also defined a Multi-Systems Integration Facility (MSIF) to ensure adequate
program-wide software and selected hardware integration testing. The MSIF concept
employs a cooperative integration and test approach in which the developers from the
diverse software development organizations are also involved in the MSIF test activities
under the leadership of Level II and its support contractor. The MSIF will also serve as
the flight software load generation facility.
Currently, the program is actively developing the SSE. Because NASA agrees with the
ASAP statements expressed concerning the Space Station Computing System complexity,
the program has continued to apply high priority resources and support to this critical
effort. While it is true that integration techniques for such large systems are not well
understood, we believe that SSE and MSIF efforts will provide the structure with which
to do the required software integration.
The second area of concern addressed the numerical quantification of the Data Manage-
ment System (DMS) requirements specifications, stating that they were apparently
without adequate rationale and/or traceability to any known requirements source.
Although every attempt was made during Phases A and B of the SSP to obtain quantified
data storage volume, data processing requirements, and other DMS performance
requirements, the information was generally unavailable due to the uncertainty of fund-
ing for candidate NASA payloads. We were able to obtain only strawman payload charac-
teristics and manifests which were documented in the Mission Requirements Data Base
(MRDB); however, due to funding uncertainties and the absence of formal payload selec-
tions by the scientific community, only an estimate of the anticipated needs during the
Space Station era were available. For this reason, the DMS has been scoped primarily on
the anticipated state of the art of information systems technology in the Space Station
era, rather than known quantified user requirements. However, as the program has
evolved to the present time, and as the Office of Space Science and Applications (OSSA)
has been able to further define its payload manifests and the related DMS requirements,
more specificity is being added to the baseline requirements. We expect some, but not
all, of these issues to be resolved as a result of the recent Program Requirements Review
(PRR). A rationale document for computing requirements and justification for those
requirements is evolving as a result of the multiple efforts to define the basic require-
ments.
The third concern was the lack of apparent procedures for the replacement of computing
equipment and/or software. Our current planning on this subject is in two areas. The
first is our budget planning for the operational phase of the SSP in which we are planning
mainframe computer hardware and support software replacement every 7 years and work
station replacement every 5 years.
The second area is establishing evolutionary requirements allowing the program the
flexibility to upgrade with advanced technology as it becomes available in the future.
We have requirements for the operational Space Station Information System which will
require a design to isolate applications software (both flight and ground) from the under-
lying computing system. This is to promote the migration of ground hardware and soft-
ware to the flight systems or from facility to facility, and to maximize the flexibility of
replacing the flight hardware, as required, during the life of the program. In addition,
the work packages have factored advanced automation requirements in their proposals.
As the Space Station design matures over the next year, the inclusion of these require-
ments into work package plans will happen as reviewed and as approved by program
management.
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2. Crew Emergency Rescue Vehicle (CERV)
Finding_ There is a good deal of attention being paid to crew safe-haven and crew
rescue operations at this time. There appears to be a desire to utilize a CERV as a
multipurpose vehicle beyond that required for crew rescue.
Recommendation_ There should be a CERV and it should not be designed as a multipur-
pose machine. Simplicity and availability are the keys to its effectiveness and minimum
cost. Fundings for the CERV may be delayed but the requirement for it should be speci-
fied now. (p. 16)
NASA Response: NASA agrees with the Panel that an assured crew return capability
must be provided for the Space Station crew, and studies have begun to determine the
most appropriate means of reaching that goal.
NASA studies to date have been restricted to the fundamental purpose of a CERV, and
three Design Reference Missions (DRM's) have been specified, all of which are compati-
ble with the recommendations:
(1) return or support of Space Station crew during interruption of STS launches;
(2) return or protection of Space Station crew from reasonable accidents or from
reasonable failures of Space Station systems; and
(3) return or support of Space Station crew during reasonable medical emergencies.
Analyses are continuing and several approaches which could satisfy the DRM's are being
considered; the CERV is one of those approaches. Each option considered is being
evaluated for its ability to meet the DRM's; its impact on the NSTS, the Space Station,
and expendable launch systems; and cost. The assured crew return capability for the
Space Station will impact several of the NASA's programs, and all facets must be con-
sidered in determining which is truly the most cost effective and reliable concept. As
stated, analyses are continuing, and decisions will be documented relative to specific
basic requirements, as they are agreed upon between the program and technical elements
associated with the programs within NASA.
3. Extra Vehicular Activities (EVA) Space Suits
Finding_ Considerable amounts of EVA will undoubtedly be required for maintenance
and operation of the Space Station. The current EVA suits used on the Space Shuttle are
inadequate for Space Station activities as they require excessive prebreathing time, are
not very flexible and are limited in their reusability for multiple EVA's.
Recommendation_ The ASAP commends the work now being done and that which has
been accomplished on the development of a new EVA suit by both JSC and Ames
Research Center. The Panel urges the continued development of a new higher pressure
suit that is capable of multiple reuse without requiring major refurbishment and which
has greater flexibility in its use.
Target dates for the selection of an appropriate design and its implementation into
production should be commensurate with the need for the assembly of the Space Station
and its initial operation. (p. 17)
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NASA Response: NASA agrees with maximizing the astronauts productivity where
economically feasible and thus has chartered a National Space Transportation
System/Space Station Program (NSTS/SSP) commonality working group to review the
NSTS and SSP EVA requirements and make a recommendation for the new Extra Vehicu-
lar Maneuvering Unit (EMU) design. The goal is to design a common EMU to be used on
both programs. NASA plans to develop a space suit that will be operational when Per-
manent Manned Capability (PMC) is achieved. During the assembly of the Space Station,
and during the man-tended phase of operations, the crew will function from the shuttle
and will, of necessity, use the current shuttle suit. The EVA timeline delineated for
Space Station assembly is extremely conservative. The safety proven Space Shuttle EVA
suit is adequate for the early tasks. The safety considerations relative to requirements
are complex and the final specifications for the Space Station EVA suits must be ade-
quate when baselined. The NASA strategy, relative to all EVA's and the requirements to
meet them, is undergoing continuous analysis.
E. Aeronautics
1. X-Wing Flight Test Program Structure
Findingm NASA structured a very comprehensive and safe program for flight testing the
RSRA/X-Wing aircraft notwithstanding a major programmatic planning error in that the
X-wing program was committed to the full vehicle flight test phase prematurely. Verifi-
cation of the predicted aerodynamics, structural dynamics, and control system design
parameters of the full scale X-wing rotor system were not established by tests prior to
the commitment to the complete vehicle flight test program. This resulted in large
expenditures of resources associated with the RSRA flight vehicle design modifications,
which in turn resulted in the cancellation of the program for lack of resources to solve
the rotor system design problems (subsequently discovered). To continue the program
without the design changes would have involved high risks.
Recommendationm A high level technology demonstration airplane panel should be
formed to advise in the formation and structuring of X-airplane programs. The initial
phase of such programs should concentrate on the design and manufacturing techniques
of the components that incorporate the technology challenges. The RSRA/X-Wing pro-
gram can serve as a good "lesson learned." (p. 18)
NASA Response: We agree that key technologies should be developed to the extent
practical in the ground based R&T program before commitment to a full vehicle flight
test program. The NASA/DARPA X-Wing program was aimed at satisfying a critical
national need. DARPA was willing to take unusual programmatic risks to develop the
concept within the required schedule, and agreed to provide the necessary resources.
Such ventures are within the charter of the DARPA organization. NASA was a logical
partner because of its unique management and research skills. The development of
several key X-Wing technologies was needed to realize success in what was billed from
the beginning as a high risk venture. Some of these technology problems were solved,
such as the development of the thick composite stiff blades capable of withstanding high
temperatures. Resolution of others, primarily the digital flight control system, was not
completed. The development of these technologies was even more difficult than antici-
pated, resulting in substantial cost growth.
The Aeronautics Advisory Committee has established an Ad Hoc Study Team on Flight
Research and Technology. One of the study team tasks is to address the advisability of
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flight research focusing on proof of concept experimental aircraft. They will also be
recommending the timing of when promising advanced technologies should be carried to
flight test and subsequent use. Also, the Office of Aeronautics and Space Technology
(OAST) is developing a closeout plan for the X-Wing program. The results of the pro-
gram, including "lessons learned", will be documented.
2. X-29 Flight Test Program Risk Avoidance
Findings: The X-29 flight test program is a credit to NASA. There is no question that
safety has been given the highest priority. However, it is noted that the fundamental
flight verification objectives that were originally set for the aircraft are somewhat
diminished, to a large extent because of the reluctance to expend the relatively few
additional resources needed to safely expose the aircraft to the higher risk flight
regimes. It also is noted that some risks are inherent in research (X) aircraft flight
testing and they must be balanced against the objectives of the program. The funda-
mental purpose of these programs is to discover and identify unknown problems before
making a commitment to the technologies in an operational aircraft. A "very near zero
risk" philosophy obviously makes for a safer program but can entail large resource
requirements and therefore can seriously impede program implementation. The Nation
needs to remain competitive in aeronautics and must be willing to accept some risk to
achieve this goal. (p. 18)
Recommendation_ A review of the objectives of the X-29 program should be conducted
to redefine the flight test program and its resource requirements in order to derive the
most benefit commensurate with the more than $150 million that has been invested into
the program to date, and also commensurate with acceptable flight safety risks. (p. 18)
NASA Response: NASA agrees that some flight verification objectives have been
diminished as a result of review of flight safety considerations. They are:
a. Flight test demonstration of the existence/nonexistence of a flap-tab flutter mode
within the design flight envelope.
This objective has been eliminated due to the large canard torsion loads experienced at
supersonic speeds and at high dynamic pressures. The limit is based on 80 percent of the
single hydraulic system capability following one system failure. Since the prediction of
the single system hydraulic power is not precise, flight beyond this limit would expose
the aircraft to the risk of loss due to one failure. Unique, one-of-a-kind hydraulic sys-
tems are not considered to be highly reliable.
b. Flight test demonstration of wing divergence boundaries based on tests at maximum
dynamic pressures.
Flight tests have shown that a reasonable estimate of the wing divergence boundary can
be made with tests performed well below the maximum design dynamic pressure. Flight
tests at higher dynamic pressures would improve the correlation between flight test and
predicted boundaries, but would only marginally improve the validation of the forward
swept wing structural design philosophy.
c. Mid envelope maneuvering.
There is a portion of the flight envelope where the aircraft is restricted in angle of
attack (AOA) due to the combined steady state and dynamic buffet loads exceeding the
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flap-tab link load limits. Objectives have not beensignificantly compromiseddue to this
limit becausehigh AOA tests can be accomplished at higher altitudes, and high load
factor tests canbe accomplishedat lower altitudes.
d. Evaluation of the flight control system at high dynamic pressures.
Due to the development of new test and evaluation techniques, the evaluation of the
flight control system has become routine. Flight conditions have already been flown (M =
0.95, alt. = 15,000 ft.) where the phase and/or gain fell below the already low limit
margins. The flight control system gains were modified and tests continued. Repeating
this process at higher dynamic pressures offers no new information.
e. A flight test objective recently expressed by the Future Applications Committee is
to expand the maneuvering envelope to 8 g's.
It is difficult to ascertain what will be learned by flying to 8 g's, and the programmatic
risks associated with such a test are relatively high. The proof load test was only taken
to 8 g's, and it is standard flight test practice to only fly to 80 percent of the proof
load. In addition, flight test has shown that the aerodynamic loads predictions are not
accurate. To fly the aircraft to proof load limits in the face of inaccurate loads pre-
dictions is a very high risk policy in light of the questionable technical gains to be
achieved.
We believe that the X-29 program has taken a prudent and balanced approach to risks in
achieving an early transition of new technologies.
NASA and USAF, with continued DARPA involvement and with consideration of the X-29
program objectives, are conducting a follow on research program using the X-29 air-
craft. This program is planned to be completed in 1989. Future plans and objectives will
be developed, consistent with overall aeronautical research requirements and considera-
tion for acceptable flight safety risks.
3. Flight Recorders
Finding_ The ASAP has previously recommended that NASA develop a flight recorder
that could be used on its administrative and training aircraft so that, in the event of an
incident or accident, data would be available for assistance in evaluating the cause of the
accident or incident. NASA has not proceeded to implement the recommended flight
recorder program.
Reo_mmendation_ The ASAP continues to recommend that flight recorders should be
developed for training and administrative aircraft. (p. 19)
NASA Response: NASA is in agreement with the ASAP recommendation. In 1985, the
Aircraft Management Office (AMO) contracted with the Flight Safety Foundation to
conduct a market survey of available recorders suitable for installation on NASA air-
craft. Using information from the survey, the AMO, in coordination with the Intercenter
Aircraft Operations Panel (IAOP), has developed an action plan for acquisition and instal-
lation of flight recorders in appropriate Agency aircraft. The AMO has requested $2M
for funds to initiate this action plan in the FY 1990 budget.
All administrative aircraft have either Flight Data Recorders (FDR) or Cockpit Voice
Recorders (CVR) installed. Latest state-of-the-art FDR's were installed in the five
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Gulfstream aircraft in 1974. The IAOP's Gulfstream Operations and Maintenance Sub-
panel recommended, in 1986, that these recorders be replaced with digital FDR's on an
attrition basis. The three smaller Kingair aircraft are equipped with CVR's. The
Administrative Aircraft Operations and Maintenance Subpanel is studying the feasibility
of dual installation of an FDR and CVR on each administrative aircraft. A prototype
installation on the LeRC Gulfstream is being evaluated by the Subpanel for possible
installation in all administrative aircraft.
4. Aircraft Operations and Safety Management
Finding_ Flight operations within NASA continue to be held together by the strong,
competent individuals who run these operations at the NASA centers. The Intercenter
Aircraft Operations Panel is the bond as well as the mechanism by which coordination
takes place among centers and Headquarters. (p. 19)
NASA has a Headquarters Aircraft Management Office which is charged to integrate
flight operations and coordinate and establish flight operation policies. The SRM&QA is
charged with proper implementation of these policies.
There is not a clear understanding as to who is responsible for what in the area of flying
safety. This lack of clarity is evidenced in the less than clear authority which appears to
reside in SRM&QA in this area.
Recommendation_ Spell out clearly the responsibilities and authorities of the Head-
quarters Aircraft Management Office and SRM&QA regarding flying safety thereby
eliminating the confusion relating to the division of safety responsibilities.
NASA Response: NASA agrees with the intent of the recommendation. The establish-
ment and evolution of the SRM&QA organization at Headquarters may have resulted in
apparent confusion concerning the responsibilities for aviation safety of the Head-
quarters Aircraft Management Office (AMO) and the SRM&QA Office; however, due to a
close working relationship, there was no confusion between the two offices. The AMO
has historically been responsible for integration of accepted safety practices in aircraft
operations and maintenance and, in the past, has been the focal point for incident report-
ing. With the growth and maturation of the Office of SRM&QA, assignment of incident
reporting has become the responsibility of the Safety Division. Consequently, SRM&QA
is responsible for all accident/incident reporting and investigation and for safety over-
sight of aeronautical activities. Action has been initiated by the SRM&QA Office to
produce a NASA Management Instruction (NMI) outlining the aviation safety program and
responsibilities. The NMI is being developed in coordination with the Aircraft Manage-
ment Office, and as part of the review process, will be reviewed by the Intercenter
Aircraft Operations Panel prior to final publication. The projected completion date for
the NMI is late summer 1988.
The SRM&QA Office is responsible for establishing the safety program requirements,
conducting oversight to ensure implementation, and providing a focal point for aviation
safety. The Safety Division, SRM&QA Office has been assigned this responsibility, as
well as coordinating all Code Q requirements regarding aviation safety. Aviation safety
within NASA remains the responsibility of each level of aircraft management, and the
AMO is responsible for implementing the program at Headquarters and ensuring that
safety requirements are integrated into all NASA aircraft operations and activities. The
IAOP meetings, IAOP reviews of field installations, and the aviation safety officer
meetings sponsored by the AMO are among the significant activities that the AMO and
the Safety Division participate in, and which contribute to the program.
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In addition to the division of responsibilities for aviation safety between the Head-
quarters Aircraft Management Office and the SRM&QA Office, and the major role of the
IAOP, as discussed above, it is extremely important to take note of the fact that the
primary responsibility for aviation safety within NASA resides in the organizations that
have operational responsibility for NASA aircraft. In recognition of this, Code M, which
has the responsibility for the majority of NASA aircraft, has appointed the Chief of the
Aviation Safety Office at Johnson Space Center (JSC) as the Aviation Safety Officer for
the entire Office of Space Flight. This arrangement has worked very well.
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IV. APPENDICES
A. NASA Response to Panel Annual Report_ March 1987
The following status is provided in response to those items considered OPEN by the ASAP
for prior years.
B. Pressure Suits, Space Station_ and Space Debris, letter from Dr. Fletcher to Joseph
F. Sutter, January 9, 1987.
1. Extra Vehicular Activities (EVA)/Space Suits
OPEN ITEM: NASA support of the development of an advanced flexible higher pressure
suit.
STATU_ NASA agrees with the ASAP relative to their concern as associated with the
EVA Space Suits. As previously discussed on page 21, the current status is: NASA plans
to develop a Space Station optimized suit that will be operational when Permanent
Manned Capability (PMC) is achieved. During the assembly of the Space Station, and
during the man-tended phase of operations, the crew will function from the shuttle and
will, of necessity, use the current shuttle suit. The EVA timeline delineated for Space
Station assembly is extremely conservative and has a safety margin factor of 2 folded
into the specific EVA tasks. The safety margin is adequate for use of the safety proven
Space Shuttle EVA suit for the early tasks. The safety considerations relative to
requirements are complex, and the final specifications for the Space Station EVA suits
must be adequate when baselined. The NASA strategy relative to EVA and the require-
ments to meet them are undergoing continuous analysis.
OPEN ITEI_ NASA support of development of necessary data to establish, with confi-
dence, what maximum stay in space should be.
STATU_ The maximum time which a person can stay in space has many complex varia-
bles. Major experiences with past EVA on the shuttle, i.e., retrieval of PAMD's with
spacecraft and the Leasat repair.., although they provide hard data, considerable
theoretical and laboratory analyses must still be performed in order to determine all of
the subject factors involved. Stay in space has to take into consideration the types of
effort being performed, physical capabilities (not only generic but individual personnel
characteristics), time already spent in space prior to EVA, consumables available,
associated equipment, etc. The progress of these analyses is directly related to the EVA
suit requirements definition efforts and is an ongoing activity.
2. Space Station
OPEN ITEM: Space Station ability to meet program objectives in a timely manner within
current budget allocations.
STATU_ NASA derived and documented a development plan that did meet the program
objectives within the Space Station budget presented to the Congress by the President.
The President requested $935M, $2,035M, and $2,756M for development for the next
three fiscal years. If Congress presents NASA with a Space Station budget that differs
from that requested by the President, obviously the development plan will be changed,
and the ability to meet program objectives in a timely manner might be compromised.
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OPEN ITEM: NASA should establish a small team composed of current and retired
NASA/contractor persons to define the management and technical lessons that can be
learned from the Space Shuttle program and applied to Space Station to preclude
missteps.
STATU_ NASA has formed an Advisory Committee within the NASA Advisory Council.
This committee, composed of distinguished representatives from NASA's contractor
community and from academia, will advise NASA on key management and technical
issues. There are retired NASA officials on the committee. In addition, NASA is form-
ing a National Research Council (NRC) Advisory Committee whose function will be to
focus on those crucial technical issues that are unique to the Space Station Program, and
to advise NASA as to the best approach in coping with these issues.
Co Space Transportation System (STS), letter from Dr. Fletcher to Joseph F. Sutter,
September 2, 1987.
i. ORBITER
a. Orbiter structural life certification
OPEN ITEM: An abbreviated conservative analysis should be documented to fulfill the
certification program.
STATU_ The Orbiter has completed the 6.0 loads analysis for the OV103 and subsequent
Orbiters and will complete an abbreviated analysis for OV102 where structural differen-
ces exist. The Design Requirements Review and the Design Certification Review for the
structure have been completed and trajectory constraints and day of launch wind condi-
tions have been specified and will not be exceeded. Additional activity includes the
trans-Atlantic abort certification and fatigue analysis scheduled for completion in FY
1989. Additionally, a structural inspection on OV103 has been completed, and a Periodic
Inspection and Maintenance Plan is in place for all Orbiters.
OPEN ITEM: It should be noted that a loads calibration program will not be conducted on
the Orbiter wing, but may be required if the flight results are questionable.
STAT[_ A strain gage program for OV102 has been approved for the next flight of
OV102, and a wing calibration is planned to be performed after the first return to flight
mission on OV102.
d. Brakes and Nose-Wheel Steering
OPEN ITEM: Redesign, tests, procurements still in process.
STATU_ The carbon brakes are currently in qualification, and the first flight hardware
is scheduled for delivery in September 1988. Additionally, a landing and deceleration
team was formed to review and make recommendations to increase safety margins. The
team recommended the addition of a drag chute and the resurfacing of the Kennedy
Space Center (KSC) runway. The runway resurfacing has been completed, and the drag
chute modification is in the approval cycle.
Design studies are underway to assess full redundancy architecture for Nose-Wheel
steering.
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2. STS Operations
a. Logistics and Launch Processing
OPEN 1TE_h KSC and Shuttle Processing Contractor (SPC) activities regarding burden
of work and flight rate.
STATU_ NASA continues to closely monitor the workload imposed by the baselined STS
flight rate. Manpower levels currently budgeted have been sized to assure that the
processing workload can be accomplished in a safe and efficient manner. Both NASA and
SPC management are adhering to the worker overtime policy outlined in Kennedy
Management Instruction (KMI) 1700.2. Both staffing and overtime data are reviewed by
top management on a weekly basis, and corrective measures are taken when required.
Do Space Transportation System, letter from Dr. Fletcher to Joseph F. Sutter,
September 2, 1987.
1. Shuttle Management
OPEN ITEM: Transfer of logistics responsibility from JSC to KSC; appropriate funding;
reduce LRU turnaround time.
STATU_ After the orbiter logistics responsibility transferred from JSC to KSC in late
June of 1986, KSC Orbiter Logistics Management reviewed and identified all spare
hardware requirements and authorized Rockwell International Corporation (RIC) to
complete the procurement process. In addition, KSC Logistics has prepared the Orbiter
Logistics Management and Budgetary Plan which has been forwarded to Congress. This
plan identifies the near- and long-term goals and objectives, management schedules, and
associated costs for correcting previous logistical problems and maintaining a high level
of supportability for Orbiter processing.
Orbiter Line Replaceable Unit (LRU) turnaround times have received, and continue to
receive, NASA management attention. Both KSC and NSTS management receive month-
ly status on LRU repair turnaround time. This high visibility, combined with the con-
tinued transition of Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) repair capabilities to the
Rockwell Service Center (RSC) Depot, will decrease turnaround times from their current
levels and increase KSC's direct control over repair activities.
OPEN ITEM: Consolidation and upgrading of data/information systems, particularly
configuration management and launch procedures.
STATU_ NASA and the SPC have been improving the data/information systems as
planned. The launch processing Problem Reporting And Corrective Action (PRACA)
system has been tied in with the Program Compliance Assurance Status System (PCASS)
and is currently transmitting daily reports to NSTS/JSC (PCASS). The existing Shuttle
Processing Data Management System (SPDMS I) is being consolidated and improved to
phase into the larger SPDMS II. For example, the software for the Auto-GOSS system,
which deals with the closed loop OMRSD/OMI procedures, is being rewritten to be more
transportable to SPDMS II. SPDMS II has been authorized by NASA, and the SPC has
issued RFP's and received bid proposals. An SPC Source Evaluation Board is now in the
evaluation process.
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OPENITEl_ Stretching of human resources at KSC (particularly overtime policy).
STATUS: The overtime policy established by the "KSC Maximum Work Time Policy"
(KMI 1700.2, dated May 13, 1987) cited in detail in NASA's response last year remains in
place. As Shuttle return to flight activities have increased, NASA management contin-
ues to adhere to this policy. Overtime data are reviewed weekly by the SPC and NASA.
NASA KSC operating Directorates are responsible for staffing, scheduling, and managing
overtime, with the KSC Director of Safety, Reliability and Quality Assurance responsible
for oversight.
OPEN ITE_I: Launch rate/manifest for Space Shuttle.
STATU_ In the current manifest (Payload Flight Assignments, NASA Mixed Fleet,
March, 1988), seven flights are planned in the first year of resumed operations, ten in the
second, and nine in the third. With the introduction of a fourth shuttle, the rates
increase to eleven and thirteen in the fourth and fifth years. These rates were estab-
lished by engineering and operational analysis in conjunction with the ongoing budget
planning. They are reassessed on a continuing basis in reaction to changing payload
requirements and annually as an integral part of the budget process.
NASA has assessed the payloads that are functionally suitable for launch on expendable
launch vehicles in terms of the availability and cost of ELV's and the cost and schedule
impacts on the affected programs. The result was a significant shift of payloads off the
shuttle. The March 1988 Mixed Fleet Manifest for flights through September 1993 shows
16 NASA and NOAA spacecraft previously planned for the shuttle being launched on
expendable launch vehicles. In addition, some 20 DOD payloads have been off-loaded to
ELV's.
2. Space Shuttle Systems
OPEN ITti2g_: Redesign of solid rocket motor, certification/verification for flight.
STATU_ The major certification tests for the redesigned SRM are two qualification
static firing tests (Qualification Motor 7 or QM7 and Production Verification Motor 1 or
PVM1), and one Transient Pressure Test Article (TPTA 2.2) test. The QM7 and the TPTA
2.2 tests are complete, and the test results are satisfactory. THE PVM1 firing is
scheduled for late August 1988 and will be completed prior to STS 26R launch. The
SRM/SRB Design Certification Reviews (DCR's) were completed with Level III on May
18-19,1988, Level I/II on June 78, 1988, and the AA Review on July 78, 1988.
OPEN ITEM: Provide funds to check OVI02 loads based on ASK A 6.0 analyses, check
other Orbiters,update Orbiter load indicatorskedlines,prepare reports.
STAT[J-_ Funds have been provided to verify OV102 certification to the 6.0 loads, and
this work is currently underway. Additional discussions associated with the OV102 loads
program are on page 12, as associated with the NASA responses to the ASAP 1987 find-
ings and recommendations.
OPEN ITEM: Orbiter 102 loads test program to calibrate strain gauges, etc.
STATUS: The program planning to instrument OV102 for obtaining strain gauge data to
verify loads analysis has been approved and will be implemented over the next several
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flights of OV102. OV102 wing calibration will be performed after the first return to
flight mission. Additional discussions associated with the OV102 loads program are on
page 12, as associated with the NASA responses to the ASAP 1987 findings and recom-
mendations.
OPEN ITEM: Panel recommends that SSME two-duct hot gas generator and large throat
combustion chamber be tested and certified as soon as possible.
STATUS: The two-duct hot gas manifold/large throat main combustion chamber (precurs
or engine) is assembled. The test series, which was to begin in the fourth quarter of CY
1987, has slipped to September of CY 1988. The delay is due to continued ground test
demonstration of critical operating failure mode margins of the engines, anal hot fire
acceptance testing of flight engines for STS flight resumption.
OPEN ITEM: NASA and SSME contractor continue development of improved methods of
demonstrating critical operating failure mode margins.
STATU_ NASA is continuing development of improved methods for actually demon-
strating critical operating failure mode margins and more rigorous risk assessment
analytical procedures. For demonstration of critical operating failure modes, an exten-
sive ground test program, including margin demonstration test (higher power level, longer
duration, and off nominal performance response), has been defined and is being per-
formed. Since the initiation of the extensive ground test program, subsequent to the
STS-51L accident, 182 cycles and 62,606 seconds have been accumulated on the SSME's.
OPEN 1TI_VI: Orbiter landing gear system; including brakes, nose-wheel steering, etc.
STATU_ The carbon brakes are in qualification, testing and the first flight hardware is
scheduled for delivery in September 1988. The carbon brakes will be installed at the
earliest possible time. The landing deceleration team recommended incorporation of a
drag chute and the resurfacing of the KSC runway. The runway surface has been com-
pleted and the drag chute modification is in the approval cycle. The Nose-Wheel
Steering System Redundancy Design Studies are underway to assess full redundancy
architecture for nose-wheel steering.
4. Safety, Reliability,Quality Assurance
OPEN ITEM: Development of operating policy for the new SRM&QA offices at Head-
quarters and at NASA centers.
STATIJF_ Each Center has established a SRM&QA Director who reports to the Center
Director. Within the SRM&QA organization exists a Safety Engineering function that is
responsible for implementation of the safety policies established by the Headquarters
organization, as well as those established by the Center organization. Over the past year
the Headquarters Safety Division has continued to develop and define the roles and
responsibilities of the various safety areas and disciplines within the Headquarters Safety
Division and at the Centers. While this is an ever-evolving procedure, significant pro-
gress has been made in the Systems Safety aspects of the STS, Space Station, and Pay-
load areas. The Associate Administrator (AA) for the Headquarters SRM&QA office,
Code Q, has implemented a Headquarters and Center SRM&QA Directors meeting/review
which takes place periodically, much in the same manner as the Program Office
Management Council meeting. This approach has had considerable results in the devel-
opment and the providing of operating policy.
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OPEN ITEM: Independent review of payload safety.
STATL_ Independent review of the inherent safety of payload components and analysis
of the safety implications of potential interactions between payloads has been continued
by the JSC and KSC Payload Flight and Ground Safety Panels. Additional emphasis has
been placed on this function by management at each of the centers, and is being sup-
ported by the various assigned payload safety engineers at the payload developing cen-
ters, as well as with additional emphasis and visibility within the Headquarters Safety
Division. A Payload Safety Subpanel has been established, chaired by Headquarters, to
provide an improved forum for discussion of payload safety related issues, development
of Agencywide policies for payload safety, and coordination of potential resolutions to
payload safety concerns of general and specific interest.
5. Space Station Program
OPENITI_I_ Use of ELV's.
STATU_ A transportation study by the Office of Space Flight and the Office of Space
Station considering the use of the STS and ELV's for the launch and assembly phase of
Space Station has been completed. The conclusion of the report was that ELV's were not
needed for that phase of the Space Station program. A study for the operational phase of
Space Station has now been initiated by the Office of Space Flight and the Office of
Space Station to examine:
(1) station logistics requirements for the use of ELV's;
(2) requirements on the Station logistics module design to be consistent with the use of
ELV's;
(3) station modifications required to accommodate ELV's; and
(4) station proximity operations requirementsto be consistent with the use of ELV's.
As the results of these analyses mature, the results will be factored into the mixed fleet
planning to assure availability of adequate transportation systems for the operational
phase.
OPEN ITEM: Crew safe haven and life boat, crew rescue.
STATU_ NASA agrees with the Panel that an assured crew return capability should be
provided for the Space Station crew, and as discussed on pages 20 and 21, studies have
begun to determine the most appropriate means of reaching this goal.
NASA studies to date have been restricted to the fundamental purpose of a CERV, and
three Design Reference Missions (DRM's) have been specified, all of which are compati-
ble with the recommendations:
(1) return or support of Space Station crew during interruption of STS launches;
(2) return or protection of Space Station crew from reasonable accidents or from
reasonable failures of Space Station systems; and
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(3) return or support of Space Station crew during reasonable medical emergencies.
Analyses are continuing, and several approaches which could satisfy the DRM's are being
considered; the CERV is one of those approaches. Each option considered is being
evaluated for its ability to meet the DRM's; its impact on the NSTS, the Space Station,
and expendable launch systems; and cost. The assured crew return capability for the
Space Station will impact several of the NASA's programs, and all facets must be consi-
dered in determining which is truly the most cost effective and reliable concept. As
stated, analyses are continuing and decisions will be documented relative to specific
basic requirements as they are agreed to between the program and technical elements
associated with the programs within NASA.
OPEN ITEM: Computer system's use of new developments; also use of 32 bit architec-
ture.
STATU_ As discussed on pages 19 and 20 and repeated here for continuity, provisions
have been made in the Space Station planning for upgrading computers and/or software
systems as improved technology permits. Our current planning on this subject is in two
areas. The first is our budget planning for the operational phase of the Space Station
Program (SSP) in which we are planning mainframe computer hardware and support
software replacement every 7 years and workstation replacement every 5 years.
The second area is establishing evolutionary requirements allowing the program the
flexibility to upgrade with advanced technology as it becomes available in the future.
We have requirements for the operational Space Station Information System which will
require a design to isolate applications software (both flight and ground) from the under-
lying computing system. This is to promote the migration of ground hardware and soft-
ware to the flight systems or from facility to facility, and to maximize the flexibility of
replacing the flight hardware, as required, during the life of the program. In addition,
the work packages have factored advanced automation requirements in their proposals.
As the Space Station design matures over the next year, the inclusion of these require-
ments into work package plans will happen as reviewed and as approved by program
management.
Relative to 32 bit architecture and a data bus baseline, the Space Station onboard Data
Management System (DMS) is designed for a RAD hard environment and employs current
state-of-the-art INTEL 80386 microchip technology. Provision has been made to upgrade
the system architecture as technological advances are made. Specifically, plans have
been made to utilized the INTEL 80486 chip set when it becomes available. The current
bus architecture employs MILSTD 1553 for slow speed (10 MHz) data transmission. This
interface is the same as is currently used in the F16 and B1. The American National
Standards Institute (ANSI) Fiber (optic) Distributed Data Interface (FDDI) standard for
all data transmission.
OPEN ITI.:M_ Use of lessons learned.
STATU_ A draft "lessons learned" document has been prepared. This document will
provide guidance to the Space Station Program to utilize applicable lessons learned from
the Shuttle 51L mishap. In addition, a newer concept is being explored to create a
"lessons learned" action item system in the form of a checklist, which will be tailored for
the type of program or system being developed and type of professional discipline
involved, and will require action to address the applicable lessons learned in the safety
analyses.
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6. NASA Aeronautics
OPEN ITEM: Modification of Grumman Aircraft as Space Shuttle flight simulators.
STATU_ JSC has purchased the aircraft for use as a shuttle trainer. Because the air-
craft is not required to support the shuttle manifest until the summer of 1991, modifica-
tions will not commence until mid 1989. In the mean time, we are considering a program
to continue turboprop research.
OPEN ITEM: X-Wing project flight test program. Other comments included under this
heading.
STATU_ OAST is developing a closeout plan for the X-Wing Program. Part of the plan
will be to document the results of the program through the first three flights which we
successfully conducted. This documentation will include lessons learned as recommended
by the ASAP.
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!C, PanelActivities-February1988-January1989
FEBRUARY
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
MARCH
0
0
0
0
0
FEBRUARY 5-6 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, SOLID ROCKET
MOTOR REDESIGN PANEL, WASHINGTON, DC
FEBRUARY 10 - CONGRESS, HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON SCIENCE,
TECHNOLOGY, AND SPACE (NELSON) DISCUSSIONS RE: SAFELY
RETURNING THE SHUTTLE TO FLIGHT STATUS (PREPARATION FOR
UPCOMING HEARINGS)
FEBRUARY 10 - DR. FLETCHER, DISCUSSIONS RE: USE OF
PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENTS
FEBRUARY 8-11 - AMES RESEARCH CENTER, AERONAUTICAL R&D
DISCUSSIONS
FEBRUARY 16 - US SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE
TECHNOLOGY AND SPACE, HEARING: RETURN TO
STATUS, WASHINGTON, DC
ON SCIENCE,
SAFE FLIGHT
FEBRUARY 17-18 - PROGRAM DIRECTORS MONTHLY REVIEW, OFFICE
OF SPACE FLIGHT, JSC, HOUSTON, TX
FEBRUARY 22 - LEVEL II 1/2 SSME BOARD MEETING, MSFC,
FEBRUARY 23-25 - COMPUTER HARDWARE/SOFTWARE, VALIDATION
AND VERIFICATION, JSC, HOUSTON, TX
MARCH 3-4 - LIFE SCIENCES ADVISORY COMMITTEE MEETING, NASA
HQ,
MARCH 9-11 - DESIGN CERTIFICATION REVIEW LEVEL I/II, LAUNCH
AND LANDING SYSTEMS, EXTERNAL TANK AND SSME, MSFC
MARCH 16 - ANNUAL STATUTORY MEETING WITH DR. FLETCHER,
MR. MYERS AND NASA SENIOR MANAGEMENT, NASA HQ,
MARCH 17 - PROGRAM DIRECTORS MONTHLY REVIEW, OFFICE OF
SPACE FLIGHT, NASA HQ
MARCH 22-23 - DESIGN CERTIFICATION REVIEW, KSC, FL
C-I
APRIL
MAY
JUNE
O MARCH 30-31 - NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, SOLID ROCKET
MOTOR REDESIGN PANEL, MORTON THIOKOL, UT
O
O
O
O
APRIL 6 - SPACECRAFT FIRE SAFETY MEETING, LEWIS RESEARCH
CENTER, OH
APRIL 12-14 - INTERCENTER AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS PANEL
MEETING, ATLANTA, GA
APRIL 21 - SPACE STATION RISK MANAGEMENT REVIEW, RESTON, VA
APRIL 25 - SPACE STATION PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS REVIEW
KICKOFF MEETING, RESTON, VA
O
O
O
O
O
MAY 2 - SPACE STATION PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS REVIEW,
RESTON, VA
MAY 3 - ROCKWELL, DOWNEY, CA, DISCUSSIONS RE: 6.0 LOADS AND
FACTORS OF SAFETY FOR 1.4 FOR IST FLIGHT
MAY 12-13 - SPACE STATION SAFETY SUMMIT, MSFC
MAY 12-14 - NRC SOLID ROCKET MOTOR REDESIGN PANEL, MORTON
THIOKOL
MAY 17 - SRM&QA INDEPENDENT WORKING GROUP MEETING, NASA
HQ
O
O
O
O
O
O
JUNE 6 - i) SPACE STATION SRM&QA DISCUSSIONS
2) ASSURED CREW RETURN CAPABILITY
3) STS-26 AND BEYOND - ASAP ASSESSMENTS
DALE MYERS
WITH
JUNE 7 - 1) SRM&QA ASSESSMENT WITH G. RODNEY
2) SPACE STATION ASSESSMENT WITH J. ODOM
3) ORBITAL DEBRIS BRIEFING
JUNE 9 - SRM&QA DISCUSSIONS WITH KOHRS, HARLAN, ET AL, JSC
JUNE 9 - STS/SRM&QA/TREND ANALYSIS DISCUSSIONS WITH
G. RODNEY
JUNE 13-14 - SPACE STATION DISCUSSIONS/RANGE SAFETY REVIEW,
KSC
JUNE 20-21 - SPACE STATION PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS REVIEW,
RESTON, VA
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JULY
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
AUGUST
0
0
SEPTEMBER
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
OCTOBER
O
O
O
JULY 6/LIQUID ROCKET BOOSTER, HQS BRIEFING
JULY 7-8 - SRM/SRB DESIGN CERTIFICATION REVIEW, KSC
JULY 11-13 - TEST READINESS REVIEW, KSC
JULY 11-1'3- SAE/AIAA JOINT PROPULSION CONFERENCE, BOSTON,
MA
JULY 14 - RISK MANAGEMENT REVIEW, HQS
JULY 18-21 - STS LOGISTICS SESSION, ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL,
DOWNEY, CA
JULY 22-23 - NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, SRB REDESIGN PANEL,
IRVINE, CA
AUGUST 1-5 - SPACE STATION SAFETY SUMMIT, OTTAWA, CANADA
AUGUST 9-10 - NUCLEAR SAFETY WORKING GROUP MEETING
(GALILEO/ULYSSES MISSION)
SEPTEMBER 6-7 - NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, SRB REDESIGN
PANEL, WASHINGTON. DC
SEPTEMBER 6 - AERONAUTICS REVIEW, LANGLEY
SEPTEMBER 7 - LEVEL IIISSME FRR, MSFC
SEPTEMBER 13/14 - STS-26 FLIGHT READINESS REVIEW
SEPTEMBER 20 - AERONAUTICS REVIEW, LANGLEY
SEPTEMBER 22 - SSME REVIEW, ROCKETDYNE, CANOGA PARK, CA
SEPTEMBER 28-29 - AEROSPACE MEDICINE ADVISORY COMMITTEE,
ALEXANDRIA, VA
OCTOBER 3-6 - AIAA SPACE LOGISTICS SYMPOSIUM, COSTA MESA, CA
OCTOBER 6-7 - RISK MANAGEMENT REVIEW (JSC/MSFC)
OCTOBER 18 - SPACE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM ORBITER &
INTEGRATION UPDATE, RI/DOWNEY
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OO
O
NOVEMBE R
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
DECEMBER
O
O
JANUARY
O
O
OCTOBER 19 - SPACECRAFT/PAYLOAD SAFETY, TRW/EL SEGUNDO,
CA
OCTOBER 20 - DRYDEN FLIGHT RESEARCH FACILITY
OCTOBER 27 - RISK MANAGEMENT DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA
HEADQUA RTE RS PE RSONNE L
NOVEMBER 1 - SPACECRAFT BATTERY WORKSHOP, GSFC
NOVEMBER i0 - JSC, COMPUTER SOFTWARE/HARDWARE VALIDATION
AND VERIFICATION SAIL 
NOVEMBER 15-16 - STS-27 FLIGHT READINESS REVIEW, KSC,
NOVEMBER 15-17 - AERONAUTICS ADVISORY COMMITTEE MEETING,
LaRC
NOVEMBER 17 - STS LOGISTICS/SHUTTLE PROCESSING REVIEW, KSC
NOVEMBER 21-23 - SPACE STATION SAFETY SUMMIT, NASA HWS
NOVEMBER 29/30 - AUTOMATION AND ROBOTICS SYMPOSIUM,
ARLINGTON, VA
NOVEMBER 30/DEC i, 2 - SPACE STATION AVAILABILITY WORKSHOP,
RESTON, VA
DECEMBER 6-7 - NASA HQS, MEETINGS WITH NSTS, SSFP AND DR.
FLETCHER AND MR. MYERS, CONGRESS, SPACE STATION, SRM&QA
DECEMBER 13 - ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL, DOWNEY, CA STS-27
DATA REVIEW
JANUARY 18-20 - ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL
JANUARY 24-27 - NSTS INTEGRATED LOGISTICS ACTIVITIES AT KSC
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D, ImprovementsRecommendedforSpaceShuttleElements
The following improvements to the STS elements are recommended for study to
ascertain whether they can truly enhance flight and ground safety, and if so, the
advisability of implementing such improvements based on prioritizing them regarding
safety enhancement and associated cost, schedule and performance impacts. These lists
were obtained from NASA centers (JSC, KSC, MSF C) and their prime contractors.
MSF C
A. Solid Rocket Motor (SRM)
1. Submitted Changes
Description
Locking feature for nozzle leak
leaking check port plugs
Design and fabricate foam
core systems tunnel
2. Recommended Changes
Description
One-piece case stiffener rings
Non-asbestos motor insulation
Redesign of forward segment grain
to permit direct removal of core
Molded, one-piece o-ring from
from second source
Nozzle Modifications
Aft exit cone ply angle
New high strength nozzle adhesives
Lightning protection enhancement,
case, nozzle
Modify cowl vent holes to prevent
plugging by slag
Remarks
Reliability
Flight Safety
Reliability
Remarks
Flight Safety
Reliability
Health Safety
Ground Safety
Reliability
Reliability
Reliability
Safety
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Incorporate new elastomer and
adhesives in flex bearing
More flex boot interply vent holes
to avoid exclusion of the vents by
contacts with fixed housing
So External Tank
Description
Plasma arc welding on nine additional weld assemblies
Elimination of non-self-locking standard length thread inserts
Revise design and installation of cable attach clips on LH2 fwd & aft domes
GH2 pressurization line composite fairing
Changes Recommended by Contractor
Description
Add a sensor/monitor device to the facility side of the GUCA to detect a leaking
vent valve (GH2)
C. Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME)
SSME Areas of Future Emphasis
Description
HPOTP
Alternate turbopump development
Bearing modifications and improvements
Bearing and cage improvements
Blade optimization
HPFTP
Alternate turbopump development
Bearing and cage improvements
Sheet metal reduce cracking
Blade improvements - improved Mar-M and single crystal
LPTOP
Bearing improvements
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Engine Systems
Elimination of preburner pops
MFV valve leakage and preburner valve(s) operating improvements
Combustion Devices
Two duct manifold development
External HEX
Large throat main combustion chamber (Technology Test Bed evaluation only
effort currently authorized)
Single tube heat exchanger
Avionics and Controls
Block II controller
Addition of FASCOS (active redline)
Hot gas sensor improvement (thermocouple)
NOTE: Several producibility items not included
D. Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) Assembly
Recommended Changes
Description
Implementation of parachute ripstops to improve reliability of the deceleration
system.
Adaption of an improved APU turbine wheel.
Addition of a radar tracking beam on each SRM to enhance tracking.
Use of booster trowelable ablative (BTA) as component of the thermal protection
system. Eliminates use of MTA-1 which contains a carcinogen.
Implementation of a TVC pod which would enhance both TVC system safety and
reliability.
Implementation of biasing at the holddown post/mobile launch platform interface to
increase the aft skirt ultimate factor of safety.
Redesign of multiplexer/demultiplexer (MDM) to eliminate obsolete components.
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Orbiter Vehicles
*1.
*2.
*3.
"4.
5.
"6.
.
.
.
10.
11.
"12.
13.
Structural beef-up of the Tail section, wings, aft fuselage, mid-body/landing gear
area. All of these to enhance safety and ability to meet wider flight envelopes
and environments.
Auxiliary Power Units (APUs) continue to upgrade so that those items classed as
critically 1 and 1R can be shown to have an extremely low probability of
occurrence. Metal parts cracking, seals (such as carbon face seals), overspeed
control are examples.
Nose wheel steering redundancy (hydraulics, electrical_ontrols).
Elimination of the problems associated with the use of Kapton wire.
Upgrading of the brake system to eliminate landing failures.
Upgrade of the main (currently 17-inch) hydrogen and oxygen valves between
Orbiter and External Tank. Eliminate and/or reduce probability of failures of
any kind during ascent flight.
Upgrade valves and pressure regulators throughout the Main Propulsion System
to eliminate leakage and assure proper closing and opening to meet the
demanding requirements of the Space Shuttle Main Engine operations.
This also applies to the Reaction Control System (RCS) and Orbital Maneuvering
System (OMS)... see item 7 above.
Upgrade the ET/Orbiter umbilical door retention/release latch mechanism, door
drive torque limiters on the motors.
TPS outer tile study to determine modifications based on flight data with
objective of reducing tile weight (overall), attempt to reduce the number of
unique tiles, provide carrying plates with reinforced carbon-carbon (R C C) in lieu
of tiles where they are damaged on every flight.
Increase avionics and software reliability.., this is abroad spectrum of items
looking at those pieces of hardware that are the most safety critical to increase
reliability and the enhanced testing of software to eliminate possible "bugs" that
can bite you during critical phases of the mission.
Crew escape systems improvements which cover as much of the mission profile
as possible. These are either in addition to current methods/thoughts or new
items.
Enhance the safety of the Remote Manipulator System (built by the Canadiens)
such as preventing joint-runaway which can damage the Orbiter.
* In process or under review
D-4
14.
17.
Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU= space suit) enhancements to assure safety of
the crew when doing EVA tasks.
RCS nozzle enhancements to prevent material burn-through.
A further study to determine hardware and software modifications that would
reduce the number of launch commit criteria and launch constraints and reduce
their limits (that is widen them) without affecting safety but increasing
probability of launch.
Examine the Orbiter systems to ascertain possibility of adding redundancy
enhancements in safety critical areas.
E. KSC
Description
1.
2.
Hypergol exhaust fans control - HMS
Resolution of safety and documentation issues on Westinghouse
Brazing/Debrazing equipment
3. Install remote CNTL lockout switch
4. MMH, N2H4, NH3 flammable concentration detection cart upgrades
5. Hoist design discrepancies
6. Fire detection/protection for quality tair vans
7. Him "A" card failure - restart command for compressors A & B - Him 237
8. Him "A" card failure - GH2 fire detector remote test command
9. Him "A" card failure - GH2 fire detector remote test command
10. Him "A" cards failure - restart commands for compressors A & B - Him 152
11. Equipment access ramp HB-3 South 10th floor to D-Roof
12. Add platform beneath 186' LVL and method to remove static lanyard cable
without removing cable sheave
13. Relocate emergency showers/remove copper plumbing
14. General paging to ESA (3R18)
15. Install paging/area warning system, LC-39 FFD work locations
16. Upgrade flammable concentration detector cart
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17. Provide accessplatform with handrails
18. SSMEheat shields & LRU handling
19. LH2 horiz drain line leak (Ref: SYO-0815-001-001)
20. Platform inadequate for handling BI-POD strut fixtures
21. FCSS LH2 hazardous warning system
22. Requirement to heat treat secondary P/L support fittings to control stress
corrosion
23. Modify vertical motion system
24. Payload Bay Bridge and Bucket System Mods
25. Payload Bay Bridge and Bucket System Mods
26. Payload Bay Bridge and Bucket System Mods
27. Payload Bay Bridge and Bucket System Mods
28. Payload Bay Bridge and Bucket System Mods
29. Payload Bay Bridge and Bucket System Mods
30. Remove ECP/ESP after hoisting system failure
31. OPF target track antenna safing
32. Improve hyper storage tank relief valve protection
33. 30 ton bridge cranes safety lines, handrails and screening mod
34. OPF firex diesels compressed air manual bypass
35. Modification of C70-1226 cabin leak test unit
36. Flow switches
37. OPF scrubbers upgrade (fuel & oxidizer)
38. PGHM LRU platform hoist system modification
39. Over pressure piping connections, sound suppression 36" J pipe replacement
40. Eliminate safety hazard in the RSS hoist machinery room
41. Fix deformed pin hole on lower release mechanism of MLP/TSM
42. Fixed toxic vapor detectors
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43. Move FD's to different HIM's
44. HWS-OMBUU gas sampling
45. Pneumatic control valves leak air
46. LC-39 MLP-zero level water spray for hydrazine spill fire protection
47. Authorization & calibration of Raymond Engineering Inc. bolt gage PDX
934
48. OAA critical single failure points
49. OAA critical single failure points
50. FCSS HAZ warning DC power module redundancy
51. MLP HAZ warning DC power module redundancy
52. Removal of wire mesh from SRM segment bottom covers S/N 13 through 24
covers only
53. 3-ton and 5-ton cranes not acceptable for operation, K6-1547
54. Inadequate purge air supply at OPF
55. E-1 HPOTP support beam
56. Elimination of HOSIT critical single failure points
57. Connect 02 sensor to audible/visual alarm in hallway
58. Removal of wire mesh from SRM segment bottom covers S/N 13 through 24
covers only
59. OPF breathing air system
60. Upgrade orbiter emergency alarm system
61. Resolution of safety and documentation issues on Lepel brazing/debrazing
equipment
62. Mod PGHM support beams as a result of stress analysis
63. Mod stairs, side 4, PCR
64. Provide remote stop capability on (4) 400 AMP receptacles
65. Upper hinge platform
66. Provide emergency AC power to hydrogen leak detector vacuum pumps
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67. Removalof wire meshfrom SRMsegmentbottom coversS/N 13 through 25
coversonly
68. ModPGHMsupport beamsasa result of stress analysis
69. Trolley accessladdersfor 200-ton cranes
70. OMRF low bay roof safety railing
71. C-hookstorage, OPFHB-1 & HB-2
72. OAA white roomsafety lanyard attachment point structural deficiency
73. Elimination of GN2 from GO2 panel
74. Heating, ventilating and air conditioning (HVAC), OPF
75. HIM redundancy for F CSS leak and fire detectors and vacuum pumps
76. Provide safe access to hammerhead crane machine room
77. Provide safe access to hammerhead crane machine room
78. Eliminate critical one-step commands
79. Platform crossover area needs to be relocated
80. Add ARM/execute command to fuel OX hyper storage tank vent valve
81. SRB AFT skirt GN2 purge panel redundant pressure transducer
82. PCR/canister lightning policy impact
83. Critical helium purge for the hydrogen vent stack at LC-39 pads A & B
84. HIM "A" card review problem
85. Replacement of firex water pumps/motors at pad-A & pad-B
86. Replacement of firex water pumps/motors at pad-a & pad-B
87. Resolution of HIM "A" card review problems
88. VAB extensible platform life lines and tie OFFS
89. VAB vertical door panel life lines
90. Fab/install remote cables & readout distribution box
91. Target track antenna (TTA) rotational limits
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94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
lO0.
lO1.
i02.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
Provide low flow purge air capability
Platforms AP 48, 50 and 93 to provide sufficient working area for SRB
inspection and measurements
Modification to Diver Operated Plug (D.O.P.)
Redesign pressure monitor port fitting stackup on the 8" VJ F/H
Eliminate LPS single failure points in the hypergol vapor detection system
Modify area warning system to provide control for new areas individually
Modify area warning system to provide control for new areas individually
Complex F area warning
Sample rate change for critical GLS functions
Backup HAZ gas detection system for firing rooms #2 and #4
Paging and public address system
ET LO2/LH2 monitor/pressurization system
Modify the design and expedite activation of the TPS P/AW system
Communication system support for PHSF service bay and control building
Install LH2 leak detector at 8" T-O LH2 flex hose connection
Make the 17" QD fire & temp detectors permanent LPS monitored SYS &
upgrade the egress route
Provide locking device for LRU extendible platform
Flow switches
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